# The World Today*

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When I was a little boy my mother used to assure me that to be elected a senator of the United States was to reach the summit of human achievement. Since, however, she had married a Scotsman, resident in England, I was never able to see how it would be possible for me to realize such an ambition. Nevertheless, if she were alive today, I think she would have drawn ample reward from the spectacle of her son being honored as a former prime minister of Britain by the authorities of Columbia University, and invited to address so distinguished and notable an assembly as is gathered here. She would have felt a glow of legitimate pride at an event which so happily linked the country of her adoption wih the country of her birth.

But this was not the only lesson which I learnt from my mother. I used to listen with rapt attention to her stories of her childhood in what was then—I am speaking of nearly 120 years ago—the distant and pioneering region of the Middle West. Even my memories go back nearly seventy years, when children received their first teaching at their mother's knee.

These early recollections, followed by a close connection with my mother's homeland during all the years of my life, and

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strengthened by the comradeship of two wars, have constituted my "special relationship" with the United States. Such a phrase, I know, is out of fashion now. But so long as the English-speaking peoples cherish the same traditions of liberty and honor; so long as they are bound together by the same great literature, enjoy the same common law, and share the glorious story of their race, no changes or chances of political fortune can alter the fundamental facts of history.

## I

It is one of the compensating advantages of old age that when the daily stress of urgent action, or at least what passes for action, is removed, an opportunity for reflection follows.

When after my retirement I began to record my memories of the age through which I had lived, one theme soon came to dominate my thoughts—that my contemporaries and I had witnessed a period of change more swift, more total, and in some ways more disconcerting than at any time in the world's history. We grew up in a secure world, knowing it was imperfect but believing that a gradual and steady evolution would, if we seized our opportunities, set right the wrongs we saw around us. Dimly we realized the changes that must come. But we were unprepared for the sudden leap into an era—not of evolution but of revolution—into which two world wars were so violently to propel us.

First, we have had the technological revolution. We have passed, within my life-time, from the horse-and-buggy age to that of the motor-car, the airplane, and—alas— the nuclear bomb.

Secondly, we have had, in almost every part of the world, the social revolution. In many countries it has happily come about, in spite of stresses and imperfections, without disorder. In others it has been the cause of violent and bloody conflicts. Yet everywhere the old social structure has passed or is passing away—a new society is being born.

Thirdly, we have had the political revolution. Since the end of the Second World War, the old imperial systems have disappeared. Many independent nations have sprung up, with varying prospects and fortunes, from their ashes. This has involved the relative weakening of Europe and European power and prestige and the rise of two great colossi, the United States and Russia—so

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different in purpose and way of life—which now "bestride the narrow world." A new, and precarious, balance of power has taken the place of the old.

## II

This, then, is the world with which we find ourselves faced today. Its more recent developments could scarcely have been foreseen by the founders of the United Nations Organization. Mindful of the two great defects that destroyed the old League of Nations—its impotence and the absence from its membership of the most powerful state in the world—the founders of the UN were determined that it should be both comprehensive (including not only wartime allies and neutrals, but ex-enemies, too) and clothed with real authority. It was not merely to talk; it was to act. There was to be a General Assembly and a Security Council. The Assembly would discuss and deliberate; and advise. It would be consultative and not executive. It would recommend and pass declarations, but take no action. For this it would look to the Security Council, which would investigate and settle any disputes, by persuasion or, if necessary, by force. This, indeed, was a widely different concept from that of the old League of Nations. To emphasize the reality of power, elaborate arrangements were to be made for the setting up of a military force to which all members, in accordance with Article 43, were to make contribution. The following articles envisaged a military staff to discuss plans and, if necessary, conduct operations. This staff was clearly based upon the system of the Combined Chiefs of Staff which had served the Allied governments during the war. The Security Council itself was to represent genuine power. It was to consist of the United States, Britain, Soviet Russia, China; to which was soon to be added France. These were the Great Powers and the permanent members. They were the inner core, the true source of power and strength. The new authority was based upon the great war alliance against nazism and fascism which it was hoped to carry into the years of peace. From its success in this fundamental duty all the other beneficent activities of the United Nations—in health, in aid, in education—were to flow.

It is true that the Security Council was enlarged, but not necessarily strengthened, by six additional states, to be elected for

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two-year periods, thus creating a kind of microcosm of the Assembly. This may or may not have been a wise development. But in any case it did not override the validity of the original plan.

What, then, went wrong? The process of disintegration began very soon. What went wrong was the Russian aggression in Central and Eastern Europe, beginning with Poland, Hungary, and other neighboring states and ending in what we Western people called the rape of Czechoslovakia. It was because of this that Churchill issued his great appeal in the Fulton speech in 1946, a speech ill-received by a great body of opinion both in your country and mine, regarded by many as unduly pessimistic, even hysterical, but in reality wise and timely. He succeeded. In contrast to his role of Cassandra in the interwar years, his warnings were not disregarded. In due course the North Atlantic Alliance came into being. This splendid enterprise, largely inspired and supported by American statesmen, undoubtedly halted any fresh aggression and preserved the world's peace. It may perhaps be argued that during the period when the West alone held the dreaded secret of nuclear weapons, peace was maintained by the overwhelming superiority of the United States and Britain. It may equally be argued that since the Russians obtained the weapon, peace has been kept not by the superiority of one group over the other but by equality of fear. Nevertheless, the creation of NATO was the turning point in history.

These events, involving the polarization of power into two great and hostile groups, shattered the new concept of the United Nations as completely as the League of Nations was destroyed by the rise of nazism and fascism between the wars.

It is true that by ingenious contrivances, partly arising from the absence of Russia from the Security Council at a vital moment and the temporary lapse of her veto, partly from the method by which the Assembly acquired some of the authority which the Security Council in its hopeless division failed to use, some semblance of unity was preserved. By the famous "Uniting for Peace" resolution of the Assembly, the Korean War was given at least the appearance of an operation supported by the nations of the world. Nevertheless, the reality of the structure has been destroyed and the purposes of its founders negatived by the fatal split between the Communist and the free world.

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Let us consider for a moment the effect of this upon the group of so-called "unaligned" powers, ranging from large territories like India to smaller countries. These nations, through the collapse of the great empires and the failure of the United Nations to set up an effective world authority in their place, have now found themselves in a delicate position. They are weak from the economic and military point of view. They can only improve their position if they show sufficient ingenuity to exploit both the contending groups. This has been particularly true in the field of civil and military aid.

It is true that some of this aid is distributed by international bodies such as the World Bank. Yet it must be remembered that since these agencies are boycotted by the Communist countries, in the context of the great division of the world into rival camps the difference is not great between unilateral aid and that distributed by agencies only supported by countries of the free world.

It would be disingenuous to assert that all programs of aid are purely charitable in their character. It would be equally unfair to deny that a great part of them had no other purpose than the elevation and improvement of conditions. Yet, whether with or without strings, aid is inevitably thought of as an instrument in the great contest. Sometimes uncommitted or unaligned nations have told us, almost in as many words, that unless they receive to the extent they require and under financial conditions of their own choice large assistance for the carrying out of a favorite project—the building of a dam or the diversion of a river or the erection of a plant—they will turn not the other cheek but the other ear. It is soon hinted that what Washington may not be willing to concede may be more readily forthcoming in Moscow. Hence the almost ridiculous spectacle of the two leading powers in the world, in spite of all their strength and wealth, being harried and, if it were not too harsh a word, almost blackmailed by the uncommitted nations, great and small.

To you and us the story is only too familiar. "Help us," they cry; "finance us, feed us, arm us, for if you don't, we'll join the other side." If this is their appeal to the leaders of the free world, it is not difficult to guess what they are saying to the Communist authorities.

These endless processions to Moscow are not mere pilgrimages

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of devotees. They are not even composed of genuine seekers for enlightenment in the doctrines of Marxism and Leninism. In each case, whether visiting Moscow or Washington, the motives are purely practical. They are looking for Works, not Faith. The Great Powers seem disposed to distribute charity; so there are plenty of clients. Since there are two rival groups in the business, it should not be too difficult to keep them up to the mark.

Troublesome and often distasteful as this situation has become on the civil side, in the military sphere it is more dangerous, and of more questionable morality. I remember the days when the manufacturers of armaments were denounced in my country, and in yours, as engaged in a wicked trade. "Merchants of death," they were called. Now it is not merely a question of private dealing. The governments themselves have entered the field of armament exports in a big way. No doubt, as in other forms of manufacture, the unit cost can be cut down and overheads reduced by sales at nominal or cut rates—dumping, it might be called. Alternatively, the profit can be taken not in cash, but in credit, by attracting the receiving country to our side. Of course, in building up NATO and the other alliances, such assistance in one form or another was justified and effective. But military aid has often been sadly misused. Indeed, we had recently the tragic sight of two nations, part of one great subcontinent—India and Pakistan—fighting each other with sophisticated weapons provided by their friends in Britain and America for very different purposes. Indeed, we may both unwittingly have assisted this unhappy conflict—almost civil war—between these brothers and neighbors.

To many it is a tragic thought that in the very parts of the world where peace is most insecure, frantic armament is going on of combatants recently at war and likely again to be at each other's throats. Russian arms, American arms, French arms, British arms are sought with desperation, either for money or for influence. Yet we know in our hearts that their object is not to support any defensive or stabilizing alliance. Their purpose is that the small powers can have a go at each other. As soon as one set of arms is destroyed or captured, another set is rapidly made available. And so the sorry tale goes on. For many years, America, Britain, and France exercized a joint control of arms for Middle Eastern countries, in the hope of at least maintaining a fair bal-

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ance. Since Russia entered the field, the last remnant of any common plan has disappeared. Thus, as part of the great East-West competition, we multiply the flash points of the world and consume in armaments resources that could have been invested for prosperity and for posterity.

## III

Twenty years have passed since NATO was launched. We were certainly wise to follow Churchill's vigorous lead at Fulton in the circumstances of the time. But I often ask myself what would be the advice which he would give now, twenty years later. I have no right to put words into his mouth or even to suggest what course of action he might now recommend. Yet I feel sure that he, with his usual prescience, would be trying to attune his thoughts to the actual facts and to frame his recommendations in their light.

It may well be that we have all along underestimated the depth of the wounds from which Soviet Russia suffered. First, in those frightful years before the war when Stalin, in what seems now a mood of maniacal frenzy, murdered vast numbers of the leading men in Russia in every sphere, administrative, political, and military. Second, by the German invasion with all its destructive brutality. With these experiences Russia's policies have been dominated by distant recollections of Napoleon's invasion in 1812 and recent bitter memories of Hitler's invasion of 1941. The Russian people, as fervently as those who hold the strings of power, are determined that they should never be repeated. There is a curious and illuminating account in Churchill's history of the war of a talk which he and Roosevelt had with Stalin. "All of us," declared Stalin, "want to secure peace for at least fifty years. The greatest danger is conflict among ourselves because if we remain united the German menace is not very important. Therefore we must now think how to secure our unity in the future, so that the great powers will maintain a united front." We all know the sequel.

Nothing can justify the Russian aggression in Europe in the years following the war. But perhaps it can be explained more by fear than greed, more by the fixed desire for military security than by an apostolic fervor to spread the Communist faith. It is quite

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true that communism in the early stages of the Russian Revolution was the creed of a fanatical group for which many people in Russia were prepared to suffer in the belief that they were somehow assisting the journey to the Promised Land. But fifty years have passed, and with it have come many changes of mood and method. Of course, Russia being so vast and primitive a country, everything has taken longer to work out. France passed rapidly through the early phase of the Revolution and with the death of Robespierre the terror ended. It took only half a decade. In Russia it has taken almost half a century. But although struggles for power have often been represented as struggles for principle, I think we would be wrong in attributing to a people, or their leaders, the same emotions after two generations of revolution which inspired them at the beginning. In China, of course, we see the early stages, the volcano erupting with wild and uncontrolled energy. No doubt as the generations pass the first heat of the lava streams will begin to cool. But, alas, not yet. In China time moves even more slowly than in Russia.

Yet, in due course, a revolutionary and ecstatic creed may sober down into something like orthodoxy. The revolution in Russia was fifty years ago. But I remember during a trip as early as 1932 being struck by how rapidly what seemed to me most monstrous became thought of as almost respectable. I was paying a visit to a school, where I was courteously received by a rather formidable-looking headmistress, a caricature of a Victorian schoolmarm—short hair, pince-nez, and a rather disapproving expression. I raised some points about the curriculum, which she answered clearly and with obvious pride in the progress of her school. I ventured to ask how they began the school day. She looked at me with amazement, as if I had asked an impudent or indecent question, and replied: "Why of course, we begin the day with the anti-religious lesson." The way in which she said this was just as if I had asked such a question in a Church school in England, and received an appropriate rebuke: "Why of course, with Prayers."

Russia has naturally used communism as a convenient instrument for spreading her influence just as we on our side have similarly used the principles of freedom. But the Russian rulers have never hesitated to take a pragmatic view of varying situations. May it not be that those who now guide Russia after so many tur-

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moils—Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev—have now passed through the early stages of the terror and moved into a more normal, even constitutional, dare I say bourgeois, approach? Certainly, things in Russia can never be the same again since February 1956, and the notorious attack on Stalin and his murderous tyranny. In any event, as a former prime minister I took great comfort in the circumstances in which Mr. Khrushchev lately left office. He was not liquidated; he was not even sent to a prison camp or appointed to a distant embassy or consulship. His retirement followed conventional lines. He was very properly rewarded with a pension, a dacha in the country, and an apartment in the center of Moscow. Perhaps the only drawback was that Mr. Molotov is said to have been allotted the apartment immediately above. But, seriously, all this marks a real advance.

Of course, if we believe that the apostolic flame of Marxist doctrine still burns in the hearts and minds of the rulers of Russia with undiminished intensity, and that their sole purpose is still to bring about a world revolution—a universal communism under Sino-Soviet auspices—why then there is nothing to be done. We must just stick it out. We know, of course, that some day all the horrible things that have been done in the name of communism and social revolution will seem as extraordinary and incredible as the tortures inflicted by Christian people upon each other in the wars of religion. Some day the wheel will turn, and in Lord Acton's noble phrase, "the individual soul become more sacred than the State." Our difficulty is to assess the position today. Some progress has clearly been made. May it not be that communism has ceased in the mind of the Kremlin to be a matter of pure principle? Has it not become a convenient instrument of defense or aggression, as the case may be, in the struggle for power? Has the natural evolution of which I have spoken already softened the picture which seemed so menacing twenty years ago? And have not other events served to turn Russian eyes eastward rather than westward, in anxiety rather than in satisfaction?

You will remember that at Dumbarton Oaks China was to be a founder member of the Security Council as one of the Great Powers. China—or the fragment into which she has dwindled—still sits there, in oriental and insular passivity. But the real China—continental China—while it can be legally regarded as non-exist-

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ent, cannot really be ignored. Indeed, it is the country all of us are thinking about all the time. And this doesn't just go for Americans or Britons. It goes—perhaps still more anxiously—for Russians, too.

We are all involved in this, whether we like it or not. The social revolution in China, in its wild and turbulent phase, has set up internal and external pressures which affect the whole world. It is not just America, but Britain, and more urgently the Commonwealth countries of Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia. India, too, has plenty of reasons to fear the future, based on bitter experience of Chinese aggression. Russia is perhaps the most threatened of all. For she has meanwhile become almost a satisfied power—one of the "have's" not one of the "have-nots"—in a sense, a conservative power. Napoleon said of China, "There lies a sleeping giant —do not wake him." But he has woken now, and I am sure that Moscow would prefer that Peking should still be slumbering.

It should be remembered that the great ideological dispute, which developed in recent years between Moscow and Peking, was based not merely on pedantic discussions as to the true interpretation of Marxism. In the course of this quarrel, Mao Tse-tung did not hesitate to remind Khrushchev that large areas of Siberia, including Vladivostok, had been ceded to a strong Russia "by a weak China in a series of weak treaties under the Tsars." From such a source these are menacing words.

I harp still upon the Russian aspect, although I well know that for the moment it is the problem of China and Southeast Asia which fills your thoughts. It would be impertinent for me to do more than express my deep sympathy for your government and people in your anxieties, and to express my admiration for your determination to prevent aggression and defend liberty in Asia as well as in Europe. I can only wish that in the planning and execution of policy the British government could have been more closely associated. Nevertheless, individual friendships are drawn closer than ever in these troubled times.

There are no doubt many who will say that, until the Vietnam problem has been resolved, and some form of agreement reached, whether restricted to Vietnam or extended to neighboring states, no progress can be made. I am not persuaded that this is true. The

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solution of the Asian problem could well be the fruit and not the precondition of a new and determined effort to reach agreement with Soviet Russia.

Since under Khrushchev Soviet policy began to accept the principle of coexistence and the need for some kind of stability in the world, the search for a *détente* has been long and arduous.

The first sign of a more flexible mood was the acceptance of the Austrian Treaty in 1955. The Geneva Conferences, if they achieved no tangible result, did produce a better spirit. Then things hung fire. There have been many ups and downs. When in 1959 I thought a new attempt should be made, my Western friends accepted my decision to visit Moscow with varying degrees of sympathy or resignation. President Eisenhower was willing that I should do my best and wished me luck; General de Gaulle was not enthusiastic (his policy has since developed); Dr. Adenauer was suspicious. Yet following on the Summit Conferences at Geneva, which had at least broken the ice, my visit as prime minister certainly prepared the way for further progress.

My visit to Russia and that of Khrushchev to the United States, and the summoning of a new Summit conference at Paris in 1960, raised high hopes. If it was to end, or rather begin, in a tragic failure, this was due to bad luck rather than to evil intent. Perhaps also we did not realize the risks that the Russian leaders were taking in agreeing to the meeting, and the pressures that were put upon Khrushchev as the result of the U2 incident, which the President did not disclaim. We have long been too prone to attribute to Stalin's successors the same degree of autocratic power which the great dictator enjoyed.

There followed the Cuba crisis, which was perhaps an impulsive gamble of Khrushchev to obtain a spectacular advantage. Handled with consummate skill by President Kennedy, this bold adventure failed. It may well be that this dangerous enterprise was held against Khrushchev and was one of the reasons for his fall. If so, that is a good sign. In any case, in spite of many frustrations, there has been a sense of a greater realism in Russian policy, both internally and externally. Inside Russia, people of all ranks of life are more relaxed. They no longer fear the knock on the door, or the other signs of the terror. Outside, there has been a growing ex-

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change of ideas, of books, of culture, and of science. The rule of the party machine remains unchanged. But the intelligentsia are growing in authority, or at least in daring.

Moreover, all the attempts based upon orthodox revolutionary policy to use communism as an instrument to spread power throughout the world have really failed. In Indonesia, there has been a shattering counterrevolution, horrible and cruel, but effective and conclusive. In the Middle East, the Russian position is not a happy one. Indeed, it is worth noticing that it is only in countries bordering Russia, where they have been able directly to threaten military action, that communism has been spread or maintained by forcible means. Yugoslavia resisted and Tito inflicted a wounding rebuff to the all-powerful Stalin. At the same time, a greater degree of flexibility, self-assertion, and national feeling has spread to many of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, still under Communist suzerainty.

I believe, therefore, that the time is ripe and the conditions encouraging for a new attempt at genuine discussions. If the United States were to give the lead, I am certain Great Britain and the countries of Western Europe would welcome a new initiative. The Russians have been checked in the West; their policies have not been happy in the Middle East; they look with growing anxiety to the Far East. There are many reasons why they, too, should welcome a *rapprochement* with America and the West.

I am persuaded that the present rulers of Russia have adopted Khrushchev's policy of consolidation, just as he himself adopted it from Malenkov. The test-ban treaty was only a symbol, but it was important. More significant has been the firm refusal to give any nuclear assistance to China. There are, I know, at the present time approaches by your government aiming at a non-proliferation agreement. I do not believe that they will be successful unless a broad negotiation can be begun, covering the real issue. The real issue is a determination to cooperate, inside and outside the United Nations, for the tranquilization of the world.

After all, both Russia and America and their allies have much to gain. Vast expenditure on maintaining the old and developing the new methods of destruction and defense put an almost intolerable pressure upon the economies even of the Great Powers. The American economy is so strong that you, no doubt, can stand it,

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although you would be glad to transmute much of this warlike effort into peaceful uses. But on Russia the burden is even greater. Vast fields of enterprise and effort stretch out before the Russian people and their rulers—to raise the standard of living by increasing the economic strength and developing the resources of their huge territories. If Russia could agree, in addition, not to waste her efforts upon a sinister and unremunerative rivalry in arming the unaligned nations; if Russia could revert to the aims that all the allies at the end of the war accepted, an illimitable field of growing prospects would open to the Russian people. Surely this may well, after fifty years, seem more attractive than the pursuit of a world revolution in which they scarcely believe. The gains for the free world, and not least for the developing nations, need no elaboration.

## IV

How is this to be done? By a return to the United Nations structure as it was meant to be, with a Security Council armed with military strength and a joint military staff, and acting to preserve peace among all nations. In such a system, the Assembly would fall into the place which was first designed for it, and all the various procedural methods, by which it has attempted to engross an authority to which it is not entitled, would cease. But this cannot come about by minor or even major rectifications—resolutions to abolish the veto or constitutional amendments carried through the Assembly. It can come about by one means only, by a new effort for direct agreement between the principals—the Great Powers. Then, and then only, can the United Nations, either in its present state or in a reformed state, carry out its task. But what matters is not the constitutional structure, but the will. The Great Powers must, therefore, resume this position with which they were entrusted after the Second War. They must become in a true sense, the Concert not of Europe, but of the world. Their slogan might well run, by a minor adaptation of a famous or infamous cry: "Great Powers of the World Unite!"

What chance is there of success? Greater in my view than cynics would admit or even many optimists venture to assert. Human nature being what it is, agreements among nations, as between individuals, can be reached either by a mutual affection or a common

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interest. Twenty years have passed since Russian aggression—whatever its motive—brought America and the nations of Western Europe into a firm military alliance. The whole balance has since been changed. The Russian revolution is fifty years old; the explosive period is over. Fifty years or even twenty years ago, Russian statesmen were still ignorant of the free world and held fantastic notions as to our plots and plans. It is true that these delusions were sometimes fostered by the threats and promises of foolish men on our side. But all this has changed. The Kremlin now is far better informed than ever before—less nervous, more sure of itself. The rulers of Russia now know there can never be any danger to them from the American nuclear power. What about China? The threats from China, to both their political authority and their territorial interests, are increasing.

Ever since the war Western Europe has suffered from the failure to find a solution of the German problem. If the unity of Germany is ever to be reached, it cannot be by war. That is now accepted by our German friends. Even conventional war is painful enough, but a nuclear war could only unite the two Germanys in utter destruction. Any changes or improvements in Western Europe can only come about by agreement.

Equally, it is in the interests of Russia, as well as America and her allies, to see a stabilization or a neutralization of Southeast Asia. Russia is as vulnerable—even more vulnerable—than America. In the present situation, joint agreement and action by Russia and America, relative to China, can be decisive. It does no good to wait in the hope that when by some method or other in conditions yet unknown the question of Vietnam has been settled, we can then turn to the larger negotiations with Russia. This is the time; and this is the best and perhaps the only means to reach some stability in the world before it is too late.

Of course, we must act with prudence as well as with boldness. The old alliances—NATO and the rest—must be preserved. We must not lower our guard. There used to be a slogan "Negotiate from strength." Both sides are now strong—the Western allies and the Russian group. From this strength, therefore, let them both negotiate.

I ask for a return to the authority of the United Nations by the unity of the Great Powers. To this end, I ask, boldly but unequiv-

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ocably, for a return to direct meetings between Russia and America, and their allies.

All this may seem something of an impertinence coming from one who holds now no post or position of authority of any kind. Yet old age brings obligations as well as privileges. I have lived through two great wars. In the first I fought as a young soldier; in the second, served in Churchill's government as a minister. I have seen much good come, as under God's blessing it so often does, out of sorrow and suffering. Many of the revolutionary changes, which I have described, have been to the benefit of the people. But some may be turned to their fatal injury. If we are to sit still and wait until these dangerous weapons pass into the hands of powers not so responsible and not so prudent as those who possess them now, we all know that a third conflict would reduce all that we mean by civilization to ashes.

My country, with its great history, its still splendid strength, and, whatever you may sometimes read or hear, its unaltered courage, cannot now continue in the leading role which she held in the last century. In that sense we have had "our finest hour." But as a loyal ally, sustained by the affection of the countries of the Commonwealth, and the respect of the leading nations of Europe, we can play an important and perhaps decisive part by giving our assistance and advice. But the torch which we carried for so long has passed into your more powerful hands. Yet, remember the purpose of the torch is not to add to a conflagration, but to illumine the path to peace and progress.

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# Dean Acheson and the Korean War

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Until about the time of the Inchon landing the announced purpose of United States intervention in Korea was to punish the aggressor and bring about a restoration of the independence of South Korea. This was entirely consistent with the prudent policy which the administration had previously adopted with regard to Red China. Dean Acheson had made it the premise of his Far Eastern policy that there was more likelihood of conflict in the long-run interests of China and the Soviet Union than between China and the United States. On the basis of that premise Acheson had fought for eighteen months to disentangle the United States from Chiang Kai-shek's regime on Formosa, and scrupulously to refrain from appearing to thwart the ambition of the Communist government in Peking to achieve "the political independence and territorial integrity" of all of China. Even after the North Korean attack on South Korea Acheson took the lead within the administration in opposing any action that might bring on a war with Red China or the Soviet Union.

Having initially declared that the United Nations were fighting in Korea "solely for the purpose of restoring the Republic of Korea to its status prior to the invasion of the north,"[1] and having con-

[1] *State Department Bulletin*, XXIII (July 10, 1950), 579-80. "I wanted it clearly understood that our operations were designed to restore peace there and to


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sistently opposed any act likely to provoke Chinese or Soviet intervention, why then did Acheson agree to permit the United Nations forces to undertake the unification of all Korea?

## I

While fundamentally cautious and calculating in his diplomacy toward the Communists it was not in Acheson's nature to pass up an opportunity to enhance the strength and stability of the non-Communist world. After the Inchon landing Acheson reasoned that if MacArthur's victories had completely demoralized the North Koreans, the occupation of the northern half of Korea might be accomplished by the simple process of South Korean units moving into the no-man's land between the narrow waist of the Korean Peninsula and the Yalu. By limiting the means employed to ROK forces in regions bordering on Manchuria and Russia, Acheson hoped to accomplish unification without triggering a strong, undesired reaction, that is, Soviet or Chinese intervention. Acheson also thought that he was controlling the risks by having it understood that MacArthur was not to send his forces north should Chinese or Soviet forces occupy North Korea. Should Soviet or Chinese forces enter North Korea the United Nations Command would simply break off operations and repair to a suitable defense line, there to await developments.

While "pushing to the limits" and "pursuing" a retreating foe are the essence of this strategy for optimizing gains, it is equally important to "know when to stop." To calculate the risks in an optimizing strategy of this type requires that one "understand the opponent's interpretation of one's own signals, as well as the motives behind his."[2] Unfortunately Acheson's evaluation of Peking's behavior was carried on from the beginning to the very end in almost total incomprehension of Communist China's frame of reference.

Acheson's stress upon Chinese national interest led him to overestimate (at least in the short run) the potential for conflict between

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restore the border." Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs* (Garden City, N. Y., 1956), II, 341.

[2] Alexander L. George, *The "Operational Code": A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making*, RAND Document, D-15669-RR (Sept. 1967).

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Communist China and the U.S.S.R.[3] Allen Whiting has summed up this well-nigh fatal predilection:

> Judgments in Washington reflected a belief in basic conflicts within the Communist world that if properly exploited would inhibit Peking's actions in Korea. One such conflict was seen in a supposed clash between "innately Chinese" qualities and "alien Communism". This theory comfortingly left intact the presumed bonds of "friendship" between "the Chinese and the American peoples". Another clash was seen in Peking-Moscow relations, where "Chinese national interests" were thought to conflict with "Russian domination".... Such assumptions consistently attributed to the Chinese Communists a benevolence they were far from feeling.[4]

On the other hand Acheson fatally underestimated the threat to Chinese national interest that would appear from the advance of foreign armies up the Korean invasion corridor bordering Manchuria. Acheson made a considerable verbal effort to reassure Peking of America's benign intentions, but his campaign was doomed to failure because he never asked himself if his words meant the same thing to Peking as they meant to him.

In making judgments about another state's possible behavior two criteria are normally considered: capabilities and intentions. In the case of China, Acheson rather consistently underestimated China's war-making capacity. Had he not told a gathering of Republican congressmen on February 7, 1949, that China would remain weak even under the Communists? He urged his listeners not to exaggerate the magnitude of America's reversal in Asia—China was not a modern centralized state and the Communists would most certainly face as difficult a time in governing China as had the previous regime.[5]

Acheson also appears to have been betrayed into discounting Red China's capacity for action by his preoccupation with Moscow (not dissimilar to present hopes regarding Moscow's dissuasive capacity vis-à-vis Hanoi). Since Moscow had not been willing

[3] This is not to denigrate the shrewdness of Acheson's judgment that the national interests of China and Russia would sooner or later come into conflict and lead to schism.

[4] Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu, The Decision to Enter the Korean War* (New York, 1960), 169-70.

[5] Bradford Westerfield, *Foreign Policy and Party Politics* (New Haven, 1955), 347.

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to risk general war in July when the United States was unprepared and when United Nations forces could have been evicted from the peninsula, the Kremlin would certainly not risk enlarging the war when United States forces were so much better prepared. "They [Acheson and the President's other National Security Council advisers] reasoned, it appears, that mainland China was dependent on the Russians and that more ambitious wants [more than a buffer zone along the Yalu] would mean that *Russia* was courting war."[6]

United States intelligence estimates also appear to have played a role here, although to what extent they may have reinforced Acheson's predisposition to downgrade the menace of Chinese intervention is problematical. The initial reaction of the intelligence community to North Korean aggression was a rather panicky assumption that the Soviet Union might be willing to risk a general war and that the United States, being militarily unprepared, must take whatever precautions to avoid precipitating Soviet actions. By the end of September the intelligence community had reversed its earlier estimates and ruled out the likelihood that the Soviets were ready to risk a general war. Since it was the Soviet threat with which Washington was primarily concerned, the assumption being that Red China was militarily too weak and ill-organized to risk engaging a well-equipped Western army in all-out combat, intelligence reports to the National Security Council in September and October had the effect of down-grading estimates that the Chinese would intervene.

Estimates of intentions constitute another important criterion for risk-calculation. Previous to the Inchon landing no government leader had been more concerned than Acheson to provide a reassuring image of American intentions vis-à-vis mainland China. Now by a curious inversion of reasoning, with United Nations forces advancing into North Korea, Acheson persuaded himself that the United States had given the Peking regime enough tokens of America's good will and restraint so that it would have no reason to distrust its intentions in Korea.

"No possible shred of evidence could have existed in the minds of Chinese Communist authorities," Acheson later declared, "about the intentions of the forces of the United Nations. Repeat-

[6] Richard Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York, Signet ed., 1960), 136.

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edly and from the very beginning of the action it had been made clear that the sole mission of the United Nations was to repel the aggressors and to restore to the people of Korea their independence."[7] Had not the United Nations made it abundantly clear that it wished to localize hostilities in Korea? Had not the UN resolution of October 7 explicitly stated that "United Nations forces should not remain in any part of Korea" once its objectives were attained? And had not the administration disentangled itself from Chiang Kai-shek and refused to go back on its wartime pledges that Formosa must ultimately revert to China? If the exigencies of the war in Korea had made it necessary for the administration to protect Formosa by interposing the Seventh Fleet between the island and the mainland, Acheson professed himself unable to see the provocation: ". . . the President neutralized it [Formosa] by saying that the Seventh Fleet would prevent any attack upon Formosa, and Formosa should not make any attack upon the mainland. There was a fair proposition. . . ."[8] Had not the United States kept the war scrupulously limited to the Korean Peninsula, *despite incentive to bomb Rashin and points bordering on Manchuria?* Since American and UN declarations of good will were judged to constitute sufficient assurance to China's Communist leaders, the latter's threats of intervention were considered as a bluff. "I should think it would be sheer madness," Acheson declared on September 10, "on the part of the Chinese Communists to intervene and see no advantage to them doing it."[9] This presumption led Acheson to dismiss too readily warnings relayed from Peking by the Indian ambassador, K. M. Panikkar, that China would feel obliged to intervene if the Americans advanced to the Yalu or even crossed the 38th Parallel.[10]

[7] *State Department Bulletin*, XXIII (Dec. 18, 1950), 963.

[8] CBS Interview, *ibid.*, 463.

[9] John W. Spanier, *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), 95. Contained in directive to MacArthur of Sept. 15, 1950.

[10] K. M. Pannikar, *In Two Chinas* (London, 1955), 108. Both Truman and Acheson had acquired a prejudice against Panikkar because of his seeming subservience to the Chinese Communist position. Pannikar states that Chou made a distinction between ROK and non-South Korean forces. He was emphatic: "The South Koreans did not matter, but American intrusion into North Korea would encounter Chinese resistance" (p. 110). D. Rees, in *Korea: The Limited War*

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There is too lengthy a pattern to such utterances on Acheson's part to assume that he did not sincerely believe what he was saying or to doubt that it did lead him fatally to minimize the risk being run in attempting to unify all Korea. Just as Acheson earlier had assumed that America's policy of moderation and hands off Formosa would show Russia to be the principal threat to China's integrity, so in Korea his unguarded optimism concerning the unlikelihood of Chinese intervention betrayed a curiously naïve faith in the currency of his own verbal assurances. Convinced of his own good will toward China, Acheson downgraded the importance which Peking would attach to the loss of prestige and security if it permitted the Western "imperialists" to advance unhindered to China's borders. The importance of North Korea as a historic invasion route into Manchuria and North China seems to have figured scarcely at all in Acheson's deliberations with his staff. Rees notes that "like the Russians in 1904, Communist China was now making the crossing of the 38th parallel a *casus belli*,"[11] but there is no evidence that Acheson considered this historical precedent until very late in the game. Nor does it appear to have crossed Acheson's mind what Peking might make of the many hostile and threatening statements being made by Syngman Rhee, MacArthur, and others whose authority the Communists had reason to believe was as valid as that of Secretary Acheson, especially when nothing had been done to punish MacArthur for his previous insubordination. Time and again Peking pointed to their utterances as evidence of America's hostile intentions without prompting any off-setting reaction in Washington.[12] Peking was to show confidence in a general who, in the words of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the MacArthur hearings, was "not in sympathy with the decision to try to

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(New York, 1964), writes that a general U.S. Eighth Army advance across the Parallel began on the morning of October 9. Chinese troops reportedly began crossing the Yalu on October 14. J. M. Macintosh, *Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy* (New York, 1963), 48. What is interesting is the direct correlation between the restraint which was originally imposed upon MacArthur to rely primarily upon ROK troops in making his advance to the North and Chou's emphasis upon the threat posed by the non-ROK forces.

[11] Rees, 107. At a meeting with his staff on November 21 Acheson finally mentioned the possibility that Russia and China might be concerned over the use of Korea as a route to Manchuria.

[12] Rees, 106.

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limit the conflict to Korea" and not "responsive to control from Washington."[13]

The other means by which Acheson may have hoped to exercise control and minimize risks was through the President's authority over the commander in the field. But for Acheson to have reposed trust in MacArthur after all the chicanery and deceits which the State Department had suffered at his hands seems an act of unbelievable innocence.[14]

## II

In the directive of September 14 MacArthur was told to restrict the operation of his non-Korean forces to a line south of Chonju-Yong Won-Hungnam, running across the narrow neck of the Korean Peninsula. Acheson also thought that he was minimizing risks by having it understood that MacArthur was not to send his forces north in case of Chinese or Soviet occupation of North Korea and that should *strong* Chinese Communist units penetrate south of the 38th Parallel, the United States "would not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with China." Unfortunately, the circumstances under which Soviet or Chinese Communist intervention might occur were never thoroughly explored. The military campaign unfolded in a fatal state of ambiguity in which the only authoritative evidence of Chinese determination to intervene would be an all-out attack upon the United Nations forces.

[13] U.S. Congress, Joint Senate Committee on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, *Hearings, Military Situation in the Far East*, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, pp. 325, 878-79.

[14] By remaining in Japan after the war and never returning even for a visit, MacArthur had enhanced his legendary stature. Furthermore, his insistence upon ruling Japan with a completely free hand and the failure of the Department of State to establish an effective control over Japanese decisions—as had been done in Germany by the McCloy appointment in 1949—gave MacArthur a virtual monopoly over authoritative judgments about the Far East. When Acheson had proposed to begin negotiation of a Japanese Peace Treaty the previous year, MacArthur let it be known through various emissaries sent out that he was opposed to it. He had labeled the proposal a smart-aleck propaganda trick on the part of the State Department to put the Soviet Union on the spot, since the latter would hardly desire an unfettered Japan; but he refused to consider any request to treat it seriously since that would mean giving up America's military mastery over Japan. The State Department's relations with MacArthur in Japan had always been a one-way street, with MacArthur acting in Japan with very little regard—when possible, none—for the State Department's suggestions or wishes. See Rees, 66-72.

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Perhaps the most critical fault on the part of Acheson and the President's military advisers was their failure to keep Truman adequately informed of the risks. While this fault had much more disastrous consequences in November when the President was not informed of the military imprudence of MacArthur's reckless advance to the Yalu, it was already manifest in October. Because of inadequate intelligence the administration did not know that tens of thousands of Chinese troops were crossing the Yalu by mid-October. Nevertheless, by mid-October Chinese intervention was being discussed as a real, albeit unlikely, possibility. Logically this should have prompted a much greater assertion of control over MacArthur's opeations. Instead, a further extension of MacArthur's discretion was contained in a directive of October 9. MacArthur was now told that even if Chinese intervention occurred, he should continue operations "as long as, in your judgment, action by forces now under your control offers a reasonable chance of success."[15] Nothing Truman's advisers told him gave him any reason for questioning these instructions. Yet the directive of October 9 constituted a dangerous derogation of the President's authority to the theater commander, a general whom the men in Washington had every reason to know was malevolent in his predisposition toward them, unreliable by virtue of his vanity, and hell-bent on a showdown with communism in Asia.

Knowing MacArthur to be an unpredictable and avowed opponent of the administration, why did Acheson acquiesce in this delegation of authority? Like everyone else Acheson shared the conviction that the war was practically over, that if the Chinese happened to intervene it would not be on a significant scale, and that MacArthur was amply instructed about how to respond to such an eventuality. Being rational men themselves, it was simply inconceivable to Truman or Acheson that MacArthur might act in ways which would violate the restraints to which they had subjected him or imperiously transgress the canons of ordinary military prudence. They were in no state of mind to examine critically the mentality or the personality of the general to whom they were entrusting the final delicate military phase of the operation.

The victory celebration on Wake Island (October 15), from

[15] Truman, II, 362; *Hearings*, 720.

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which Acheson unfortunately absented himself, only confirmed the President in his confidence in MacArthur.[16] "Nothing said by anybody at Wake Island on October 15th qualified their delegation to MacArthur; indeed, it was confirmed by the prevailing atmosphere of confidence in him."[17] Against this almost universal confidence the President had only vague estimates that Peking could mount an offensive but probably would do no more than covertly assist the North Koreans. Here was no pressure on the President from a war-minded Pentagon, simply a vacuum created by the absence of any serious appreciation of Chinese motives.

Now began a series of events in which the ungovernable MacArthur, taking advantage of the authority and discretion handed to him by a negligent administration, brought his armies to the brink of destruction and the administration to the brink of disaster.

## III

On October 17, upon his return from the Wake Island Conference, MacArthur extended the restraining line to a line from Chongju on the west to Songjin on the east coast, well north of the "only really defensible line north of the Parallel." On October 24, MacArthur erased the restraining line altogether. He advised his field commanders that the initial restrictions had been based upon "the possibility of enemy capitulation." He now authorized them to use *any and all* ground forces at their command, as necessary, in order to capture all of North Korea. On October 25, MacArthur's headquarters denied "that 'foreign' United Nations [non-Korean] troops had been ordered to halt their advance 40 miles south of the frontier to minimize the international tension over a Red 'counter-invasion' of the North Korean Communist state." There was no intention, MacArthur's headquarters added, "of establishing a formal 'buffer territory.' "[18] The JCS warned MacArthur

[16] Halle emphasizes MacArthur's threat to Truman's political position: "The President had reason to believe that if he attempted to discipline his subordinate . . . he would be committing political suicide." Louis Halle, *The Cold War as History* (London, 1967), 219. If Truman really feared a disaster which he could do nothing about, why was he so cocksure and insouciant, especially upon his return from Wake Island?

[17] Neustadt, 133.

[18] Rees, 127; Trumbull Higgins, *Korea and the Fall of MacArthur* (New York, 1960), 64.

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that his order of October 24 was "not in consonance" with their directive of September 27.[19] In reply MacArthur referred to General Marshall's message of September 29 "to feel unhampered in his operations" and justified his action as militarily necessary to relieve the ROK forces which were being manhandled (they were encountering Chinese forces).[20]

Normally military commanders conduct their operations on the basis of intelligence and estimates of subordinate commanders. How did MacArthur treat these matters? The more serious reports from the front he dismissed as exaggerated; yet, unlike the State Department, which regarded Chinese intervention as essentially defensive, MacArthur felt that Chinese Communist activity had always been aggressive and offensive.

If that was not enough to forewarn MacArthur that greater uncertainties surrounded his advance to the Yalu than he had supposed, no sooner had ROK forces begun their advance away from the Chongchon River in the direction of the Yalu than they were pinned down and routed by remarkably effective operations which could only be coming from entirely new armies.[21] A Chinese prisoner was taken on October 25 and for several days UN forces were stymied in their advance. The wildly contradictory nature of MacArthur's reports and the inconsistencies between what he said and what he did raise serious questions as to his rationality throughout this period. Normal cautionary advice by the JCS at this time was greeted in Tokyo as evidence of a Washington conspiracy to bring on defeat and appeasement.[22]

While the full extent of Chinese intervention was still unknown, General Walton Walker interpreted the stiff resistance that his ROK forces were encountering as evidence "that China was in deadly earnest" and he was strongly against a hasty advance to the Yalu. With a gap of fifty to seventy miles between his Eighth Army on the west side of the peninsula and Almond's Tenth (Marine) Corps on the east, elementary military tactics dic-

[19] Quoted in Rees, 128.

[20] Higgins, 65; Lynn Montross and Nicholas Canzona, *U. S. Marine Corps Operations in Korea*, Vol. III: *The Chosin Reservoir Campaign* (Washington, 1954-57).

[21] S. L. A. Marshall, *The River and the Gauntlet* (New York, 1953). Marshall was operations analyst for the Eighth Army.

[22] Higgins, 68-72.

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tated extreme caution until a link-up could provide accurate intelligence of what lay between the two forces. The JCS was generally aware of these dangers, but it hesitated to challenge MacArthur's authority and it did not broach the subject with either the President or his civilian advisers.

But even if Acheson was not *au courant* of the military deficiencies and risks of MacArthur's strategy, the latter's decision to advance to the Yalu was already evoking demands from him which were clearly not consonant with the political and military limitations which Acheson had assigned to the operations. For example, it had been understood that under no circumstances was the United Nations Command to bomb the bridges or power complex over the Yalu connecting North Korea and Manchuria. Consonant with this limitation, on November 7 the United Nations Interim Committee on Korea had declared that the United Nations troops would "fully support" (meaning respect) the Manchurian frontier; three days later a six-power resolution introduced into the Security Council reaffirmed that the United Nations would hold the frontier "inviolate" and "would fully protect Chinese and Korean interests in the frontier zone."[23]

Yet on November 6 Acheson succeeded only at the very last minute in halting a bombing mission to take out the bridge across the Yalu River from Sinuiju (Korea) to Antung (Manchuria) ordered by the Far Eastern Commander. As there still seemed to be no serious and immediate threat to American forces, the President vetoed the mission and MacArthur was ordered not to attack targets within five miles of the Manchurian border. These demands should have been a signal warning to the administration that MacArthur's operations had reached the point at which they could continue only by violating the self-imposed limitations beyond which it was feared the United Nations Command might precipitate Chinese or Soviet intervention.

Instead of having the requisite effect, two days later Truman succumbed to MacArthur's protests that failure to destroy the bridges would endanger his command. On November 8 the Far East Air Command knocked out the twin three thousand-foot spans, "although of course most of the Chinese Communist troops were already in Korea by this time."[24]

[23] Rees, 133.
[24] *Ibid.*, 131.

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Acheson had another opportunity on November 9 to call a halt to MacArthur's offensive on the grounds that it was endangering the nation's political and strategic interests. MacArthur had just announced a final great offensive which would carry the United Nations Command to the Yalu. At the November 9 meeting of the National Security Council, General Bradley explained that the United Nations "*could hold its present positions* in Korea but beyond that, any advance would entail the possibility of the need for decisions by the United States for attacking Manchurian bases."[25] The threat to Acheson's policy of definite but limited and controlled risks from MacArthur's grandiose designs was now posed in political terms: either MacArthur's offensive must be halted forthwith or face the military necessity of having to extend operations into Manchuria. Typical of the failure of the JCS to perform its function at this time was the statement to Chief of Army General Collins by U. S. Army Director of G-3, Major General Bolte, that "it was easier to support MacArthur, since in any case he would not change his mind."[26]

It has been argued by Neustadt and others that Acheson hesitated to oppose MacArthur's offensive out of scruple at appearing to trespass into the field of military operations (unfortunately MacArthur suffered no such scruples about trespassing into the political sphere). But given the terms in which Bradley posed the alternatives, one can scarcely contend that Acheson would not have been on solid political grounds in opposing the offensive.

As if to underscore the likelihood that MacArthur would sooner or later have to have recourse to bombing Manchuria, the new Secretary of Defense, General George C. Marshall, "pointed out . . . that our eastern front in Korea was widely dispersed and thinly spread and that this represented an added risk. . . . Bradley replied that of course General MacArthur had done this in order to carry out his directive that he was to occupy the whole country and hold elections."[27] Acheson did ask "if there was any line that was better from a military point of view than the present one, and Bradley

[25] Documents, Princeton File. The Princeton File is a transcript of a seminar that was held by Acheson and his principal lieutenants after his retirement from office. It constitutes a combination debriefing and analysis of his decisions as Secretary of State.

[26] Quoted in Higgins, 73.

[27] Princeton File. See, also, Rees, 132.

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replied that . . . the farther back . . . the easier it would be to maintain . . . however, he realized that any backward movement . . . might lose us the South Koreans will to fight."[28] Since this was a political judgment, here again Acheson was offered an opening to reconsider the merits of the offensive from the viewpoint of America's political objectives. It could hardly be seriously argued that South Korean morale would have fallen so much as to outweigh the risks of war with Red China. Instead of all these discouraging statements becoming the basis for a serious reconsideration of Chinese intentions and of the risks implicit in MacArthur's offensive, Acheson let the occasion pass. He seized upon a statement by Bradley that "if the Chinese desired only to set up a buffer area . . . negotiations might be fruitful"[29] and offered forthwith to look into that possibility.

Truman, who had to miss this meeting, records Acheson's summation of the Council's views:

> [Acheson] pointed out that it was agreed that General MacArthur's directives should not now be changed and he should be free to do what he could in a military way, but without bombing Manchuria. At the same time, the State Department would seek ways to find out whether negotiations with the Chinese Communists were possible. . . .[30]

Whatever prompted Acheson to think that he might try for a diplomatic understanding with Peking while MacArthur was left free "to do what he could in a military way"? It had not previously been assumed that ending the war would depend upon negotiations with Peking. All calculations up to this point had been made on the assumption that the Chinese did not intend to intervene, but if they did the United Nations would be able to break off military operations, repair to a good defensible line, and await developments. Now that the Chinese had indicated that they were not bluffing there was no reason for Acheson not to assume that they meant what they had said all along—that they intended to evict the United Nations Command from all of North Korea and that in some sense they had the means to do it. Besides, as Acheson told Truman, "the trouble with any such proposal for nego-

[28] Princeton File. See, also, Martin Lichterman, *To the Yalu and Back* (Inter-University Case Program No. 92), 36.

[29] Cited in Rees, 131-32.

[30] Truman, II, 378-80; *Hearings*, 619-20.

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tiations . . . would be that the Communists would insist on all foreign troops leaving Korea, and thus abandoning Korea to the Communists."[31] Nevertheless he now permitted himself to believe that Chinese intervention could be parried diplomatically by negotiations for a ten-mile buffer zone south of the Yalu.

All evidence suggests that the participants in the meeting of November 9 knew that the military situation was uncertain and that depending upon Chinese strength it could quickly become desperate. Acheson had been told that unless the Chinese were weak and willing to accept a buffer zone the military situation might become so desperate as to necessitate bombing bases in Manchuria. Even if the Chinese had shown any inclination to negotiate, *which they had not*, would they be willing to accept a mere buffer zone? Moreover, such negotiations would take time in view of the non-existence of normal channels of communication between Peking, Washington, and New York. Now, if ever, would have been the time for Acheson to have notified the President that both the political and the military risks far outweighed the advantages of continuing the advance northward. Instead, the issue as it reached President Truman "wore a diplomatic face which fatally obscured the military risk, a reversal in effect of late September's situation."[32]

## IV

Why, then, did Acheson not call for a re-examination of the political risks which he had a perfect right and duty to do. Neustadt suggests that Acheson, already under fire for his Far Eastern policy, was reluctant to appear to meddle in military strategy. "In immediate terms the risk was 'military'; if it justified reversing the commander in the field, then the Joint Chiefs must make the judgment and tell Truman."[33] But if that is the case Acheson never should have fostered or even permitted the idea to exist that it might be possible to reach an accommodation for some form of buffer zone.

Thanks to Neustadt and others a myth has been fostered that

[31] *Ibid.*

[32] Neustadt, 137.

[33] *Ibid.*, 139. But, as we have indicated, the immediate risk was not only "military"; it was "political" as well.

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Acheson felt constrained by his role as Secretary of State and by his reluctance to bring down upon the administration the obloquy that would follow, should MacArthur's offensive be called off, from going to the President to tell him that the war was on dangerous grounds.[84] It is true that Acheson could not help but be influenced to some extent by the obvious price which both he and the President would pay should it become known that he had been instrumental in denying MacArthur "total victory." MacArthur had made it clear that if his command were ordered back to the waist of Korea north of Pyongyang-Wonson he would regard it as an act of appeasement, a defeat for the West, and a scuttling of United Nations objectives.

Despite these considerations it would be a mistake to believe that Acheson was a convinced opponent of MacArthur's campaign, constrained to silence by virtue of his civilian role or by political expediency. Quite to the contrary, in confidential meetings with his staff and in conferences with Marshall and Bradley *in the absence of the President*, at which Acheson might have made known his reservation without intruding upon military policy, Acheson does not seem to have expressed any serious misgivings about the consequences of Chinese intervention. For example, at a meeting of Acheson and his staff on the morning of November 21, Acheson noted the confusion in MacArthur's authorizations. On a straight military basis, Acheson noted, he was authorized to pursue the enemy forces north of the 38th Parallel and destroy them as a military force. If China intervened he was to pursue the mission until it was evident he could not succeed. Acheson felt that *no one should change this part of the directive* until MacArthur had had a chance to "probe" the situation, but there was no attempt to define what was meant by "probe" or to arrive at any conclusions on the basis of alternative outcomes.

[84] Neustadt goes to an extreme when he writes that "for Cabinet members and for military chiefs, a decision to go to the President is something like a government's decision to go to war; it is not something done each day on every issue." *Ibid.*, 140. This happened to be an issue of the gravest kind involving the likelihood of war with China. This seems to me a strange explanation for keeping the President ignorant of the risks and no justification whatsoever unless we are to assume that the President is the equivalent of the pre-war Japanese emperor. Unfortunately, it seems to be true that in this instance the President was not kept informed, with what consequences we all know.

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Acheson noted the concern which China and Russia might experience over the use of Korea as a route to Manchuria. But he doubted that the Communists believed that the United States would use Korea in that way. Their fear may relate, he said, "to propaganda on the rearmament of Japan. . . . This might lead you to believe that there is more sensitivity here than the intelligence reports lead one to believe."[35] This observation does not appear to have led to any significant revision of his thinking, however. Acheson's concluding observations accepted by implication the possibility of Chinese intervention.

> If MacArthur is successful in repelling Chinese intervention and ROK takes over tension may ease, but if Chinese Communist forces cannot be destroyed and strong resistance is met there and we find ourselves with a long struggle on our hands we must turn to negotiation and their [Chinese] sensitivity becomes even more important.[36]

Secondly, Acheson showed very little knowledge or concern about MacArthur's actual military dispositions. That afternoon (November 21) when Acheson, Marshall, Bradley, and their advisers met at the Pentagon, Robert Lovett, Undersecretary of Defense, reported nothing from MacArthur to indicate that he could not accomplish his mission of getting to the Yalu. Acheson did not demur from that judgment. Whatever reservations he may have had, the minute of the meeting shows General Marshall expressing his satisfaction that Acheson had stated his belief that MacArthur should push forward his planned offensive. Attention was mainly centered on the modalities by which a buffer zone would come into being between the United Nations Command and the Chinese along the Manchurian border. But the unreality of this discussion for bringing the war to an end should have been enough to make Acheson wonder about the feasibility of the campaign itself. Discussion at the November 21 meeting went as follows. Should the United Nations attempt to negotiate a buffer zone or simply make an announcement of intent to practice self-restraint? General Marshall preferred a political announcement of intent *following MacArthur's success*. "The time for making political proposals would

[35] Documentation, Princeton Seminar. Meeting in Department of State, Nov. 21, 1960. Note that it is on the basis of a sensitivity *to Japan*, not to the American advance, that Peking might react.

[36] *Ibid.*

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be after MacArthur had had such a success."[37] Acheson stressed the need for finding a way of terminating Chinese intervention in the war should it occur. The concept of a buffer zone *based upon the high ground along the Yalu* was finally agreed upon, with Acheson envisaging a demarcation line accepted tacitly by the Chinese and ratified by negotiation. When the decision to try to establish a buffer zone along the Yalu River frontier became known to MacArthur, he immediately branded it "a form of appeasement on the lines of the Munich Conference in 1938,"[38] and let it be known that "to give up any portion of North Korea to the aggression of the Chinese Communists would be the greatest defeat of the free world in modern times."[39] The possibility of Chinese involvement was now taken for granted within the administration, but it was assumed that with the success of MacArthur's offensive it would only require a measure of self-restraint in the approaches to the Yalu to establish a buffer zone which would be accepted by the Red Chinese either tacitly or after some brief period of skirmishing.[40]

There was something strangely unreal and inconclusive about this meeting. Reputedly the principal participants had been laboring for weeks under the dread of Chinese involvement; now it was simply taken for granted that whatever happened MacArthur's offensive would be a success and that hostilities would end with the Chinese accepting some form of demarcation line between the UN Command and the Manchurian frontier.[41] Far from revealing great anxiety or trepidation about MacArthur's advance to the

[37] Minutes of meeting in the Pentagon, 2:23 P.M., Nov. 21, 1950.

[38] Higgins, 72.

[39] *Hearings*, 1957-59; Truman, II, 379-80.

[40] True to form, when the Pentagon told MacArthur that he should hold his forces on the Yalu heights, dominating the river, principally with ROK troops, and that the advance in the northeast should be stopped at Chonjin, MacArthur bluntly replied that it would be "utterly impossible to stop his command short of the frontier because of the terrain." He also felt that the matter of the hydroelectric power would *not* be a major factor. Lichterman, 38.

[41] The estimated presence of some 100,000 frontline Chinese troops (there were actually 300,000) together with 40,000 guerrillas in the rear of the United Nations Command does not seem to have dampened the confidence with which the American high command plotted the final stage of the war. Large though the United Nations Command seemed (377,000 men), it actually consisted of only 100,000 frontline strength, which (as General Marshall noted) was already stretched thin and about to become even more dispersed as it fanned out toward the Yalu.

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Yalu, Acheson seems to have shared the prevailing confidence that MacArthur could accomplish his mission and that Chinese intervention, if it did occur, could be contained within a buffer zone along the Yalu.

In the light of the minutes of the meeting cited above, and of what we know about Acheson, it seems hard to believe that he felt constrained by his role as secretary of state or by considerations of domestic politics from revealing any deep concern he may have had about MacArthur's campaign. This was not the time for Acheson, Marshall, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to engage in some kind of Gaston-and-Alphonse routine about who would be the first to break the news to the President that his Commander in Korea was a dangerous plunger whose judgment could no longer be trusted.[42]

Acheson's misjudgment which he shared with all the other participants seems to have derived from wishful thinking. "Such a lack of realism is not at all rare. Psychologists have noted a general disposition in individuals to exaggerate gratifying features of one's environment and to overrate the probability of desirable events. . . ."[43] Acheson still clung to the rather benign view of Peking's motives and capabilities which had all along conditioned his thinking. He had hardly entered, if at all, into Peking's frame of reference. Having first adopted a prudent policy toward Peking, he failed to adhere to it when the temptation to unify Korea became too great. While aware that there was a certain level of risk in attempting to unify Korea, he completely underestimated the

[43] It is also part of the myth that MacArthur's northward advance prompted trepidation and concern in allied chancellories. "From their forward positions on the Chongchou River to the Cabinet office in Whitehall, all were keeping their fingers crossed and hoping that the worst would not happen." Rees, 146. This seems to overrate the prevalent concern in foreign capitals. According to British Ambassador Sir Oliver Franks, "We did not perceive the crossing of the 38th parallel or the later November offensive as installments of MacArthurism . . . . *No one really thought the Chinese would come in—I shouldn't say no one,* but really one didn't consider it likely. Everybody thought the war was going well. MacArthur was in the process of ending the whole thing. If he was going beyond the limits set for him was it all that bad? That was the prevalent British view." Personal Interview, Worcester College, Oxford, June 27, 1964. In fairness, Rees does note that "like Truman and Acheson, Attlee and Bevin did not think that the objective of a united Korea would provoke a massive Chinese counteraction" (p. 147).

[42] Klaus Knorr, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Cuban Missiles," *World Politics*, XVI (1964), 455-67, quoted in Peter Toma and

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incentive which China would have to protect its flank against a powerful foe to whom it imputed only the worst and most aggressive of intentions.

Secondly, Acheson was *not* well informed on the deficiencies of the military situation. There was no proper intelligence being received in Washington about the Chinese build-up, and what was being received was not being presented to the Secretary of State or the President by the JCS in such a way as to enable them to come to any very clear conclusions about the magnitude of the risks involved. Lichterman excuses the JCS by saying that "they were not sufficiently sure of their ground to be insistent."[44] But if, as reputedly they were, in a state of fear and trembling, why then did they have to be more sure?

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were rightly concerned about MacArthur's strategic dispositions, but their concern reached Acheson only in a muted form. MacArthur's violation of orders and his refusal to be guided or even influenced by recommendations from the JCS was essentially unknown to Acheson. The Joint Chiefs of Staff knew that MacArthur's forces were spread dangerously thin and that their disposition was faulty in the extreme but they were too intimidated and bamboozled by MacArthur to express their concern in an unequivocal or decisive fashion.[45] As a result, they put the best face possible upon the situation and let Acheson and presumably the President think that all was well. ("Lovett reported nothing from MacArthur to indicate that he could not accomplish his mission.") As in the subsequent case of the Bay of Pigs, the professional military passed over in silence miscalculations and risks which eventuated in "one of the great historic examples of human fallibility."[46] Here, too, the blame is attached to an impersonal phenomenon called role function. The Joint Chiefs

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Andrew Gyorgy (eds.), *Basic Issues in International Relations* (Boston, 1967), 343.

[44] Lichterman, 42.

[45] Bradley admits that MacArthur's stature was so great that the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt literally incapacitated to deal with him. Personal interview, Department of Defense, April 25, 1963. When Truman finally decided to remove MacArthur neither Marshall nor Bradley had difficulty convincing themselves that MacArthur had violated orders on countless occasions and should have been removed much earlier.

[46] Rees, 137.

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of Staff, it is said, were reluctant to question the military feasibility of the political goals that MacArthur had been set and at the same time they were reluctant to interfere with the theater commander's authority. In point of fact, MacArthur was determined to carry out his plans despite JCS admonishments and the JCS were too weak to impose their collective judgment upon MacArthur or to bring to the attention of the President the obvious military risks inherent in what MacArthur was doing.

## V

The meeting at the Pentagon on November 21 was the administration's last chance to stop MacArthur. On November 24 MacArthur launched his fatal "end-the-war" offensive. Hardly had the advance begun when the United Nations Command was struck by the full fury of the Chinese armies massed in the mountains. Within two days the advance which MacArthur had launched with such high hopes had become a defeat and within four days a total rout.

There is a refreshing candor in Acheson's subsequent statements about his and others' responsibility for misjudging Chinese intentions. "They really fooled us when it comes right down to it, didn't they?" asked Senator Saltonstall of Acheson in the course of the MacArthur hearings. "Yes, sir."[47]

Such candor is all very well, but it should not be allowed to divert our attention from the analysis of the mistakes themselves because there is always the danger of their being repeated. Characteristically, Acheson has been most forthright in pinpointing the initial error. In a cable of December 7, 1950, to William J. Sebald, MacArthur's political adviser, Acheson explained that Sebald must not let the notion exist that the Chinese intervention was due to the late November offensive. The department considers it important, Acheson wrote to Sebald, that

> when you encounter such explanations you make it clear that it is wholly at variance with fact, it is [the] unanimous considered judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, supported by information from field commanders, the present Chinese offensive planned and staged over considerable periods of time. . . . Appearance on Korean front of Chi-

[47] *Hearings*, 1835.

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> nese Communist troops . . . began during initial Korean assault and long before return to 38th parallel *indicating Peiping would in any case feel free to assert itself in Korea regardless of military situation.*[48]

Why was this not apparent to Acheson at the time? All previous experience forewarned that China would not willingly tolerate the presence of hostile armies in its backyard. The United States had not hesitated to resist aggression eight thousand miles from its shores; why should China not be expected to react to MacArthur's hostile campaign in similar fashion? With logic and history to guide us, what can possibly account for such a monumental aberrancy? The explanation seems to lie in the pervasive American tendency, shared by Acheson and his critics alike, to believe that somehow the canons of international politics are suspended when it comes to China. We have already indicated that China invoked in Acheson an image which was quite at variance with the facts and quite at variance with the way Acheson conducted diplomacy when he was dealing with the Soviet Union. Acheson's image of the Peking regime was that of a docile puppet of Moscow without a will of its own.

Characteristically, Acheson denigrates the importance of public opinion and insists that governments alone constitute the only meaningful agent in international relations. But in the case of China, Acheson denied that the regime in Peking represented in any real or ultimate sense the will of China and that somehow the stronger affinity of the Chinese people for democratic forms and for America would triumph over the malevolence of their leaders. It is difficult to excuse Acheson's judgment that the United States could conduct an offensive designed to wipe out China's North Korean ally and not expect Peking to react with the maximum force at its command.

If Acheson miscalculated Peking's intentions, MacArthur and the JCS miscalculated China's capabilities. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were under no obligation to be bound, as Lichterman points out, by the State Department's notion that "it was more likely that [the Chinese] would not come in than that they would."[49] Furthermore, a number of inhibitions had been set upon Mac-

[48] Quoted in Courtney Whitney, *MacArthur, His Rendezvous with History* (New York, 1956), 447.

[49] Lichterman, 42.

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Arthur's conduct of the war, designed to limit the political and military risks of the campaign, such as halting at the waist, advancing to the Yalu with ROK troops only, and the like. These were as valid militarily as they were politically, because it was a prime military objective to avoid becoming entangled in a general war with China. Had MacArthur been held to these limitations his armies would not have been so vulnerable to the Chinese onslaught and it would certainly have prevented the campaign from becoming an unmitigated disaster whose consequences have weighed fatefully on Sino-American relations ever since.

Instead of removing MacArthur when he disobeyed orders (in the matter of using non-ROK troops in the border regions) and instead of being more specific in their directives to the theater commander, the JCS merely cautioned him and did not reveal to either the President or the Secretary of State the full extent of the military risks involved in MacArthur's gamble. The argument that the JCS did not want to interfere in the theater commander's conduct of the war is itself dubious when the theater commander was violating orders. Chains of command exist not as an abstraction but as a means of bringing the largest possible intelligence to bear upon the conduct of operations. The argument that the JCS had to respect the discretion of the theater commander has been invoked to excuse the fact that the JCS and the Secretary of Defense lacked the will to impose their better judgment upon MacArthur. General staffs and civilian secretaries of defense exist under a responsible system of government precisely for the purpose, among others, of coping with imperious, romantic, and irresponsible military figures such as MacArthur.

Nor does it appear that Acheson and his civilian associates were deterred from opposing MacArthur's campaign out of fear of the reaction in the Pentagon. On the contrary, General Bradley and other members of the JCS shared completely Acheson's view of grand strategy, that is, that a war with Red China would be the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time. Far from exploiting their political leverage, Bradley and the Joint Chiefs were so in accord with Truman and Acheson that they earned from Senator Taft the epithet of "political" generals. The Achilles heel of American policy in this instance lies elsewhere. It appears to lie in the comparative insouciance with which the conduct of policy

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in the concluding phase of the war was left to the determination of the military campaign.

## VI

Perhaps the case of Korea represents, as Alexander George says, "a sorry example, indeed, of narrow bureaucratic role playing at the highest advisory level."[50] But to leave it at that is not enough. The breakdown of the advisory function in this case revealed an intolerable divorce between the theater commander and the general staff and between the general staff and the President as commander-in-chief. But this breakdown was accompanied by an equally egregious tendency on the part of Acheson and his civilian associates to take the assumptions, claims, and estimates of the military at their face value. Once war begins, there may be a greater propensity than we care to admit for America's civilian leaders to accept the judgments of their military advisers with a mimimum of skepticism, to assume that military calculations are based upon more objective and rational criteria than prevail in other spheres. The frequency with which the military succeed in repeating the errors of the past, for instance, in their claims for the bombing of North Vietnam in the light of demonstrated limitations in the strategic bombing campaign in World War II and of the interdiction campaign in Korea, gives one pause.[51] It would be an exaggeration to say that there is in America an inadequate institutional subordination of soldiers to civilians, but there may be a more subtle danger of undue weight being given, in policy decisions, to technical military claims at the expense of general political considerations. After all, America has not lost many wars, and there may be an exaggerated confidence in the promises of the American military which only time will deflate.

Acheson assumed that winding up the war was a technical military problem well within the reach of the military. He was inadequately concerned, until it was too late, with the risks involved. He placed an implicit confidence in the military chain of com-

[50] Alexander George, *Presidential Control of Force: The Korean War and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, RAND, P-3627 (July 1967), 8.

[51] Despite an all-out interdiction campaign sustained over many months the U.S. Air Force and Navy were unable to prevent the Chinese command from supplying the ninety divisions deployed on the Korean front. Rees, 382-83.

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mand. What was the reality of this chain of command?—a theater commander who, in the words of General Matthew Ridgway, had an unusual capacity for "discounting or ignoring all unwelcome facts," and a JCS that was incapable of either disciplining or firing MacArthur and which lacked the gumption to tell the President that he must do so.

There is a real danger of attributing the Korean tragedy to a deadlock in role-playing and thereby of ignoring the part which human passion and prejudice play in political affairs. There is also a danger of minimizing the limitations of American experience and of overlooking dangerous underlying social and psychological tendencies in American foreign policy. The advance to the Yalu is a prime example of an American propensity to take the righteousness of its actions for granted and to ignore the objective reality which its behavior represents to others. Overweening confidence in the judgments of military men may be another fault. Better organization for decision-making will not redeem a defective view of the universe or of America's place in it.

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# Thoughts on Assassination in Africa*

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Perhaps no international treaty betrays a greater sensitivity to the risk of assassination than does the Charter of the Organization of African Unity. The Charter consecrates its disapproval of this phenomenon in Article III, in which it expresses its "unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination, as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighboring States or any other State."[1]

Independence is a beginning. So is the month of January every year, sometimes spilling over into February. For some reason a disproportionate number of the historic acts of violence in Africa since independence have tended to happen in the months of January and February. It was in January 1961 that Patrice Lumumba was handed over to Moise Tshombe, his enemy in Katanga. That was the prelude to one of the most significant assassinations in Africa's history. The following month the death of Lumumba was announced.

In January 1963 President Sylvanus Olympio of Togo was as-

* This paper was written for the panel on "Consensus and Dissent, with Special Reference to the Developing Countries" at the Seventh World Congress of the International Political Science Association in Brussels in September 1967.

[1] The Charter is available in Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "The Addis Ababa Charter," *International Conciliation*, No. 546 (Jan. 1964), Appendix, 53-62.

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sassinated. And it was with Olympio's fate in the background that the Charter of the Organization of African Unity was signed a few months later.

In January 1964 the Zanzibar revolution exploded in East Africa, with vital consequences for the region as a whole. Among the immediate effects were the army mutinies of Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya which happened later the same month.

In January 1965 the prime minister of Burundi was assassinated. The heads of neighboring Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania discussed the event and jointly expressed their sense of shock.[2]

Within the same period Kenya had its first assassination since independence—the killing of Mr. Pinto, a prominent member of Parliament.

In January 1966 came the Nigerian coup, which cost the lives of Federal Prime Minister Balewa and the premiers of the northern and western regions. The following month Nkrumah fell. His regime was overthrown while he was on his way to Peking. From the point of view of the theme of assassination the Ghanaian coup had a different kind of significance; it seems to have been a studied policy of the soldiers to avoid the risk of assassinating Nkrumah. That seems to have been one reason why the coup was timed to take place after his departure for Peking.

Is there any special reason why the opening months of January and February from year to year should have had such a disproportionate share of Africa's great acts of turbulence? Other months have had their events, too. But the deaths of Lumumba, Olympio, Balewa, and the Sardauna of Sokoto; the regionally transformative Zanzibar revolution; the East African mutinies; and the fall of Nkrumah are almost in a class by themselves as events which shook Africa. Yet, while sharing January and February for their anniversaries, the events provide little evidence for a Montesquieu-like hypothesis about the effect of climatic changes on major political events. Our collection of events is too

[2] This was the second prime minister of Burundi to be assassinated. The first was Prince Rwagasore, who was shot dead with a hunting-gun as he sat in a restaurant in Usumbura, less than a month after his Lumumbist Uprona party had swept the polls in September 1961. That, however, was before Burundi's independence. For an account of the trial and retrial of those accused of complicity, see, for example, Clyde Sanger's article in *The Guardian* (Manchester), Jan. 12, 1963.

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widely distributed to be correlated with weather conditions in January and February. The most that one can hope for is a symbolic correlation—a new year; a new nation; a new manifestation of instability.

What is of greater interest than the month in which it occurs is, of course, the phenomenon of assassination itself. Everything considered, there might easily have been many more assassinations in Africa than we have had so far. The potentialities of this and other forms of political violence have been there from the start. What this paper hopes to analyze are, in part, precisely those potentialities. But it will be a postulate of mine that the risk of assassination was not only objectively there, but was keenly felt to be there by many of the leading participants in African politics. African leadership soon developed a conscious or subconscious fear of the assassin. This fear exerted an important influence not only on their personal behavior from day to day, but also on their policies and ideologies.

In our analysis we shall first place the issue of assassination within the context of the problem of legitimacy in a newly invented state. We shall then link this up with different levels of consensus, and examine these in relation to personal leadership as a functional alternative to weak legitimacy. Where authority is too personified, challenge to authority also tends to take the form of personal violence. The possibilities of assassination are maximized. Ideology, however, tries to mitigate these possibilities. And in any case there are assassinations which, in their impact, produce the kind of retrospective hero-worship which is itself a contribution to national identity. We shall conclude with an examination of the influence of assassination on certain aspects of Pan-African behavior and diplomatic thought.

But, first, a definitional problem has to be tackled.

### *What is "Assassination"?*

An alternative rendering to the term "assassination" is sometimes supposed to be "political murder." But this rendering only shifts the definitional problem. When is a murder "political"? If the answer is "When it is committed for political reasons," then not every political murder is an assassination. In the course of the Zanzibar revolution thousands of people were killed, and many

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of these were killed for reasons which, in their racial implications, could only be described as "political." Yet the killing was at the grass-roots level—a petty Arab shopkeeper killed by his African neighbor; a petty landlord killed by a tenant. One of the curious things about the Zanzibar revolution—in contrast to, say, the Cuban, with which it has often been compared—was the relative toleration shown toward leading members of the previous regime under the Sultan. The Zanzibar revolutionaries showed little immediate desire to "make a public example" of their predecessors in power. Not only were there no executions, but a special effort was apparently made by the revolutionaries to spare Sheikh Ali Muhsin, the leader of the overthrown Nationalist party, any public indignity. Even John Okello, the temperamental Ugandan who appeared to have spearheaded the coup, made threats on Zanzibar radio against anyone who had "violent designs" against Ali Muhsin. A long detention awaited him and his kind, but there was a marked reluctance to sentence them to a physical penalty.

Yet this tolerance of the revolutionary leaders toward their predecessors was in marked contrast with the outbreak of racial vendetta at the grass-roots level—neighbor against neighbor, farmer against farmer. Many of these were politically-inspired killings. But were they "assassinations"? It is possible to argue that the Zanzibar revolution unleashed a large number of "political murders"—but not a single "assassination." For the term "assassination" does not merely mean "killing for political reasons." In fact, the reasons can be quite irrelevant. For example, in November 1963 headlines in different parts of the world proclaimed "Kennedy Assassinated"—before we knew who had killed him, let alone for what reasons. Perhaps we still do not know for what reasons. Yet the death of John F. Kennedy remains a case of assassination.

What seems more plausible is that the term "assassination" derives its meaning less from the motives of the killing than from the political importance of the victim. The victim need not be a professional politician, nor hold a formal office of state. Neither Mahatma Gandhi in 1947 nor Malcolm X in 1964 was a politician or state official in this professional sense. Yet we think of their deaths as instances of "assassination."

Victor T. LeVine prefers to base the definition of "assassination" on the role of the killer rather than the status of the victim.

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LeVine would also add the element of surprise to his definition. As he himself put it, "the difference between assassination and political murder is admittedly a tenuous one; I would contend that it lies in two areas, the role of the killer, and the element of surprise. Assassins are usually hired or delegated, and they generally strike without warning to the victims."[3]

That assassins usually carry out their purpose "without warning their victims" can surely be taken for granted. Assassins do not normally warn the police, either. As for the claim that "assassins are usually hired or delegated," surely this—even if it were statistically true—could have no bearing on the definition of assassination. A king can be assassinated by his own prospective successor.

As for the element of surprise, again this is at best an accompanying characteristic of assassination rather than a defining one. What if the killer is "theatrical" enough to telephone his victim anonymously and tell him that he has only until Thursday the following week to live? And what if on that Thursday the man is indeed killed? Was the theatrical forewarning enough to deprive the killing of the status of an assassination?

What about Lumumba when he was handed over to his enemies in Katanga? The news of his death was announced a month later. Many people were "shocked" without really being "surprised." The phenomenon of "surprise" implies a high degree of unexpectedness. And yet Lumumba already bore the marks of a violent beating even before he was handed over to his worst enemies. He was being publicly manhandled as he was being transported to Katanga, and the press informed the world with photographs of an abused Lumumba being dragged about by soldiers. There followed the weeks of mystery and speculation. Was Lumumba still alive? When the answer came in February 1961 many people, especially in the Third World, were indeed shocked that the worst had come to the worst. Any yet somehow it was the shock of anger, and perhaps of political anguish, rather than the shock of surprise.

From this it can be concluded that neither the speed of killing

[3] See Victor T. LeVine, "The Course of Political Violence," in William H. Lewis (ed.), *French-Speaking Africa, The Search for Identity* (New York, 1965), 59-60; 68; 241, n. 15.

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nor the role of the killer is crucial in defining assassination. What is crucial is the status of the victim. The core or minimal definition is that an assassination is the killing of someone politically important by an agent other than himself or the government—for reasons which are either political or unknown.

### *Legitimacy Versus Integration*

Perhaps the most fundamental problems confronting African countries are reducible to two crises—the crisis of national integration and the crisis of political legitimacy. For our purposes, the crisis of integration may be seen as a problem of horizontal relationships. It arises because different clusters of citizens do not as yet accept each other as compatriots. The sense of a shared nationality has yet to be forged.

The crisis of legitimacy, on the other hand, is a problem of vertical relationships. It arises not because one citizen does not recognize another as a compatriot, but because significant numbers of citizens are not convinced that their government has a right to rule them. Integration is a problem of neighbor against neighbor, legitimacy a problem of the ruled against their rulers.

Assassinations arise both in situations of inadequate national integration and in situations of weak legitimacy or accepted authority. But it would be a mistake to assume that the crisis of integration and the crisis of legitimacy need necessarily go together. It is possible for a country to have attained a high degree of integration or sense of nationhood while its capacity for accepting shared authority remains underdeveloped. The reverse phenomenon is also quite possible, and has perhaps even more examples in history.

Assassinations are often symptomatic of both crises. But here again it is not necessary that both crises be present. Recurrent assassinations have been known to happen in countries with a highly developed sense of shared nationality. Japan provides one dramatic example. Robert E. Ward has argued that Japan's history as a whole is a strange mixture of docility and violence:

> Violence and the use of armed force to accomplish political ends have a long and honourable tradition, which is by no means limited to pre-Restoration times. The phrase "government by assassination" gained

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broad currency in Japan as late as the 1930's and with considerable justification.[4]

Ward points out that the fourteen-year period of 1932-45 marked a reversion to this form of political behavior. The period began with the assassination of Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi on May 15, 1932: "This was merely the most conspicuous of a number of such incidents that represented protests against widespread economic—especially agrarian—distress . . . and a foreign policy held to be insufficiently nationalistic and aggressive."[5]

Here were a people with a marked degree of national consciousness. Indeed, many of the killings were widely regarded as "*patriotic* assassinations," carried out for the sake of national honor. And yet the widespread approbation of many such acts in the country was an indication that the successful creation of national identity in Japan had not been accompanied by a successful tradition of governmental legitimacy. It is true that the emperor himself had more than political acceptance. He commanded mystical reverence as well. But in the final analysis the emperor was perhaps more a symbol of nationhood than of secure governmental authority.

In Africa the crises of both integration and legitimacy are still acute. And political violence is often symptomatic of both. Assassination itself as a political solution was rare during the colonial period. One can almost say that—in the light of our definition of it as "the killing of someone politically important, by an agent other than himself or the government, for reasons which are either political or unknown"—assassination comes near to being a post-independence phenomenon in Africa. Rival political groups in colonial Africa might have killed each other before. But the kind of political importance which a victim had to have if the killing was to be defined as an "assassination" was, to some extent, camouflaged by the colonial situation. Thus, if Patrice Lumumba had been killed mysteriously before the Congo became independent and afforded him a chance to be prime minister, the killing would have appeared less obviously as an assassination than it did when it took place some months after the country's independence.

[4] "Japan," in Robert E. Ward and Roy C. Macridis (eds.), *Modern Political Systems: Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963) 60.

[5] *Ibid.*, 30.

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But reasons of definition are not the only ones which make the killing of politically important African figures a post-independence phenomenon in the main. More weighty reasons are tied up with problems of the crises we have mentioned.

British colonial governors were hardly ever killed in office whereas within a few years of independence African heads of governments found themselves victims or near-victims of assassins. Why the difference? One possible answer is that the British colonial governor was well guarded. Another answer is that he mixed less with the general populace, and therefore exposed himself less to possible assassination. Both these statements might be true, and yet as *reasons* they might be of only marginal relevance.

We might get nearer the real reasons if, first, we reflected on this hypothesis: That there had been few attempts on the lives of colonial governors in Africa for the same reason for which there had been few mutinies by African soldiers under the colonial regime—the range of possible retaliatory signals was wider in the British power-spectrum than in that of the new regimes.

And yet the range of possible changes in the situation which could result from an assassination was seemingly narrower in a colonial situation than in a post-independence one. An assassin asks himself in a colonial situation what will happen if he kills the British governor. On the one hand, British power seemed great enough to be able to inflict a whole range of possible acts of revenge on the assassin alone, or on the assassin and others as collective punishment.

On the other hand, British power also seemed great enough to prevent any fundamental change in the political situation being brought about by the mere assassination of a governor. A replacement could be sent, and the colony would remain a colony under basically the same policy. British capacity for varied forms of revenge could put off an assassin through fear of credible consequences. British capacity for maintaining the political *status quo* despite the loss of a governor could put off an assassin through fear of futility.

But in a post-independence situation, getting rid of a prime minister could cause a more significant change in a country's orientation—just as an army mutiny after independence can ef-

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fect an important change, unless it is thwarted by appeal to the former colonial power.

And even when thwarted it could—on issues like the Africanization of the officer corps in the army—prove to be a victory of the vanquished. The fluidity of the basis of legitimacy in a post-independence situation maximizes the temptation to revolt—and both military insubordination and attempted assassinations become a more common phenomenon than in pre-colonial days.

That is one reason why African independence and increased African violence are often companions—at least for a time.

### *Consensus, Primary and Secondary*

Linking this up with more traditional categories of political analysis, we may say that the problem of legitimacy is the old problem of "political obligation" in political philosophy. It is the problem of why and when one obeys or ought to obey the government. Where legitimacy is fully secure, the citizens do not question the government's right to govern, though they may question the wisdom of this or that governmental action. When it is not secure, challenges to authority may allow little differentiation between dissent, insubordination, rebellion, and outright treason.

In traditional political theory, the problem of political obligation involves a shifting balance between the area of consent in government and the area of compulsion. And the area of consent itself has different levels. To take Uganda as an example, one might note that there is a difference between consenting to being ruled by President Obote's government and consenting to this or that *policy* of his government. It is possible for an opponent of Dr. Obote's regime to be in favor of this or that policy pursued by the regime. Thus there were many Ugandans outside Obote's party who supported his toughness against the kingdom of Buganda although they would not vote for Obote in a general election. In this case they accept the policy though, given a choice, they would not accept the government.

But even the idea of accepting Obote's government, or consenting to be ruled by it, has two levels. The more obvious level is in the sense of having voted for Dr. Obote's party at the last election. Yet there is a sense, of course, in which even the Democratic party, although in *opposition*, consented to be ruled by

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Obote's Uganda People's Congress. The very idea of a loyal opposition implies consenting to be ruled by the constitutional government in power, although reserving the right to disagree with almost everyone of its policies.

The problem in Africa in the first few years of independence was of trying to ensure that every Opposition remained a loyal opposition. It was a quest for a situation in which one could challenge decisions of the government and not the government's right to execute them.

In the final analysis, this was the ultimate problem of *consensus*—not a consensus on policies (that is, secondary consensus), but a consensus on legitimate methods of policy-making and legitimate methods of implementation (primary consensus). Thus even those who did not vote for the majority party in Uganda but took advantage of the elective principle concede the right of governance to their rival party.

In this primary sense, consensus is that which makes it possible to have *compulsion by consent.* It is what makes citizens accept a certain degree of force from the government, or even complain about that force, without feeling that the government lacks the right to govern them at all.

But the degree of compulsion needed is sometimes in inverse proportion to the degree of secondary consensus already achieved. This secondary consensus, or agreement behind certain policies, is sometimes known as "national unity" at a particular moment in time. There are occasions when we have to think of compulsion as that which we have to put into a governmental system in order to make up for deficiencies in unity. The Congo is less united than Uganda; therefore the Congo needs more coercion or compulsion in its system than does Uganda. Mainland Tanzania is more united than Uganda. Therefore mainland Tanzania or Tanganyika needs less coercion for minimal system-maintenance than does Uganda. Coercion and consensus are sometimes functional alternatives for system-maintenance.

But secondary consensus is not necessarily agreement behind policies; it can sometimes be agreement behind a leader, almost regardless of the policies he pursues.

African countries, faced with inadequate primary consensus, have sometimes invoked diverse devices in order to consolidate

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at least secondary consensus behind the leader. There is a tragic paradox involved in the process. On the one hand, the absence of primary consensus creates the danger of assassination because of the very inadequacy of legitimacy. On the other hand, the attempt to create secondary consensus leads to the personification of government. "Nkrumah is the CPP; the CPP is Ghana; Nkrumah is therefore Ghana." This is the syllogism which, in its conclusion, legitimates African equivalents of Louis XIV. But the doctrine of "I am the State," by personifying government, can be an invitation to regicide in conditions of primary dissensus. To challenge the leader is to challenge the state. The transformation of the state therefore "requires" the elimination of its present embodiment.

African attempts to promote "leader-worship" are, therefore, caught up in this contradiction. The whole idea of promoting it is partly inspired by a desire to mitigate the potential for regicide inherent in primary dissensus. And so leader-worship sometimes verges on being almost literal. Nkrumah was the clearest example in recent African history, though by no means atypical. He permitted himself to be portrayed as a messiah. But he needed to be a political Christ without a political crucifixion. Indeed, the reason for portraying him as a messiah was to avert the danger of crucifixion. But the sacralization of authority has entailed a personification of authority as well. And it is this which leads to the personification of opposition as well.[6]

### *Death and Hero-Worship*

Then there are occasions when it is, in fact, the "crucifixion" which achieves the leader-worship so vainly sought by propaganda. The clearest example is probably the place of Lumumba in the Congo. Before his death Lumumba was perhaps more a hero of Pan-Africanists outside the Congo than of the Congolese themselves. It is true that he was "the nearest thing" to a national leader that the Congo had; but that was not all that "near." Lumumba stood for Congolese unity, but he was not himself popular enough or strong enough to ensure that unity without exter-

[6] See Ali Mazrui, "The Monarchical Tendency in African Political Culture," *British Journal of Sociology*, XVIII (1967), 231-50. See, also, David E. Apter, "Political Religion in the New Nations," in Clifford Geertz (ed.), *Old Societies and New States* (New York, 1963), 82-84.

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nal help. Perhaps the forces against unity were in any case greater than any single leader could cope with. Lumumba might well have been a casualty of circumstances. Yet one thing was clear: while he lived he was essentially a factional hero rather than a national one.

But after his death the myth of Lumumba was rapidly nationalized. His death was announced in February 1961. By the summer of the same year a coalition government was formed under the premiership of Cyrille Adoula, with Kasavubu still president. When the new Prime Minister Adoula ventured into Stanleyville, he made a point of placing flowers at a temporary monument of Lumumba and he exclaimed: "We have achieved what Lumumba wanted: one Congo, one Congo, one Congo."

Commenting on this situation, Henry Tanner said:

> The gesture . . . showed that Lumumba's place in Congolese politics has undergone a subtle but far-reaching change. Before the formation of the coalition government, the Lumumba legend had been the exclusive tool of one political faction. Now it is being invoked, with different shades of meaning and enthusiasm, by both parties in the coalition . . . even a politician who owes his power to Kasavubu, Lumumba's earliest rival, may find it wise to worship at the shrine.[7]

In July 1964, to the astonishment of the world, Moise Tshombe, the former secessionist of Katanga, was invited by President Kasavubu to succeed Adoula as prime minister of the Congo. Tshombe was widely regarded as the man behind the murder of Lumumba. Yet he had now come back from his exile in Europe to take over the reins of national power. On July 19, 1964, he addressed an enthusiastic crowd of 25,000 at the Baudoin Stadium in Leopoldville and proclaimed: "Give me three months and I will give you a new Congo."

On July 26 he was in Stanleyville, the Lumumbist stronghold. He repeated his theme of "give me three months" to a major rally. And as one more step toward that goal of a "new Congo," Moise Tshombe laid a wreath at the monument of Patrice Lumumba.[8]

Yet instability continued in the Congo. Tshombe scored a victory over the rebels, but the entire political regime ended with

[7] Henry Tanner, "Over the Congo, Lumumba's Ghost," New York *Times Magazine*, Oct. 29, 1961.

[8] *Africa Report*, IX (1964), 20.

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General Mobutu's coup in December 1965. On the first Independence Day anniversary following the coup a great crowd assembled in the capital to celebrate the occasion. The day was June 30, 1966, and President Mobutu was delivering a speech. Suddenly he made an unexpected statement:

> Glory and honour to an illustrious citizen of the Congo, to a great African, and to the first martyr of our independence. Patrice Emery Lumumba, who was the victim of the colonialist plot. In the name of the Government, we proclaim his name on this national heroes' day. . . .

Mobutu also declared a new policy toward the Belgian mining interests in the Congo, implying a greater assertion of Congolese control over the country's economy. Opposition to the autonomy of mining interests in the Congo was certainly in the tradition of Lumumbist thought in the Congo.[9]

Not long after, George Penchenier devoted one of four articles on the Congo in *Le Monde* to Mobutu's move in proclaiming Lumumba a hero. Penchenier pointed out that it was not merely in the rebel-held areas that Lumumba was regarded in such terms. "The three short months in which he held power were enough to make him a legend, and the circumstances of his death made him a martyr." Penchenier went on:

> Six years have passed. . . . The old street named Leopold III will be known in future as Patrice Emery Lumumba and a monument will be erected to his memory. The Congolese welcome these acts without stopping to think about the strange fate of a man who was followed, then betrayed, and now rehabilitated. General Mobutu has taken a political step. After having defeated the Lumumbist rebellion, he is trying to create a united Congo. Who better to help him than Patrice Lumumba?[10]

It looks as if the *memory* of Lumumba may contribute more to the "oneness" of the Congolese than anything Lumumba himself actually did while he was still alive. It all depends upon whether shared heroes constitute one of the factors which help to create national consciousness.

[9] *Africa Digest*, XIV (1966), 22-23.

[10] *Le Monde*, Sept. 1, 5, 1966. The English rendering of the quotation is from *Africa Digest*, XIV (1966), 22-23.

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But why should Lumumba be a hero for reasons other than what he actually accomplished for his country while he lived? This takes us back to the place of violence in political mythology at large. Criteria for heroism in relation to violence can take one of three main forms. First, a person can be a hero because of some accomplishment in a violent activity like war. These are, of course, the war heroes. Secondly, a person can be a hero because of his capacity for non-violence in the face of provocation. Mahatma Gandhi and Jesus Christ fall within this second category. And, thirdly, a person can be a hero simply by being a victim of someone else's violence in a particular set of circumstances. It is within this third category that Patrice Lumumba falls.

Young nations often feel a need to have an antiquity. The desire to be old becomes part of the quest for identity. And dead heroes even of the immediate past are history personified. In that lies their relevance for the development of national consciousness. Hero-worship when the heroes are alive is at best a case of secondary consensus; hero-worship when the heroes are dead might well be a contribution to primary consensus.

But the secret both of national pride and national cohesion is to know what to forget. The desire to be old and wrinkled as a nation must be accomplished by a determination to have a failing memory. In Kenya, for example, this phenomenon is tested against what happened during the Mau Mau insurrection. On the one hand, there is a desire that yesterday's villains—the Mau Mau fighters—should become today's heroes. On the other hand, there is a determination that yesterday's heroes—the "loyalists" who fought against the Mau Mau—should not become today's villains. A similar selectivity will be demanded of the memory of the Congolese. In the case of the legend of Lumumba, it is a selectivity which has already taken place.

As we have argued before, the very idea of a nation can sometimes be a little too abstract, and hence a little too cold, to command ready human allegiance. To give the idea of a nation warmth, it is often necessary either to personify it metaphorically, or, more effectively, to give it specific human form in national heroes. This is why ancestor-worship is important not only among tribes but also within nations. And this is indeed why the assassination of Patrice Lumumba remains one of the most important

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single contributions to the development of primary consensus in the Congo.

### *Pan-Africanism and the Assassin*

The distinction between national consensus and regional consensus in Africa is not always easy to draw. The same factors which make nationalism and Pan-Africanism in the continent so intimately connected have also produced an overlap between problems of domestic territorial identity and problems of continental racial identity. The very fact that Lumumba was a Pan-African hero before he became a Congolese national hero emphasizes this overlap.

Problems of separatism in Africa often get into a paradoxical relationship with problems of Pan-regionalism. The old issue of Katanga's secession, the continuing difficulty of secessionist Somalis in Kenya and Ethiopia, and even the isolation of Biafra, have in their different ways exemplified the tense connection between the politics of African separatism and problems of Pan-Africanism at large.

In what way is seccessionism on the one hand and pan-regionalism on the other related to the phenomenon of assassination in Africa? A step toward an answer can be taken by asking yet another question: What sort of issues in such areas of political experience arouse the kind of passions which produce assassins?

One major category is of issues which imply a great sense of finality once a decision is taken. And these are issues which command such a degree of emotional involvement among those affected that the apparent finality of the decision, once it is taken, seems almost unbearable to the loser. This category of issues can produce assassins even though the immediate reason for killing a public figure might be a mere side-effect of the central factor which set the passions free.

Pre-eminent among the breeding grounds of assassins is a situation involving territorial partition—prospective, accomplished, or thwarted partition. Partition can take different forms. The term is normally used to apply to a case like that of Ireland or India where a foreign power was involved in the partitioning. But in-

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ternally-generated secessionism is also a quest for partitioning a country.

Mahatma Gandhi lost his life in a situation involving separatist passions. Abraham Lincoln lost his life after frustrating a bid to partition the United States. More recently the issue of the separation of Algeria from France let loose emotions which resulted in a number of political murders, including several attempts on the life of de Gaulle.

The situation in the Algerian case was indeed complex. But to people like Jacques Soustelle, Algerian independence was at the time synonymous with the partition of France. The assassinative emotions generated were in part derived from the dread of partition, while the FLN was regarded as a secessionist movement.

When one considers this relationship between separatism and assassination, the prospect in Africa can be very disquieting. It was, after all, in Africa that Europe practiced the art of partition at its most elaborate. Where Europe attempted to unify those who were distinct, it left the seeds of future separatism—and Patrice Lumumba was assassinated in a secessionist province. Where Europe divided, it sometimes left behind latent passions for reunification—and political killings at the grass-roots level have resulted from such division. In short, balkanization is a breeding ground of political violence, including the phenomenon of assassination. And balkanization is what Africa is burdened with for the time being.

Pan-Africanism is often an attempt to grapple with the consequences of balkanization. One early assassination which had Pan-African significance, as well as being somewhat connected with Africa's fragmentation, was the assassination of Sylvanus Olympio, first president of independent Togo. In this regard, we might begin by noting that, from the point of view of Pan-Africanism, there are three types of assassinations. There is the kind of assassination which might harm the cause of Pan-Africanism; secondly, the kind which might conceivably help the cause of Pan-Africanism; and thirdly, of course, the kind which has had little relevance for Pan-Africanism.

The assassination of Sylvanus Olympio remains perhaps the most dramatic case of a continentally divisive assassination which Africa has had so far. Olympio happened to be a pre-eminently

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"bicultural" or "tricultural" African leader in his upbringing. He was at home both among French- and English-speaking colleagues. And his country, Togo, under his leadership, was expected to be an important inter-lingual link between the two sectors of Westernized Africa.

However, a border dispute between Togo and Ghana marred this picture of potential amity. Nkrumah had become a champion of the reunification of the Ewe on the two sides of the border, hoping thereby to enlarge the boundaries of Ghana. Because of this border dispute and of personality factors in the relations between Olympio and Nkrumah, Ghana became a little too hospitable in the refuge it gave to discontented Togolese "at war" with the regime of their own country.[11]

When, therefore, Olympio was assassinated in January 1963, there was immediate suspicion in some circles that Ghana under Nkrumah was, either directly or indirectly, implicated. Nigeria's Foreign Minister at the time, Jaja Wachuku, articulated his suspicions perhaps a little too quickly. He regarded Olympio's assassination as "engineered, organized, and financed by somebody." He warned that Nigeria would intervene militarily if "the contingent of armoured Ghanaian troops lined up on the Ghana-Togo border" attempted to cross the border.[12]

Observers outside shared similar suspicions. Even the pro-Ghana American periodical at the time, *Africa Today*, saw a connection between a frontier dispute of that kind and the danger of assassination. In its own words:

> It is not the opposition which takes to the hand grenade but usually the neighbouring country whose leaders have taken up the cause of the opposition. . . . Africa balkanised will continue to be fertile ground for senseless political rivalries.[13]

But apart from the issue of frontiers, there was the issue of diplomatic recognition. With the murder of Olympio, African states were faced for the first time with the whole problem of "legitimate succession" following a case of regicide. West African

[11] For a comprehensive recent treatment of the border problem and its ethnic implications, see Claude E. Welch Jr., *Dream of Unity* (Ithaca, 1966), especially Chaps. II, III.

[12] See Helen Kitchen, "Filling the Togo Vacuum," *Africa Report*, VIII (1963), 9.

[13] "Conspiracies and Balkanisation," *Africa Today*, X (1963), 3.

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governments were divided on the issue of whether or not to recognize the new Togolese government under Mr. Nicolas Grunitzky. From the east coast of Africa came the voice of Tanganyika, then almost alone as an independent state in its area. Tanganyika cabled the secretary-general of the United Nations in the following terms:

> After the brutal murder of President Olympio, the problem of recognition of a successor government has arisen. We urge no recognition until satisfied first that the government did not take part in Olympio's murder or second that there is a popularly elected government.[14]

The first condition concerned the issue of whether assumption of power was by legitimate means. The second concerned a possible subsequent legitimation of what was originally an illegitimate method of assuming power. Subsequent elections were, in other words, capable of giving a stamp of moral dignity to a regime which originally acceded as a result of assassination or insurrection. It was like de Gaulle coming into power in 1958 as a result of military insubordination—and then organizing a referendum throughout the French community in order to validate his standing.

The year of Olympio's murder was also the year of the formation of the Organization of African Unity. Only a few months separated the two events. The ghost of Olympio virtually dictated that dramatic part of Article III of the Charter of the new Organization: "unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination, as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring States or any other State."

Lumumba's martyrdom had perhaps, on the whole, been a positive contribution to Pan-Africanism. It gave Africa a shared hero as the memory of nationalism indulged in unifying selectivity. Olympio's murder, on the other hand, at first deeply divided the continent, as suspicion and recrimination reigned supreme. But history is beginning to reveal Olympio as essentially the first major victim of a military coup in independent Africa. His death now appears to have been an omen of things to come. Whether this prophetic symbolism of his assassination would convert Olympio into a continental African hero depends very much upon

[14] *Tanganyika Standard* (Dar-es-Salaam), Jan. 26, 1963.

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whether Africa will experience a fundamental disenchantment with military regimes—and turn back with nostalgia to the first casualty of the wave of militarism.

If that were to happen, other heroes, too, of pre-military Africa—from Lumumba to Balewa—may contribute the vague mystique of their ancient names to the slow growth of primary consensus in the consciousness of Africa.

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# Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth: The Economics of Food Aid Programs*

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In the late nineteen-fifties and early sixties, food aid became a large and popular part of the United States foreign aid program. Under Public Law 480, it took the form of concessional sales of foodstuffs for soft currencies and concurrent loans of most of the generated funds for economic development.[1] On the surface, food aid appeared to offer a convenient combination: it promoted economic development in the recipient countries and at the same time allowed the United States to defer a politically risky reform of its domestic agricultural price support policy, which was fostering surpluses. Soon, however, certain economists voiced fears that the proponents of PL 480 were ignoring a potential danger. By relieving the recipient countries of the necessity of supplying their ever increasing demands for food on their own, food aid may discourage them from attempting increased internal production. It may cause neglect of agricultural development and foster perma-

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[1] Throughout this paper, the type of food aid examined is not emergency aid meant to ease the famine caused by occasional poor harvests; such aid, temporary in nature, can be justified on humanitarian grounds alone. The food aid discussed here is that which is meant specifically to underwrite development plans in the recipient countries. Development aid has been the most important type of aid under PL 480.

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nent dependence on outside supplies of food beyond the ability of these countries to pay for them, even in the amounts presently needed and available.[2] At present, with the apparent end of the American food surplus, the consequent disappearance of the need for surplus disposal, and the new plans to increase American production of food specifically for the purpose of development aid, the effects of food aid on development take on renewed importance.

## I

As formulated by the FAO in its *Commodity Policy Studies #5* and *#6* and subsequently elaborated, food aid programs have been designed to avoid permanent dependence. The theory of food aid for development can be summarized as follows. Men are taken from the farm and put to work primarily in programs designed to increase the capital stock of the country without requiring a significant amount of imported capital goods. Wages can consist entirely or primarily of payment in kind, with the commodities making up this payment consisting of goods donated to the country as food aid. Alternatively, the laborers can be paid by internal credit creation (deficit financing). Such credit would, of course, exert inflationary pressures in an economy without sufficient real resources to meet the corresponding consumer demand. Because of the low income and diet levels of the workers, however, most of this new demand will be concentrated in food products of the kind which can be supplied from foreign surpluses. If, then, the government secures sufficient food aid in grants or loans, it can sell this food simultaneously with the execution of the development project and use the proceeds to offset the deficit created to pay wages on the project. To the extent that the additional demand created by the project can be met by the sale of surplus food, the deficit spending and danger of inflation will be minimized.

When resources complementary to labor, such as heavy industrial goods, are necessary for these capital formation projects and unavailable within the country, foreign exchange aid must supplement food aid. If complementary resources are to be supplied from

[2] In addition, the ability of the present food-surplus countries to supply indefinitely the ever growing needs of the rest of the world is questionable. Even population control will not eliminate the food problem, although it will make solution easier.

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within the country or some part of the wage bill is not translated into demand for food aid commodities, some slack must exist in the economy to supply this non-food demand.

The development which is supposed to accompany food aid should include sufficient improvements in agriculture to allow internal production eventually to replace the aid. The need for outside food aid should in time diminish and fall to zero. In practice, however, one way in which the distribution of food aid may inhibit the necessary increase in production is the transmission of disincentives to farmers through the price mechanism. As Mordecai Ezekiel points out in the FAO's *Pilot Study in India*, when the release of food aid shipments exactly corresponds in time and amount with the newly created demand for food, the effect of food aid on agricultural prices is neutral.[3] Any inflationary or deflationary forces which already exist in the economy will remain, but food aid and its associated programs in themselves will neither depress nor raise food prices. If, however, the release of the food precedes the creation of demand for it or if the amount released exceeds the amount newly demanded, prices received by domestic food producers will fall.[4]

Such a fall in food prices is no cause for concern if the price response of farmers is negative, as Deena Khatkhate and R. O. Olson have argued.[5] In the underdeveloped countries, according to this argument, the majority of food output originates on small subsistence farms which produce just about enough during normal harvests to support the farmers and their families. In the absence of any outside pressures, these subsistence farmers would have no

[3] Mordecai Ezekiel, *Commodity Policy Study #6, Uses of Agricultural Surpluses to Finance Economic Development in Underdeveloped Countries: A Pilot Study in India* (Rome, Food and Agricultural Organization, 1955), 5.

[4] Of course, historical prices are not necessarily the correct prices. Before the advent of food aid, they may already have been depressed by government policy below what they would have been on the free market. More important, yesterday's free market prices may not be the correct prices to induce an increase in supply sufficient to satisfy the new demand being met temporarily by food aid.

[5] Deena R. Khatkhate, "Some Notes on the Real Effects of Foreign Surplus Disposal in Underdeveloped Economies," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, LXXVI (1962), 186-96; R. O. Olson, "Impact and Implications of Foreign Surplus Disposal on Underdeveloped Economies—Discussion," *Journal of Farm Economics*, XLII (1960), 1042-45. Khatkhate's conclusions are based in part on the findings of P. N. Mathur and H. Ezekiel, "Marketable Surplus of Food and Price Fluctuations in a Developing Economy," *Kyklos*, XIV (1961), 396-408.

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incentive to market any of their food produce. They have, however, certain fixed obligations such as rents and taxes which must be met with cash payments. In any given year they must sell just enough of their output to cover their cash obligations.

This type of behavior has two implications. First, because the subsistence farmer cannot normally consume as much of his output as he would like, he has a powerful incentive to make his acreage yield as much as possible no matter what market prices are. The limits on his production, then, stem not from a lack of economic incentives, but from a lack of technique. Second, because the subsistence farmer cannot expand his production, the response to price of his marketed output is necessarily negative. His cash requirements are fixed, or nearly so. Therefore, high prices mean that he has to sell less food to meet these requirements and can keep more to consume. Even if prices are high enough to leave him, after meeting cash requirements, with a surplus greater than he can consume, he will not sell the excess. Rather, he will save it in kind in order to sell it when low prices force the sale of large amounts of produce to meet cash payments; by hoarding surpluses until the advent of low prices, the farmer avoids a sacrifice of current output that would severely restrict his consumption. Low prices, therefore, do not affect production adversely and actually increase the percentage of production which is marketed. High prices have the opposite effect.

Khatkhate further asserts that the behavior of larger producers often leads to a similar result because of destabilizing speculation. These producers hoard output as prices rise in hope of even higher prices and dump it as prices drop in fear of an even greater fall.

For the theory of negative price response to be valid, however, the total acreage, labor, and other factors of production engaged in agriculture must not expand or contract in response to price or be able to shift to alternative agricultural commodities under the stimulus of changes in relative prices.[6]

Does this rigidity in the allocation of resources engaged in agricultural production actually exist? The argument that resources

[6] It seems illogical to assume that all agricultural prices move together as a result of food aid and that, consequently, no changes in the relative prices of agricultural commodities will materialize to stimulate such shifting. Although an excess supply of wheat may depress the price of a substitute good such as rice by about as much as the price of wheat, the likelihood of a parallel effect on commodities like cotton appears negligible.

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used in agriculture as a whole are invariant with regard to price appears justified for that part of acreage engaged in subsistence farming, for the subsistence farmer must produce as much as he can regardless of price in order to support his family, and the resources at his command usually have no alternative use outside agriculture.[7] With regard to larger farms operating primarily as integrated parts of the monetized market economy, however, the most convincing supposition is that prices do affect inputs, investment, and production.[8] The destabilizing speculation described by Khatkhate can come into play, but only as a short-term reaction to price changes. As prices continue to be depressed, commercial farmers can contract production by reducing variable inputs—taking land out of production, dismissing or underemploying unneeded labor, using less seed and fertilizer. In addition, low prices may induce them to postpone or cancel investments in large-scale technological improvements which increase productivity. Higher prices will tend to produce the opposite long-run responses.

The relative importance of this responsive commercial sector and the importance of its price response are matters of debate.[9] In any case, as the underdeveloped economies become increasingly developed, more farms will leave the subsistence sector, and the price response of commercial farms will become ever more important.[10]

[7] Hope for increased total production from the present subsistence sector must lie with the introduction of new and different productive factors and new ways of organizing them.

[8] Empirical studies relating agricultural prices to yields and to total agricultural output have apparently been inconclusive. One explanation may be that the groups of farmers studied contained only a small number of market-oriented farms and a large group of subsistence units from which positive price response of yield and total output cannot be expected. See Panel on the World Food Supply, *The World Food Problem* (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), II, 528-29.

[9] See India, Planning Commission, *Third Five Year Plan* (Delhi, Government of India, Planning Commission, 1961), 231, for references indicating the existence of large progressive farms. For differing views of their importance, see Khatkhate, 190; Christoph Beringer, "Real Effects of Foreign Surplus Disposal in Underdeveloped Economies," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, LXXVII (1963), 318; Walter Falcon, "Further Comment," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, LXXVII (1963), 326.

[10] Falcon, 324; Franklin Fisher, "A Theoretical Analysis of the Impact of Food Surplus Disposal on Agricultural Production in Recipient Countries," *Journal of Farm Economics*, LXV (1963), 869.

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The negative price response theory also rests on a second implicit assumption which appears to be invalid for subsistence and commercial farms alike. The theory fails to recognize that resources in agriculture can shift among different crops even when they cannot shift out of agriculture itself. When faced with depressed prices for a commodity which they are marketing, farmers are not forced to act as if that commodity were the only one they could produce. On the contrary, they are free to shift to another crop commanding a higher price.

Such producer substitution implies a positive price response, and to the extent that it occurs, may bode ill for food aid which is administered so as to depress prices. If, for example, aid in the form of wheat depresses wheat prices, wheat growers can shift to the production of a substitute staple such as rice, whose price may also be falling, but, because of imperfect consumer substitution, not quite as fast as the price of wheat. This shift will raise rice production and hence lead to a further fall in the rice price until the ratio of wheat price to rice price comes to rest near its starting point. The wheat producers, however, will more likely shift to a non-food crop such as cotton. Because it is not a substitute for wheat, the price of cotton will not initially be affected by excess supplies of wheat. Hence, a switch to cotton may be more attractive for wheat farmers than a switch to a staple food crop; indeed, cotton may even attract producers of the other staples, whose prices are falling with that of wheat.[11] Cotton prices will begin to fall only as these new producers begin to inflate production, and even this decline may not materialize if internal and foreign demand are elastic.[12] Clearly, because the prices of non-food crops are less likely than those of staples to move downward together with the price of food aid commodities, such aid may well lead to adverse supply effects.[13] Food output, which is supposed to be growing to

[11] Even if the price-depressing effects of aid are confined to the one staple food that is being distributed, resources shifting out of its production may switch to a cash crop rather than to another staple, especially if they are more easily adapted to the cash crop's cultivation techniques.

[12] Despite the fact that international demand facing total supplies of an agricultural primary product like cotton appears to be inelastic, any particular country may well face an elastic foreign demand for such a commodity if its exports of that commodity are a small percentage of the total supply.

[13] The underdeveloped countries as a group cannot expect to trade these cash crops for food at favorable terms on the world market because, as a group, they

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take the place of food aid, will in these circumstances not only remain static but actually decline.

## II

Recent empirical studies of individual crops support the theory of positive response of production to price, despite the fact that price changes are probably dampened somewhat because a large part of retail receipts is absorbed by middlemen and landlords. For example, in Raj Krishna's study of the price elasticity of planned output in the Punjab for the period 1913-14 to 1945-46, the results indicate that nearly all crops in this region, which was relatively poor during the years covered, exhibited a positive acreage (supply) response with regard to price.[14] In a different study of the Punjab for the period 1933-34 to 1958-59, Walter Falcon also found a positive price response for cotton output, while Robert Stern found that prices influence the shifting of acreage between jute and competing crops (particularly rice) in the Bengal region of India.[15] Bauer and Yamey cite a case of Cypriot peasants switching from cereal crops to vineyard production in response to comparatively small changes in the relative prices of the commodities.[16] Similar results appear in other studies.[17]

Although both logical and empirical arguments indicate that food production will suffer if food-aid distribution is allowed to depress prices, this fact cannot serve as an a priori indictment of food aid. First, adverse effects will not materialize if, by chance, crop switching occurs mainly among substitute foods. Second, food aid distributed concurrently with new demand and in the

face a static and inelastic demand. Nor does it appear likely that such cash crops can create by import substitution the foreign exchange necessary for food purchases abroad. Manufactured goods, rather than non-food agricultural products, form the chief non-food imports of the underdeveloped countries. See any recent edition of GATT, *International Trade*, published annually in Geneva, for example, *International Trade 1963* (1964), 20-21.

[14] Raj Krishna, "Farm Supply Response in India-Pakistan," *Economic Journal*, LXXIII (1963), 477-87.

[15] Falcon, 324; Robert N. Stern, "Price Responsiveness of Primary Producers," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, LXVI (1962), 202-07.

[16] Peter T. Bauer and Basil S. Yamey, *The Economics of Underdeveloped Countries* (Chicago, 1963), 92-93.

[17] Panel on the World Food Supply, 526-28, provides a summary.

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right quantities will have no effect on prices; in fact, if food aid falls slightly short of the demand created by projects it fosters, a moderate rise in prices will probably occur. The ultimate price-depressing effects of food aid, if any, depend mainly on the policies of the governments using the aid.

Several empirical studies have attempted to assess the degree to which recipients of food aid have in fact avoided its potential price- and production-depressing effects. In Israel, PL 480 imports appear not only to have produced few adverse price and production effects but actually to have stimulated production. This favorable result was the outcome of a number of factors. First, food aid was used in the context of a vigorous development program which assured a high level of demand. Second, prices were raised even further by the relaxation of rationing and price controls as PL 480 stocks came on to the market. Third, the increased supply of foodgrains allowed an increase in livestock production which also contributed to the demand for home-grown grains. Fourth, and most important, contrary to the PL 480 agreement, sixty-nine per cent of the aid commodities merely displaced normal imports, only thirty-one per cent representing food in excess of what would otherwise have been imported.[18]

In Colombia, where some demand creation resulted from new development projects undertaken with food aid, relative prices and production of the aid commodities sesame and cotton rose, aided in the case of cotton by both active price supports and technical assistance. The government, however, did not take measures to offset the aid-induced deflationary pressure on wheat prices. As a result, acreage shifted out of wheat, and production did not increase despite technical assistance. But because the farmers shifted to the production of barley, the price of which was supported, the potentially harmful effects on food production of depressed wheat prices did not materialize.[19]

In Pakistan, the government adopted a policy of using U.S. surplus food to keep food prices from rising any faster than the

[18] Alfred A. Kahn, "Agricultural Aid and Economic Development: The Case of Israel," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, LXXVI (1962), 568-91; Carl Eicher and Lawrence W. Witt, *Agriculture in Economic Development* (New York, 1964), 346-48.

[19] Eicher and Witt, 348-49; Theodore J. Goering, "P.L. 480 in Colombia," *Journal of Farm Economics*, LXIV (1962), 992-1004.

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general price level, and total acreage devoted to rice and wheat has increased only slightly, yields not at all.[20] Even more significant, however, Christoph Beringer's study of the effects of PL 480 distribution in Pakistan reveals that the method of distribution has a depressing effect on production over and above that resulting from deliberate measures to keep prices down.[21] When the release of food is deemed necessary, the government tends to distribute all of it in the large cities because of their convenience to the only facilities where PL 480 stocks can be stored. In order to insure the orderly absorption of this food, it enjoins private farmers from selling their produce in the urban areas, which comprise the chief markets for some of the most productive farming areas in Pakistan. The private farmers are left to sell their crops in the food-surplus areas where they are grown, for food deficit areas other than the cities are closed to the farmers for the same reason that the government stocks are not distributed there—inadequate storage facilities. Pakistan's food-aid distribution policy causes oversupply and negative price incentives in the most productive areas of the country, while leaving unsupplied infertile food-deficit areas where high prices and shortages will likely cause famine rather than substantial new production.[22] The prevalence of poor storage and marketing facilities in underdeveloped areas suggests that such behavior may not be rare.[23]

Although no study has specifically explored the relationships among food aid, prices, and production in India, depressed food-grain prices certainly are in evidence there. S. R. Sen of the India Planning Commission asserts that India is careful to support farm prices through procurements for its national food reserve and fair price shops. Critics contend, however, that the minimum support prices also tend to be price ceilings, below free market prices, and that procurement prices do not even cover average costs of pro-

[20] Eicher and Witt, 350.

[21] Beringer, 319-23.

[22] Similar practices may also result from the government's desire to have farmers sell to a national food agency below normal market prices in order to keep the price level down. The government then transfers the food to deficit areas and sells it at a controlled price. In such a case, the price-depressing effects are deliberate. See FAO, *Commodity Policy Study #11* (Rome, 1958), 39.

[23] For an indication of India's food storage problems, see India, *Third Five Year Plan*, 130-31.

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duction.[24] Procurement has sometimes taken the form of compulsory deliveries, enforced by zonal restrictions to prevent the movement of grain out of the most productive areas except by sale to the government.[25] S. J. Patel points out that the support prices are based solely on average historical prices, with little regard to the amounts and kinds of agricultural production which the government wishes to encourage.[26] The availability of food aid may very well encourage such price depressing policies, which, according to many observers, are probably aggravating India's chronic and severe food shortage by discouraging needed production.[27]

The examples of India, Pakistan, and Colombia indicate that a substantial number of policy-makers in the underdeveloped countries do not accept the importance of price incentives.[28] They appear to assume that (1) high prices do not bring about increases in food production, (2) low prices are necessary to prevent urban unrest, and (3) an inflation of food prices will wreck the development plan because it will lead to a general wage-led inflation, food being the principal item in workers' budgets. Of course, an enormous inflation such as occurs after a poor harvest introduces instability and hardships which are clearly undesirable. Yet a mild inflation of food prices above the general price level, if sustainable, would probably call forth needed production without instability or undue hardship.[29] Although Franklin Fisher may overstate the

[24] S.R. Sen, "Impact and Implications of Foreign Surplus Disposal on Underdeveloped Economies," *Journal of Farm Economics*, XLII (1960), 1034; Charles E. Lindblom, "Has India an Economic Future?" *Foreign Affairs*, XLIV (1966), 241; Shwabhai J. Patel, "Impact of Food Policy on Agricultural Development," *Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics*, XXI (1966), 247-51; John P. Lewis, *Quiet Crisis in India* (Garden City, N.Y., 1964), 162-63.

[25] FAO, *Commodity Policy Study #11*, 30.

[26] Patel, 249; also, S. C. Jha, "Achieving Food Goals: A Framework for Policy Formulation," *Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics*, XXI (1966), 262.

[27] Patel, 251-52; Jha, 262; also notice the mention of "low procurement prices" as a reason for the failure of state procurement in two papers summarized on page 282 of the same journal.

[28] See, also, Khatkhate; G. Parthasarathy, "Agricultural Price Stabilisation in the Context of Rapid Economic Development," *Indian Economic Journal*, VI (1959), 456-65; and National Advisory Committee on Food and Fiber, *Food and Fiber for the Future* (Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967), 331-32.

[29] Much of this added production would probably come from acreage being switched out of non-food crops. However, for modern market farms and for

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case, inflation does perform a valuable function in calling forth extra production where it is needed.[30] As food-aid commodities are integrated into development plans, the demand created for them should be sufficient to strike a balance between the inflation desirable as a production stimulus and that which would be detrimental to political and economic stability. And in the event that the rise in foodgrain prices deemed necessary to call forth adequate production does appear incompatible with the maintenance of political stability or does inflict undue hardship on certain consumers, food could still be procured at sufficiently high prices and sold to consumers at lower prices, with government expenditures bridging the gap.[31] This course of action should be avoided if possible because it would divert scarce government resources from investment to the subsidizing of consumption.

Whether or not the price gap is adopted, the government should complement price incentives for producers with open market operations, purchasing grain when necessary to assure prices adequate to stimulate production, selling it at other times to combat excessive inflation resulting from abnormally poor harvests. Adoption of this policy tool would guarantee price stability, which may well be as important an element in encouraging foodgrain production as favorable price levels. Uncertainty about the prices they will receive for their harvest discourages farmers from investing to increase production and improve productivity (and may even discourage some from producing a particular crop altogether). Government open market operations can eliminate this uncertainty, especially if they are carried out within a framework of forward pricing, the government publicizing in advance the minimum price at which it will purchase each crop. Price stability will also

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subsistence farms which have been introduced to new inputs and new methods through agricultural extension programs, inflation of foodgrain prices could also be a way of shifting purchasing power from consumption to agricultural investment. For a concise summary of the desirability of this shift, see T. Balogh, The Economics of Poverty (New York, 1966), 363.

[30] Fisher, 868.

[31] Jha, 262-63. The introduction of this price gap would also require a complex rationing system and administrative organization, as Jha describes. The demands on the underdeveloped country's typically small supply of administrative talent which such an organization implies weighs against the adoption of the gap.

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prevent interruptions in development because of inflation and discourage speculation in foodgrains.

In order to be able to intervene as market conditions dictate, the government must back up its open market operations with a substantial food reserve, which it can build up and deplete as required.[32] Because of the difficulty of building such a reserve from the already inadequate food production prevailing in most underdeveloped countries, here is one area in which food aid commodities can be used directly to encourage increased food production. Of course, the food reserve stocks would have to be buttressed by adequate storage, transportation, and distribution facilities throughout the country so that a shortage or glut in any area could be met quickly, and unwise distribution methods like those that Beringer observed in Pakistan could be avoided.

## III

In addition to and coincidental with charges of depressing price incentives, food aid has also been accused of encouraging governments in developing countries to neglect the development of agriculture in favor of more "modern" and glamorous industrial projects. Critics have advanced two main arguments why food aid is more likely than general foreign exchange aid to skew development efforts away from agriculture. First, food aid involves no opportunity cost when employed to fill the gap between domestic production and demand; it has no other use. Because foreign exchange aid spent on procuring food can also be used to acquire foreign capital goods vitally needed for industrial development, the necessity of using this type of aid to purchase food will presumably exert pressure on planners to speed up agricultural development so as to eliminate the drain on foreign exchange aid. Second, because food aid is widely viewed in underdeveloped countries as comprising products which the United States wants to get rid of, planners see the prospect of its continuance undiminished into the future as more certain than a similar prospect for general

[32] Mathur and Ezekiel, Khatkhate, Parthasarathy, Olson, and FAO study #11 all discuss the advantages of a food reserve. They concentrate, however, more on price ceilings than upon the equally vital price floors. The value of price floors and forward pricing together with a food reserve is clearly and forcefully argued by Lewis, 163-65, and Balogh, 363-64.

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aid. Therefore, according to this argument, they feel that the wisest course for development is to promote the fastest possible industrial growth so that some of the industrial goods procured with general aid can be either produced at home or paid for by industrial exports in the event of an aid cutback. If agricultural output lags, food aid will always be available, for it benefits the donor as well as the recipient.

In order to examine the validity of these assertions, let us consider, as an example, the much lamented food crisis of India. As can be seen from Table 1, foodgrain production in India grew at average rates of about 3.6 per cent and 3.9 per cent per year in the First and Second Plan periods, respectively. Both of these rates were sufficient to meet (and in the first period to exceed) the production targets of the respective plans, and the first period performance was widely acclaimed. In the second period, however, it became apparent that the production growth being achieved was not closing the gap between demand for and supply of foodgrains and that any temporary lag in production resulting from a failure of the monsoon would precipitate a food crisis.[33] A recent analysis has shown that the trend of local production was falling behind the trend of consumption throughout the First and Second Plan periods.[34] The Third Plan called for increasing the average annual growth rate to 4.2 per cent, but in fact production grew considerably more slowly than under the previous two plans. Even though output in the terminal year is not an adequate measure of the achievements over the period, reflecting as it does the effects of poor weather, potential output, judging from performance during the last normal harvest, grew at only half the planned rate.

Can India achieve a better growth record in food grain production? A study for the Business Council for International Understanding indicates that an annual growth rate of 5 per cent is the highest feasible rate.[35] But, especially during the Third Plan period, India has not even come close to achieving 5 per cent. If the solution lies in increasing the size of public investment, India's government sector does have the resources to invest more in agri-

[33] See Lewis, 48-49. A failure of the monsoon and a food crisis did in fact occur in the production year 1957-58.

[34] See *The World Food Problem*, II, 686-87.

[35] *Ibid.*, 688-89.

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TABLE 1

Growth of Foodgrain Production in India

| Period | Production (Millions of Metric Tons) | Increase over Previous Period (Millions of Metric Tons) | Growth % per year, average |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1949-50 | 56.1 | — | |
| 1950-51 | 50.8 | — | |
| 1955-56[a] (using 1949-50 as base) | 66.8 | 10.7 | 3.6% |
| 1955-56 (using 1950-51 as base) | 66.8 | 16.0 | 5.6% |
| 1960-61[b] | 81.0 | 14.2 | 3.9% |
| 1965-66 (Ford Target)[c] | 110.0 | 29.0 | 6.3% |
| 1965-66 (Actual Target) | 100.0 | 19.0 | 4.2% |
| 1965-66 (Actual Production) | 72.6 | -8.4 | — |
| 1965-66[d] (Estimated Potential Output Given Good Weather) | 90.0 | 9.0 | 2.1% |
| 1966-70 (Goal) | 120.0 | 30.0 | 5.9% |

[a] Using 1949-50 as a base and calling the production of this year the potential production of 1950-51 gives a better indication of the growth of foodgrain output over the First Plan than using actual 1950-51 production, for 1950-51 was an abnormally poor harvest year.

[b] The growth rate over the Second Plan should perhaps be slightly lower and that over the First Plan slightly higher because the harvest of 1955-56 was somewhat below that of the two previous years.

[c] This target was proposed by a team of Ford Foundation agricultural consultants, but was not accepted in the Third Plan.

[d] Potential output is estimated from production in the last normal harvest year.

Sources: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, *India: A Reference Annual, 1965* (Delhi, 1965), except Ford Target from Ford Foundation, *India's Food Crisis and Steps to Meet It* (Delhi, 1959), Actual Target (1965-66) from India, Planning Commission, *Third Five Year Plan* (Delhi, 1961), Actual Production (1965-66) from New York *Times*, Nov. 13, 1966, Goal (1966-70) from Panel on the World Food Supply, *The World Food Problem*, II (Washington, 1967).

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culture, providing that it is willing to cut back somewhat in other areas.[36] Actual public investment in agriculture amounted to only 21 per cent of the total during the Third Plan, as opposed to 31 per cent during the First Plan, for example. (See Table 2.) But as John P. Lewis convincingly argues, the share of agriculture in public investment may not have to be greatly increased (if at all) to reap substantial output gains. Not huge investments in capital equipment and research but a more effective effort to introduce the farmer to already proven, relatively simple advances in technique is necessary. And while such an increase in effectiveness may demand some additional investment to provide, for example, increased rural credit and intensified agricultural extension services, its main requirement is a restructuring of the effort to reach the farmer, particularly so as to destroy the political power of the village elites which obstruct all change as inimical to their power.[37]

The implication of this brief analysis is that India must and can improve her performance in foodgrain production. Now we can address the central question: Would she have performed better if food aid had been general aid? I think not. First, the zero opportunity-cost argument neglects to consider that the same preference for industrial development which can make planners realize the opportunity cost of foreign exchange spent on food can also work to convince them that emphasis on industrial rather than agricultural development is the fastest way to eliminate the exchange bottleneck, especially if development of agriculture implies a temporary de-emphasis of the industrial effort or requires unpopular political acts.[38] Second, although the idea that food-aid commodities are worse than useless to the donors may in the past have worked against agricultural development, now that food is no longer surplus it can no longer be taken for granted. Third, although food aid is no longer automatic, it is still likely to be less grudgingly given than foreign exchange aid, for it is bound to be popular with the powerful American farm bloc. In the future,

[36] Of course, some industrial investments (for example, fertilizer plants) and some communications investments (like farm to market roads) do benefit agriculture directly, but certainly not all of them do.

[37] See Lewis, Chap. 6; for a more drastic view of the reorganization needed, see Balogh, Chap. 4.

[38] I have already indicated that it may require both, especially political courage. Planners may also overestimate peasant resistance to new techniques.

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TABLE 2

Public Sector Outlay—in 10,000,000 of Rupees

| | I 1st Plan | II 2nd Plan | III 3d Plan est. | IV 3d Plan actual |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Plan Outlay | 1960 | 4600 | 7500 | 8341 |
| Agriculture and Related Activities | 601 | 950 | 1718 | 1754 |
| Agriculture and Community Development | 291 | 530 | 1068 | 1092 |
| Major and Medium Irrigation and Flood Control | 310 | 420 | 650 | 662 |
| Industry | 74 | 1075 | 1784 | 1902 |
| Power, Transport, and Communications | 1285 | 1345 | 2498 | 3270 |
| Other (Social Services and Misc.) | | 830 | 1500 | 1415 |
| Sectors as % of Total | | | | |
| Agriculture | 31% | 20% | 23% | 21% |
| Industry | 4% | 24% | 24% | 22.8% |
| Power, Transport, Communications | 65% | 38% | 20% | 17% |
| Other | | 18% | 33% | 39.2% |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |

Sources: Column I—India, Planning Commission, *Third Five Year Plan* (Delhi, 1961).

Columns II and III—India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, *India: A Reference Annual, 1965* (Delhi, 1965).

Column IV—India, Ministry of Finance, *Pocket Book of Economic Information, 1965* (Delhi, 1965).

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therefore, as in the past, the end of food aid would probably not imply compensation with an equal amount of foreign exchange aid. The end of food aid would mean, rather, fewer resources to use in development, a slower pace for the total development effort, and probably even a slower rate of agricultural development, even if the relative share of agriculture in total investment increases.

In conclusion, the case against food aid as it relates to the skewing of development planning away from agriculture is not convincing. On the other hand, the potential to retard agricultural development by transmitting adverse incentives through the price mechanism is a real danger inherent in this type of aid.[39] But seeing that the United States government is now well aware of this danger, it can easily specify as a condition for food aid that the recipients employ policy measures which minimize harmful price effects.[40] When they are so minimized, food aid can be as valuable as general foreign aid in fostering all kinds of economic development in food-deficit areas such as India. Indeed, because the purpose of all aid is to make the difficult problems of economic development more manageable, the best means to encourage those underdeveloped countries with vast food problems to undertake their solution is not less aid, as cutbacks in food aid would imply, but more, as an incentive to attack the problem more vigorously.[41]

[39] The release of more grain than necessary to meet increased demand for food resulting from development without destroying price incentives may stem from the zero opportunity cost of food aid. If food had to be purchased with general foreign aid, the amounts released would not likely exceed that absolutely necessary to prevent consumer unrest. Thus the price effects of zero opportunity cost are a greater cause for concern than the "plan" effects already discussed.

[40] For evidence of U.S. awareness of food aid's potential to depress prices, see Panel on the World Food Supply, 189; National Advisory Commission on Food and Fiber, 35-36, 131-34, 333.

[41] For a discussion of aid incentives, see Lindblom, 249-52.

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# Some Reflections on Sorel and Machiavelli*

NEAL WOOD
*York University*

The comparison of Georges Sorel and Niccolò Machiavelli is not without precedent. Some twenty years ago James Burnham maintained that Sorel (along with Mosca, Michels, and Pareto) shared in a tradition of thinking called Machiavellism.[1] The principal tenets of the tradition consist of a faith in an empirical science of politics, and a conception of politics as a struggle for power involving force and fraud, in which the role of a ruling elite and non-rational action arising from an ideology are central. Burnham's approach tends to distort rather than illuminate the ideas of Sorel and Machiavelli, although I have no intention of taking issue directly with his position. Instead I shall argue that grounds for the comparison of the two thinkers are to be sought in their common devotion to a regenerative morality born out of strife and conflict, for which they find a source of inspiration in the ancient classical world. Despite the four centuries separating the two thinkers, both view politics as a kind of warfare and describe it in military terms. Oddly enough, a strikingly similar outlook is reflected in much of contemporary American thinking on the political process, a fact to which little if any attention has been directed.

* The original version of this essay was a published lecture given at the University of California, Berkeley, Aug. 19, 1965.

[1] James Burnham, *The Machiavellians, Defenders of Freedom* (New York, 1943).

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## I

Like many of his Socialist predecessors, Sorel turns to classical antiquity. His first book, *Le procès de Socrate*, is evidence of his fascination with ancient Greece and its formative influence upon his thought.[2] In this work he discusses the Athenian polis prior to what he considers its period of corruption and decline, from the beginning of the fifth century B.C. onward. These ancient Athenians were far superior to the ignorant and avaricious bourgeoisie of his own age.[3] Their society was one of industrious and thrifty equals. In comparison with the modern bourgeoisie, the Athenian citizens were not merchants clamoring for guarantees of trade, for protection of their industry, or for governmental favors; they were soldiers whose very reason for being was the grandeur of their polis, whose slightest weakness endangered the common good. According to Sorel the significance of the life of ancient Greece and Rome cannot be grasped unless heed is given to their military arrangements.[4] Ancient constitutions were shaped by the necessities of war; the education of youth was fundamentally preparation for war. The polis was indeed a warriors' guild. Classical thinkers, among them Aristotle, were fully aware of the basic military nature of the polis. So, for example, the Stagirite attempted to imitate the ancient Athenian military order in his preliminary outline of the ideal constitution contained in the last two books of the *Politics*.[5]

A life of military preparedness, of constant war and the threat of war, were for Sorel not the only interesting characteristics of classical times. He was greatly attracted to what he understood of the ancient economy, predominantly rural and agrarian, as opposed to the urbanism and commercialism of the later decadent years.[6] Agrarian life in itself, however, was not so much the attraction as the fact that the citizen-soldiers were landed proprietors who formed a fraternity of producers. Instead of living a parasitic life of indolence and luxury, the warrior-farmers actually planned the labor, did much of it themselves, and closely super-

[2] Georges Sorel, *Le procès de Socrate* (Paris, 1889).
[3] *Ibid.*, 170-72.
[4] *Ibid.*, 167.
[5] *Ibid.*, 170-71; also Sorel, *Matériaux d'une théorie du prolétariat* (Paris, 3d ed., 1929), 388.
[6] *Le procès*, 375 ff.; *Matériaux*, 387-89.

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vised their workers. Their unusual understanding of the productive process is manifest in the careful records kept by the ancient Roman agriculturalists.

Two articulate representatives of the hardy, traditional spirit survived the increasing decay of commercial Athens: Aristophanes and Xenophon.[7] As have few commentators, Sorel succeeds in penetrating to the heart of Xenophon's thought in a brief evaluation of the *Oeconomicus*, which he judges one of the most remarkable works of antiquity. The *Oeconomicus*, the first extant treatise on estate management, is by the famous soldier-farmer and founder of Western military science, whose exploits are largely known through his account of the trek of the Ten Thousand in the *Anabasis*. Xenophon is a kind of archaic survival of Greek military and agrarian life. Sorel notes that he approaches the problem of estate-management from the standpoint of a man of war. Military imagery and comparisons are employed to explain the performance of various tasks and the duties of the different workers. The ideal farm, in fact, is organized and managed like an efficient army.[8] Xenophon, comments Sorel, carries on in the *Oeconomicus* the ancient tradition of a great national poetry, without resorting to the overly polished exposition or the fine dialectical hair-splitting of his master Socrates. Much later, in the *Reflexions sur la violence* (1906), Sorel, referring to the *Memorabilia* as well as the *Oeconomicus*, affirms that Xenophon represents an older Greek tradition than Plato.[9] The soldier-farmer understands the nature of production; the philosopher does not. Speaking in the guise of Socrates in the *Memorabilia*, Xenophon advises a destitute citizen, who must provide for a large family, to establish a workshop in his home manned by the members of his family. Sorel's implication is that a recommendation of this kind represents a tradition older than Plato, because the ancient Greeks did not shun labor if by it they could free themselves from subjection by others and become self-sufficient.

[7] *Le procès*, 375 ff.; *Matériaux*, 387.

[8] For a full discussion of this perspective, see my article, "Xenophon's Theory of Leadership," in *Classica et Mediaevalia* XXV (1964), 33-66. On this score my view of Xenophon is in agreement with Sorel's, although I did not discover his interpretation until after my article had gone to press.

[9] Sorel, *Reflections on Violence*, trans. T. E. Hulme and J. Roth, Introduction by Edward Shils (Glencoe, 1950), 263, n. 59.

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What, then, are the reasons for Sorel's fixation upon the military and productive characteristics of the ancient polis? Obviously, he is not urging the revival of the polis as a form of social organization for his own industrial Europe. He does believe, however, that something of its élan and social solidarity can be recaptured at a new and higher level by the creation of revolutionary syndicates of workers. An indication of his ideal is found in a concluding statement of *La ruine du monde antique* (1902): "Socialism returns to ancient thought; but the warrior of the polis has become the worker of large industry; his weapons have been replaced by machines."[10] The vigorous, patriotic, almost ascetic soldier-farmer is replaced in Sorel's mind by the proletarian artisan, exercising control over the means of production in the small workshop, experiencing the joy of genuine creation, and becoming the master rather than the slave of the works fashioned by his art.[11] United in syndicates, the proletarian warriors will be locked in constant struggle with the bourgeois enemy. Out of the new warfare and the new production a new morality will emerge, completely transforming human relations and revolutionizing society.

Excited as he is by the ancient polis, Sorel never views its life of war and production as an end, only as a means to the fruition of a heroic morality. Ancient strife between cities was responsible for a virtue hardly equaled since. The industrial workers' revolutionary action against capitalism, in preparation for the ultimate clash of the general strike, is the latter-day substitute for the warfare of antiquity: "The revolutionary Syndicates argue about socialist action in the same manner as military writers argue about war."[12] Much of Sorel's outlook is clarified in an article on Proudhon.[13] The Proudhonian community is analogous to the polis, which

[10] Sorel, *La ruine du monde antique: conception matérialiste de l'histoire*, Introduction by Édouard Berth (Paris, 3d. ed., 1933), 311.

[11] Sorel believed that a true art would develop only on the basis of syndicates of workers. Such an art would be one of utility. See Pierre Angel, *Essais sur Georges Sorel* (Paris, 1937), 229-30.

[12] *Reflections*, 137.

[13] "Essai sur la philosophie de Proudhon," *Revue Philosophique*, XXXIII (1892), XXXIV (1892). The following quotations are from page 44, as found in James H. Meisel, *The Genesis of Georges Sorel, An Account of His Formative Period Followed by a Study of His Influence* (Ann Arbor, 1951), 96. Also see Sorel, *Le procès*, 170, n. 3; *Matériaux*, 389, n. 2.

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"had always been a congregation of soldiers." War for Proudhon "reveals our ideal to us . . . creates the great epics . . . reinvigorates nations gone soft." In the course of battle "man discovers his own best qualities: courage, patience, disregard of death, devotion to glory and the good of his fellows, in one word: his virtue." Repeatedly in the *Reflections on Violence* Sorel refers to the ancient heroic morality dependent upon the pursuit of honor and glory in military ventures.[14] Nietzsche's eulogy of the Homeric heroes is quoted with obvious relish: "that audacity of noble races, that mad, absurd, and spontaneous audacity, their influence and contempt for all security of the body, for life, for comfort."[15]

But, according to Sorel, the ancient Athenian heroism had practically disappeared by the time of the Peloponnesian War, once the city had become the emporium of a vast commercial empire with a consumer's economy characterized by avarice, luxury, and indolence. The emergence of oligarchical government catering to the masses and encouraging mediocrity in all walks of life suggests modern bourgeois democracy to Sorel. A morality of the golden mean, of moderation, based upon reason instead of conflict and war, replaced the morality of soldier-producers. The rationalism of the Sophists and of Socrates and his disciples was responsible for an intellectual orgy of introspection and self-consciousness, the ideological manifestation of a dying culture. Sorel's observations concerning the decline of Athens in *Le procès de Socrate* are his first efforts to formulate a general theory of decadence, elaborated in subsequent writings.[16] By adopting Vico's conception of *ricorso*, he conceives of each organized society passing through successive ascending and descending phases of grandeur and decadence. Western civilization has experienced at least three phases of decadence: the breakup of the Hellenic polis, the disintegration of the Roman empire, and the corruption of nineteenth-century bourgeois Europe. Decadent periods of history display political disunity, economic stagnation, military weak-

[14] *Reflections*, 50-57, 187-88, 257-60, 268-69, 276.

[15] *Ibid.*, 257.

[16] A very useful analytic summary of Sorel's concept of decadence drawn from his various works is Jean Wanner, *Georges Sorel et la Décadence: Essai sur l'idée de décadence dans la pensée de Georges Sorel* (Lausanne, 1943). Also see especially Sorel, *Les illusions du progrès* (Paris, 4th ed., 1927), 287-336; *Reflections, passim.*

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ness, disrespect for tradition, creative decline, and the leveling of all social classes to the lowest common denominator. A prime causal factor seems to be the disappearance of conflict. When a people no longer are compelled to struggle for survival, when internal contention is reduced to a minimum, their original vigor, hardiness, and decisiveness decline and disappear. Self-seeking and the loss of a sense of civic duty destroy the social fabric. Disintegration is accelerated by the questioning of rationalism; a malady of reflection and self-analysis paralyzes the will to action. Sorel's lifelong quest is for a solution to the decadence of his own epoch, and for the foundation of a heroic morality in a new dimension.

## II

Machiavelli also looks to the ancient world for moral inspiration. His political theory, reconstructed from the four major works, *The Prince*, the *Discourses*, *The Art of War*, and the *History of Florence*, is informed by the notion of an ideal man and the kind of society necessary to produce his hero.[17] The model is the sturdy citizen-soldier of the Roman republic prior to the first Punic War. He is the patriot dedicated to the common good, a man of action exhibiting foresight, constancy, boldness, self-discipline, fortitude, determination, and bravery—qualities often summarized by Machiavelli's use of the single term *virtù*. The Machiavellian hero of *virtù* is *homo militans*, the very opposite of *homo oeconomicus*, the self-seeking, acquisitive individual who aims at economic aggrandizement through a life of commerce, the model for the concept of human nature found in many of the early liberal thinkers and in the classical economists. *Homo militans* is the glory-seeker desirous of immortality, that is, some permanence in a cosmos of perpetual flux, through a personal triumph remembered and cherished by his contemporaries, and, more importantly, by posterity. Glory of the highest variety can be achieved by founding a new order of things, a new religion or a new state, by giving an existing state a new code of laws, and by great po-

[17] Unless otherwise indicated, what follows on Machiavelli summarizes certain of my views in my Introduction to Machiavelli, *The Art of War*, a revised edition of the Ellis Farneworth translation (Indianapolis, New York, and Kansas City, 1965).

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litical or military leadership.[18] True glory can never be won simply by the acquisition of wealth and power,[19] but the glory-seeker may win fame even in failure, as defeat brought posthumous renown to a Leonidas or Cato Minor. While Machiavelli stresses the military virtues of the Romans, and gives scant attention to their economy, he does refer to the simple agrarian life of his hero, who in times of peril may be called by his city to the highest office, only to return like Cincinnatus, after the fulfillment of his civic obligation, to the ploughing of his humble acres.

The Romans, as presented by the Florentine, were a frugal, disciplined people, devoted to a life of arms. A single, steadfast attachment to the common good accounted in great measure for their glorious exploits. Moreover, Roman glory resulted from an ardent and deep-rooted republicanism. Citizen-soldiers of Rome won the greatest glory in their continuous struggle for existence in a hostile environment of ferocious enemies, by fighting, as it were, for themselves, not for the sake of a commander or ruler. Roman glory was the citizen's glory, and the citizen's achievements redounded to the credit of the whole military brotherhood. The liberty provided by the republican form of government proved to be the ideal condition for the pursuit of glory.

Rome, for Machiavelli, is the model of the best government because it secured most adequately the ends of good government in general. The foundation of good government is an adequate military establishment for protection against the external foe. Internally, security must be provided for a citizen's life, family, property, and honor. Although general economic prosperity is important, individual acquisition and conspicuous consumption are to be strictly regulated. Merit is to be rewarded generously, and the pursuit of honor and glory in the service of the state is to be encouraged. The mixed constitution of the Roman republic, with institutions such as dictatorship, censorship, public accusations, popular assemblies, sumptuary laws, and a citizens' army, are fundamental means to these ends. In addition, Machiavelli emphasizes the significance of the rule of law as a guarantee of the citizen's liberty and security. Machiavelli's ideal, therefore,

[18] Machiavelli, *Discourses*, I, x.

[19] For the distinction between true and false glory, see Machiavelli, *Prince*, VIII, XIX; *Discourses*, I, ix-x.

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was a republic of citizen-soldiers, designed to provide peace and security in a hazardous world and to offer opportunities for heroic actions.

Machiavelli also offers a theory of civic degeneration similar to Sorel's. Commonwealths can be virtuous only under conditions of necessity, when, in order to survive, a people must display a spirit of cooperation and of dedication to the common good and act with industry, determination, and courage. The necessity that unites a people and generates such spirit may be a hostile physical environment, the constant threat of an external power, or the actual aggression of an enemy. Once a commonwealth succeeds in securing and maintaining its existence, degeneration begins. Although well-devised laws can serve as a substitute for an external foe by forcing a people to be virtuous, those responsible for executing the law and adjusting it to new conditions will grow lax in any prolonged period of peace and prosperity. Of course, class conflict, providing it takes place within the limits of a patriotic devotion to the common good and a willingness to abide by the rules of the game, will invigorate the body politic. Once corruption sets in, however, healthy class conflict deteriorates into factional strife and civil war. Long periods of peace and plenty result in a general relaxation and indolence, a decline of the old spirit and vigor, a propensity to acquire personal wealth, power, and luxury at the expense of the common good. Respect for authority and the sense of civic duty are weakened; questioning of traditional values begins; the original social solidarity is transformed into a collection of individuals, each for himself. Religious belief ceases to be a vital social bond; extremes of wealth and poverty develop. From the political standpoint, conspiracy, assassination, and governmental instability become commonplace. From the military standpoint, the degenerate commonwealth may at any time be a victim of foreign aggression. Every commonwealth is doomed to such eventual corruption. Inspired leadership and rational social organization may delay, but cannot indefinitely prevent the spread of decay. Even the most virtuous of all peoples, the Romans, could maintain their liberties for only four hundred years. Machiavelli summarizes his views in his case-history of civic decadence, the *History of Florence:*

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It may be observed that commonwealths amid the vicissitudes to which they are subject, pass from order into disorder, and afterward return from disorder to order. Since the nature of the world does not allow things to continue in an even course, when they have arrived at their greatest perfection, they soon begin to decline. Similarly, having been reduced by disorder to their worst condition and, unable to descend lower, they, of necessity, reascend. Thus from good they gradually decline to evil, and from evil again return to good. The reason is that *virtù* produces peace; peace, indolence; indolence, disorder; disorder, ruin; so from disorder order springs; from order *virtù*, and from this, glory and good fortune. Hence, wise men have observed that the age of literary excellence follows that of distinction in arms, and that in commonwealths and cities, great commanders are produced before philosophers. Arms having secured victory, and victory peace, the spirited vigor of the martial mind cannot be corrupted by a more excusable indolence than that of letters. Nor can indolence with any greater or more dangerous deceit, enter a well established commonwealth. Cato was aware of this when the philosophers, Diogenes and Carneades, were sent as ambassadors to the Senate by the Athenians. Perceiving with what earnest admiration the Roman youth began to follow them, and knowing the evils that might result to his country from this excusable indolence, he enacted that no philosopher should be allowed to enter Rome.[20]

## III

Sorel and Machiavelli were moralists in the sense that both were profoundly disturbed by the behavior of their contemporaries and wished to change it for the better. They were not moralists as, for example, Plato and Kant were, for they did not arrive at universal moral principles from an elaborately conceived and intricately developed philosophic system. Sorel and Machiavelli begin directly with a more or less vague notion of a good society, not from a cosmology or metaphysic. Their moralizing consists of recommendations for a mutually sustaining individual behavior and social organization. Each rejects the commercial, exploitative life of his own age, analyzes its nature, determines its causes, and suggests how a new era of grandeur and heroic morality could be

[20] Machiavelli, *History of Florence*, V, i. The translation is a modification of that of the Harper Torchbook edition, Introduction by Felix Gilbert (New York, Evanston, and London, 1960), 204.

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introduced. Each emphasizes the value of social conflict for the new morality and conceives of politics as a kind of warfare.

This emphasis upon conflict represents a radical break with the classical-medieval tradition of political thought, and is distinctively modern. Machiavelli must be credited for first assigning a positive social and political value to domestic conflict. While traditional thinkers like Plato and Aristotle had clearly recognized the existence of conflict within the polis, they thought of it as an unnatural condition arising from the domination of the human soul by the baser appetites. Since the nature of the soul was thought to be a harmony of parts under the rule of reason, social conflict represented a defection of the psyche from nature. Consequently, a social organization was recommended in which a harmony, if not a unison of parts, would replace all antagonisms, and in which civic education would mold healthy, harmonious human souls. This social-psychology of harmony has a parallel in the ancient physical concept that matter at rest is more natural than matter in motion. During the Cinquecento both theories were challenged by two Italian thinkers. Machiavelli argued that social disorder and decadence cannot be solved by the elimination of conflict. Conflict, so natural to man, the slave of contending desires, will always be present in human society. Any attempt to eliminate conflict will eventuate in the destruction of man. The solution to social and governmental instability must lie in conflict itself. Through proper regulation conflict can be a strengthening, vitalizing, creative, and integrating social factor, a way of freeing man from the domination of man. Galileo performed much the same service for physics that Machiavelli earlier had rendered politics by arguing that the natural state of matter is motion instead of rest.

Unlike Sorel, Machiavelli does not give class-struggle an economic basis. Class-warfare is considered largely in psychological terms. The major cause for intermural and intramural conflict stems from an individual lust for power and domination. In all societies a few wish to dominate the many, while the majority wish to be free and secure from the domination of this minority. Economic aggrandizement is simply a manifestation of the lust for power in all men, what St. Augustine calls the *libido dominan-*

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*di.*[21] The power-seeking elite may be a rich and powerful commercial class, such as that of Renaissance Florence, or a relatively poor warrior class, like the patricians of early republican Rome. The difference between the struggle of the plebes with the patricians in the well-ordered Roman commonwealth and the contention of the *ciompi* and oligarchs in decadent Florence is that the former occurred within specific limits while the latter did not. In republican Rome, patriotism, a sense of civic duty, and a respect for law and authority prevented class conflict from erupting into civil war. Moreover, Roman constitutional arrangements had been modified by experience to embody a balance of powers between the Senate, representative of the patricians, and the plebeian assemblies with their tribunes, thus institutionalizing and regulating conflict.

Sorel's view of society as a battlefield for the economic class-struggle is much more extreme than Machiavelli's outlook. Yet, after Machiavelli, theorists of limited conflict as a social good and of the state as the umpire of contending interests, including the British empiricists, the classical economists, and Montesquieu and his great disciple Tocqueville, broke ground for the later and more radical Socialist position on class-warfare in bourgeois society. Machiavelli, however, tends to be much closer to Sorel than most intervening non-Socialist thinkers, because out of his military interests and experience he conceived of domestic politics as a kind of warfare between groups and individuals struggling for power. Indeed, his model for leadership is military, and his political recommendations are often little more than the translation of the stratagems of classical military thinkers into maxims of statecraft.

To a marked extent much of the vocabulary of politics used today by American politicians, journalists, and political scientists is a military vocabulary. Whether one reads a description and assessment of an election in the newspaper or the erudite evaluation of practical politics in textbook, dissertation, or monograph, the language is often that applied traditionally to accounts of military operations, never to the quest for the good society. Our use of military metaphor and simile is so habitual that we are rarely conscious of it and of its historical novelty. The very use of the words struggle, contest, conflict, warfare, battle, enemy, arena,

[21] See Herbert A. Deane, *The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine* (New York and London, 1963), 48-53.

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campaign, soldier, troops, recruits, and deserters is highly significant. The political enemy is attacked or defeated; he advances or retreats; from a defensive position, he assumes the offensive. A political party is a camp to be stormed or besieged, an army to be conquered. At the head of the political army is the commander who plans his campaign in his headquarters and marshals his forces with the aid of a staff and a chief-of-staff. Communities favoring one party over another become strongholds, bastions, fortresses, and citadels. Military organization provides columnist and scholar with terms like ally, auxiliary, echelon, cadre, column, rank and file, wing, flank, rear guard, vanguard, base, battalion, and division. The words strategy and tactics never could have been applied by the ancients to domestic politics; they could be applied only to the foe in military operations, because all citizens of the polis were considered to be friends. In the second half of the twentieth century, what American politician, pundit, or political scientist is not perpetually indebted to them! Tactical terms particularly are savored: mobilize, maneuver, disposition, deployment, flanking, foray, sortie, thrust and counter-thrust, confrontation, infiltration, penetration. And when the battle is over we even talk of an armistice, or if a mutually arranged lull in hostilities occurs, we often refer to a cease-fire, a parley, or a truce.

If early modern thinkers, with their emphasis upon the value of limited social conflict and the state as umpire of competing interests, contributed to this contemporary American way of conceptualizing domestic politics, they, of course, cannot be held wholly responsible for it. Certainly the recent concept—a particular favorite among some American students of politics—that politics is purely a struggle for power, and the decline of the idea that politics is a moral science, may have contributed to the new image. Suggestive also is the group theory of politics. Perhaps the polarization of international politics into the maneuvering of two super-powers in a "cold war" to eliminate or neutralize each other has been unconsciously projected upon the domestic scene. Nor should we forget that Freud, whose thought has so shaped directly and indirectly the attitudes of the present American generation, offers a psychology of conflict in which men are in a virtual state of war and the psyche itself is a battlefield.

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Certain practical developments may well have been more important. The organization of centralized, disciplined parties in the nineteenth century to achieve the social and economic demands of the masses is quite possibly a decisive reason. Socialist theory and practice have always been especially concerned with the formation of militant, fighting parties. *The Communist Manifesto* of 1848 was an open declaration of war in the name of the worker against the bourgeoisie. Its portrayal of past and present is in terms of extreme conflict: "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles," and within society there rages a "more or less veiled civil war," in which the "bourgeoisie finds itself involved in constant battle" with the proletariat.

It is not a coincidence that one of Sorel's foremost disciples, Roberto Michels, devoted a chapter of his very influential book, *La Sociologia del Partito nella Democrazia Moderna* (1912), to "The Modern Democratic Party as a Fighting Party, Dominated by Militarist Ideas and Methods."[22] Michels writes that rules essential to the conduct of military affairs are equally applicable to modern political life, which is uniquely characterized by a "perpetual condition of latent warfare."[23] Modern fighting parties must conform to the laws of tactics, and the similarity between such parties and military organization is reflected by the Socialist vocabulary, which especially in Germany comes from military science. Scarcely one expression of military tactics and strategy, he writes, hardly a phrase of barracks slang, does not occur again and again in the Socialist press. Even early anti-militarist French Socialists referred to their leader, Gustave Hervé, as "our General." Interesting, although not mentioned by Michels, is the fact that a small group of British middle-class moderates who banded together in the eighties for social reform through education and piecemeal action should call themselves Fabians. Michels continues that a number of Socialist leaders, including Engels, Bebel, and Jaurès, wrote extensively on military affairs. Since Michels, the Russian disciples of Marx and Engels did trans-

[22] Roberto Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (Glencoe, 1949), 41-44.

[23] *Ibid.*, 41.

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form their party into a military organization in an almost literal sense, and increasingly employed military imagery in discussing the struggle between proletarians and bourgeoisie. In his *Foundations of Leninism*, Stalin allots a chapter to "Strategy and Tactics," which he terms "the science of proletarian leadership," and then proceeds as if he were writing a military handbook for proletarian generals. For each different political situation he enumerates the appropriate "main blow," "reserves," and "disposition of forces."[24]

That many American scholars and European Socialists should employ a military vocabulary to describe and assess domestic politics is one of the minor ironies of history. Precisely the justification of the Socialists in using a military model is their central doctrine of class struggle, the insistent denial of which appears to be the stock-in-trade of most American analyses of the political scene. If Socialists were pitted against the bourgeoisie in America, the use of a military vocabulary by non-Socialist students of politics would be appropriate. But the very nature of American political parties, the similar class composition, the minimal ideological differences, the obeisance to some kind of sacred consensus —all these traits would seem to reflect an almost obsessive dread of social conflict, even a denial of its very existence. The use of military metaphor to describe the relatively mild and gentlemanly rivalry among singularly like-minded men so characteristic of American politics today is, to say the least, somewhat incongruous. The much vaunted end of ideological politics in America appears to be accompanied by the emergence of a new ideology, an ideology arising from the presumed absence of conflict but expressed nevertheless in the idiom of conflict and military struggle.

## IV

Notwithstanding the many parallels between the ideas of Sorel and Machiavelli, a fundamental difference in their styles of political thinking cannot be overlooked. This difference, most apparent in their accounts of the ideal man, gives to each a unique role in the history of political ideas. Machiavelli's classical hero, su-

[24] Joseph Stalin, *Foundations of Leninism* (New York, 1939), 88-106. The chapter on "The Party" begins by proclaiming that it "must be, first of all, the *vanguard* of the working class" (p. 109).

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premely rational and calculating, is engaged in a rational enterprise of fighting a war, ruling a people, or organizing a viable civil society. The statesman like the general is a master manipulator of men. He may assume a charismatic role for the sake of more effective control and management, but he is undone if he neglects the rational calculation of self-interest, his own and those he seeks to manipulate. On the basis of his perception of the inherent order and form of things social and political, he can meticulously plan his course of action in terms of the most efficient means to achieve the public utility, and then act in a vigorous, decisive, and flexible manner. The organization and leadership of an army or a commonwealth is always a highly rational enterprise in the eyes of the Florentine. His faith in the molding of a civic-minded, sturdy, and courageous people by the rational construction of society makes him a true forerunner of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment.

By contrast, Sorel is deeply distrustful of what he calls the utopianism and the rationalism of the Enlightenment. His proletarian hero is a truly charismatic figure, a man of spontaneity, feeling, and virility, not the objective, calculating type.[25] His philosophical inspiration is the *élan vital* of Henri Bergson rather than the *phronēsis* and *sōphrosynē* of Aristotle. At the heart of his theory of action is the notion of action for the sake of action. Admittedly, acting in a prescribed manner will produce a new heroism; but this new heroism seems to be for its own sake, in large part to satisfy Sorel's own esthetic sensibility. Although Machiavelli places a premium upon heroic action, he is clear that it is a means of achieving a society of peace and security and a happy people. In addition, Machiavelli's rationalism is suggested by his faith in law as an instrument of social control. Whether he discusses an army or a commonwealth he has in mind the elimination of uncertainty and insecurity in human relations by the institution and maintenance of a rational legal order. In these various senses, therefore, Machiavelli is a political thinker, while Sorel is fundamentally apolitical. His society of proletarian-warriors would be characterized by constant novelty, excitement, and

[25] Note the excellent appraisal in Irving L. Horowitz, *Radicalism and the Revolt Against Reason: the Social Theories of Georges Sorel with a Translation of his Essay on "The Decomposition of Marxism"* (New York, 1961), 156-58.

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upheaval. He possesses no vision beyond the anarchy of the class struggle, beyond the heroic brotherhood forged in battle with the bourgeoisie, and the joy of creation in the workshop. Sorel may possibly be the spirit of the Erinyes reincarnate, but Machiavelli never forsakes the shrine of Athena.

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# Book Reviews

Newcastle-Upon-Tyne and the Puritan Revolution *by Roger Howell Jr. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967. —xii, 397 pp. $10.10.*

The Fifth Monarchy Men *by P. G. Rogers. London, New York, and Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1966. —vii, 168 pp. $4.80.*

Wayward Puritans *by Kai T. Erikson. New York, London, and Sydney, John Wiley & Sons, 1966. —xiii, 228 pp. $5.50.*

As an undiminished flow of publication shows, Puritanism continues to be a magnet of historical interest. Despite the knowledge about its ideas that modern scholarship has accumulated, historical judgment can reach no definitive conclusion concerning its significance. The prevailing tendency, of course, has been to regard Puritanism as one of the generative forces of the modern world. But assuming that this is not a grossly exaggerated view, the question yet remains, What, *precisely*, did it generate? Liberty and self-government? Radical politics? The destiny-sense of the American nation? The social discipline and value sanctions necessary to Capitalist accumulation? Individualism and inner-directedness? The self-righteous personality type that formed itself for worldly achievement by abstinence and repression? The list of Puritanism's putative offspring could be extended. Just this complexity, however—this difficult equation between Puritanism as the "middle ages" of Protestantism and as the parent of a determinate modernity—is what renders it so fascinating to historians.

The books under review all deal with Puritanism in one aspect or another. Those by Rogers and Erikson, while written from wholly different standpoints, treat of it exclusively; the other by Howell gives it consideration within a comprehensive study of an important urban community during the English revolution. Although none of these works has much to say of the wider theoretical issues involved in the investigation of Puritanism, the assiduous student will want to examine them all in the hope of finding material of value.


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The most scholarly and thorough is Howell's account of Newcastle. It is a meticulous scrutiny of the political, religious, and economic life of one of the largest English towns, the capital of coal, at a time of revolution. In describing the structure of the community and the interaction of local and national affairs, the author has provided a wealth of detail —more, indeed, than was necessary. As a result, however, we see the social texture of the revolution magnified and at the closest view. The conclusions of Howell's study correspond to those that have emerged in other recent works on English urban history at this period: the heterogeneous social-economic character of Newcastle Puritanism; the predominance of localist preoccupations in the town even amidst the upheavals of revolution; the absence of clear-cut social-economic criteria distinguishing Royalist from Parliamentarian among the townsmen. One observation deserves serious reflection: Newcastle "was a society which can be dubbed sub-political, that is, one in which the conduct of local affairs received the main emphasis, interest in national affairs a secondary one" (p. 336). This probably applies to most, if not all, the English towns of the time.

Rogers' book is a narrative of the rise and decline of mid-seventeenth-century millenarianism, fanned to white heat by the overturnings of the sixteen-forties. The Fifth Monarchists—the name is derived from the books of Daniel and Revelations—were an offshoot of Puritanism who took the belief in Christ's second coming with the utmost literalism. Imminently awaiting the earthly kingdom of Christ and his Saints— to which number they themselves, of course, belonged—they tried to usher it in by their own actions. They represented a recurrent phenomenon in Christian history, though tinged in this instance by the Puritan context out of which they arose. In the sixteen-fifties they became a minor element on the political scene. Bibliolaters and fanatics, yet at times acute critics filled with a passionate desire for justice, they made difficulties for the revolutionary regimes, for Cromwell as Lord Protector, and were mercilessly dealt with after a pathetic rising against Charles II in 1661. If Rogers has not told their story very penetratingly, he has done so fairly and sympathetically, and with the help of excellent quotations.

Erikson's is a sociological work which uses the history of New England Puritanism to test a hypothesis about deviant behavior. His point of departure is Durkheim's argument that deviance is not only inevitable, but functional for the community in that it forces the members together, concentrates their sentiments, and helps forge their solidarity and collective conscience. Given this assumption, Erikson thinks it likely that deviant behavior tends to remain constant in volume over fairly long periods, and to be related in size not to any dynamic properties of its

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own but to the extent of the community's apparatus for controlling it. This apparatus is gauged to the stabilization of deviance, as it were, not to its elimination. He believes that his view derives some support from the treatment of deviance in the Massachusetts Bay colony, which he illustrates from the antinomian controversy, the repression of the Quakers, and the witch episode at Salem. A further chapter cites data intended to show the stability of the colony's crime rate in the later seventeenth century. The conclusion advances some reflections on the legacy of Puritanism in American penology and attitudes toward deviance.

Although Erikson's book contains many perceptive observations, it is loose and inconclusive, and hence inadequate to its argument. The data on crime in Massachusetts are exiguous; problems concerning the definition and detection of deviance abound; and even if the crime rate were as stable as the data appear to indicate, the bearing of this on the general question of the stability of deviance is altogether unclear. The author has read widely on Puritanism, but his account nevertheless raises doubts. He has failed, for instance, to understand some clues in the antinomian controversy which make the authorities' treatment of Mrs. Hutchinson much more intelligible in their own terms as a case of deviance than he allows it to be. Moreover, the attitude of the English Puritans to antinomianism and the Quakers was identical with that in the Bay colony. This weakens a good deal of the significance Erikson ascribes to these instances of deviance in enabling the new community to define the boundaries of its solidarity. The witchcraft obsession was as endemic in Scotland, not to speak of the Catholic lands, as at Salem. Probably it ought to be seen not primarily as a phenomenon of deviance, but as a particular response to circumstances of stress, given belief in the demonological doctrines which Christian theology harbored.

PEREZ ZAGORIN
*University of Rochester*

Coleridge and the Idea of the Modern State *by David P. Calleo. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1966.—x, 157 pp. $5.00.*

Despite occasional exclamations over Coleridge's political theory as "remarkable both for its comprehensiveness and for its detail" (p. 75) and as reflecting "a wonderful sense of the details of political life" (p. 40), this suggestive and provocative essay is seldom concerned very precisely either with what Coleridge was talking about or with what the content of "the Idea of the Modern State" might be. When details are given, they

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tend to be misconstrued. "There was no ambivalence," we are told, "in Coleridge's attitude toward the reactionary conservatives of his own country." For example, "Long after he had come to abominate the French, he continued to be savagely critical of the Tory ministries of Pitt and Addington. Indeed his greatest journalistic triumph was a devastating analysis of the character of Pitt published in the *Morning Post* on March 19, 1800" (p. 69). Actually Coleridge in 1800 expected more from Napoleon, the "commanding genius," than from the merely talented Pitt; in 1802 and 1803 as Coleridge swung round to wishing the Bourbons restored, he went to Addington's support, and in 1804 he wrote essays in Addington's vindication; as for Pitt, Coleridge later (in the *Biographia Literaria)* argued that the *Morning Post* had been "a far more useful ally to the Government... than if it had been the avowed eulogist of Mr. Pitt."

Mr. Calleo's main aim is to suggest "that the Romantic world-view was extraordinarily suited to perceiving and solving the problems of the modern constitutional State"—solving or evading, it might seem; and he finds that "preoccupation with the reconciliation of individuality with order, the particular with the general, and the self with the group made the Romantic especially sensitive to the problem of political consensus" (p. 62). In political theory the "great Romantic philosophers" are Coleridge, Herder, Schelling, Hegel, and, of course, Burke; the nub of Calleo's application of their theory to modern times lies in his formula "Consensus needs content," followed by this explanation:

> It is the emphasis upon balanced diversity within the unity of the State that is the great heritage left by the conservative constitutionalists. It is this emphasis, I believe, that entitles them, more than democrats like Paine and Price, to be considered true prophets and apologists for modern Britain, and indeed, in a looser sense, for the United States as well. What is impressive about American society is not its democratic government "by the people." Fortunately America is not ruled by the people, albeit it is ruled with their consent. The splendid achievement of American society has been the generally peaceable incorporation, within a coherent unity, of a startling variety of groups and cultures. If we have achieved unity we have also preserved much individuality. This is the legacy not of democracy, but of constitutionalism—the tradition not of Paine, but of Burke (p. 120).

Coleridgean conservatism is defined as "expedient without being unprincipled. At best, it could not only accept change gracefully [no examples are given], but work imaginatively to perfect the present in the light of old principles" (p. 4). The basic "old principle" being that political power should be proportionate to property, the Spirit of the State defines itself as the Idea in the minds of property-holders as to the general good (see p. 26). The problem then is to keep that Idea humane; too much

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of the property must not be commercial, or the Spirit is sullied by greed. Yet the commercial is the Progressive.

Calleo insists upon the importance of "Coleridge's distrust of the unpropertied intellectual in politics" (p. 95). And his blackboard simplification of the British Constitution is hailed as a "superb example" of his analysis of "concrete institutions": the "great" landed interests represent Permanency in the House of Lords; the commercial interests represent Progress in the House of Commons; the gentry or minor barons serve in both houses as a balancing element; and the King as the "beam of the scales" unites all in loyalty. (One is reminded of Peacock's Embankment: "the soundness is checked by the rottenness, and the stiffness is balanced by the elasticity.") Coleridge , of course, had to put in as "the necessary counterpoise" a National Church, established but independent of the State "in the narrow political sense" (p. 98). Calleo sees that the Church of England has failed to become "the general guild of the intellectuals" and he concedes that Coleridge was sentimentally blind to the "chief stumbling block . . . religion itself" (p. 116).

There is, however, a modern propertied establishment that supports the independence of Coleridge's "Clerisy." Calleo in defining the purposes of the National Church can draw upon the wording of the Charter of the Collegiate School—later Yale University (p. 109). In England and America today,

> private educational institutions possess an immense Nationalty [*sic*], favored by numerous exemptions from taxation and control. Universities and foundations still give a home to the intellectual and serve to collect his loyalties within the established social order. The National Church has become secularized into the nonsectarian university and school. College presidents are the bishops of the modern world (p. 117).

In a concluding chapter Coleridge's ideas are applied to a federation of the national States of Europe—though a footnote calls attention to "my recent book *Europe's Future: the Grand Alternatives* (. . . 1965)," and the publishers of the present book have inserted a hectographed addendum to the Preface: "The book was written in 1963. The last chapter . . .has deliberately been left unchanged, although institutions and views in Europe are, of course, continually changing. The chapter [does not intend] to provide an exhaustive analysis of the Common Market today." This insertion, after printing and binding, illustrates the Coleridgean method of making a deliberated principle of necessity. One wonders what European tremors inspired it: perhaps some intimations that intellectual loyalties might not be collecting within the established order.

DAVID V. ERDMAN
*New York Public Library*

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"The Most English Minister . . ." The Policies and Politics of Palmerston *by Donald Southgate. New York, St. Martin's Press, and London, Melbourne, and Toronto, Macmillan, 1966.—xxx, 657 pp. $15.00.*

This is a book based on books. Dedicated to Pitt, Wellington, Palmerston, and Churchill, it might have invoked Guedalla, Temperley, Webster, and Taylor, for it depends on them. Southgate deplores the two-volume *Lord Palmerston* by the American scholar H. C. F. Bell (1936), although at times he relies on it (p. 168, n. 22; p. 177, n. 54). And fifteen years after Webster's *Foreign Policy of Palmerston* it is astonishing for a British historian to absolve himself from use of the Palmerston papers, as Southgate does (p. xv), the more so when Bell was denied access to the papers prior to 1936. These objections would amount to less if this were a new interpretation, relying on familiar facts, perhaps, but bringing a fresh viewpoint to bear upon Palmerston's policies. In fact, Southgate does clarify the sense in which Palmerston was not a Canningite. Whereas Canning avoided commitments to the continent, excepting Portugal, and believed British interests were served best by neighbors with institutions less free than Britain's, Palmerston made participation on the continent in aid of liberty an article of faith. But Southgate's treatment of Palmerston's role in Portugal, Greece, and the Eastern Question before 1834 makes no significant departure from Bell's. And Southgate is less detailed than Bell on Palmerston's American, and papal, policy, and adds little to Bell's account of tactics during the revolutions of 1848. Palmerston's resignation in 1851, his appointment as Home Secretary in 1853, his premiership during the Crimean War, and his diplomacy affecting Italian unification, all have a familiar recapitulation. Only occasionally are there any general propositions, like the assertion (p. 140) that Palmerston saw a need for understandings with either France or Russia, if not with both. And this proposition simply vanishes when the narrative arrives at the fateful sixties, when Palmerston had neither understanding, and when Bismarck's solution of the Schleswig-Holstein question made a mockery of Palmerston's pledges to Denmark. There is an unworn story about Palmerston and Queen Victoria. After a parade in Hyde Park "he explained that the body odours of which she complained were what was meant by 'espirit de corps.' " Yet the index leaves out Victoria's half-brother Leiningen (misspelt, p. 226), and A. J. P. Taylor (who is sometimes Mr. Taylor, as on p. 218). And the style suffers from too many sentences like "One cannot doubt that the fact that the age in which regard for empire reached its lowest ebb was the age in which

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Palmerston stood sentinel helped preserve the empire, for what future Palmerston never inquired" (pp. 557-58).

BARRY MCGILL
*Oberlin College*

The Making of the Second Reform Bill *by F. B. Smith. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1966.—297 pp. $10.50.*

The Reform Act of 1867, with its enfranchisement of the urban working class in England, turned out to be a major stepping stone on the road to democracy. This does not mean that those who devised and voted for the measure necessarily intended it to play that role. Indeed, one of the things that emerges most clearly from Mr. Smith's excellent book is how few Members of Parliament, regardless of party, genuinely had the feelings and interests of the working classes in mind. A certain amount of fear as to what would happen if the artisans were not enfranchised; a certain amount of confidence that even if they *were* given the vote, they would still support existing institutions and social arrangements—these sentiments were definitely to be found in Parliament. But, on the whole, one has the impression that the parliamentary struggle over the second Reform Bill revolved far more around political strategy and tactics than around questions of rights and moral imperatives.

Two voices, above all, on opposite sides of the fence, struck a different note—and struck it with such force that the reverberations reached far outside the Palace of Westminster: Gladstone, with his statement that every man was morally entitled to come within the pale of the constitution; and the Liberal rebel, Robert Lowe, who time and again equated the workingman with brute force and questioned both his moral worth and his right to a vote. Both Gladstone and Lowe spoke from conviction, and their voices seem to rise above a veritable chorus of factionalism and opportunism.

This is true to such an extent that a scholar trying to untangle the complex web of parliamentary maneuver and counter-maneuver between 1866 and 1867, a web so complex that a great many Members of Parliament themselves finally wearied and lost track of it, might well have failed to pay attention to the wider social and political context within which the debates over the second Reform Bill took place. Let it be said at once that Mr. Smith has not failed the reader here. We are never in danger of forgetting that behind all the endlessly debated technicalities involving lodgers, compounders, and ratepayers, there were live human beings, an

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artisan class, perhaps (as Asa Briggs has suggested), bound together more by its isolation from the other classes than by any positive political consciousness of its power, but nonetheless aware that the franchise had become its due.

It is the actual story, however, of how it received that franchise, not (as might have been expected) from the Liberals, but from the Conservatives, that forms the substance of this book. In the background, accounting in large part for the failure of Russell's Bill of 1866, lay the death of Palmerston, and with his passing the end of the coalition of divergent interests which he alone could have continued to hold together. In the foreground, accounting in large part for the success of the Conservative Bill of 1867, lay Disraeli's masterful opportunism, so easily, so effectively (and so falsely) transformed by his imagination into the working out of a consistent political theory.

Mr. Smith makes it clear that "dishing the Whigs" by passing a major Conservative Reform measure was Derby's rather than Disraeli's idea. Still, it was Disraeli who managed the almost incredible feat of persuading his party to accept a bill far more radical in its provisions and its implications than even the majority of Liberals had dreamed of. And all this in the name of preserving stability and the *status quo*. This is only one of the many ironies that must characterize any account of the passage of the second Reform Bill. The materials are there for another *Eighteenth Brumaire*. Mr. Smith has not written that sort of work of genius, but he has accomplished the next best thing. He has brought order into what for many students of the period has always appeared to be darkness and confusion, and he has done his job so well that, at least for this generation, it will not have to be done again.

JOHN CLIVE
*Harvard University*

Selections from the Smuts Papers *edited by W. K. Hancock and Jean van der Poel. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1966. Vol. I: xiv, 663 pp. $12.50; Vol. II: v, 638 pp. $12.50; Vol. III: v, 688 pp. $12.50; Vol. IV: v, 461 pp. $10.00.*

This admirably edited and handsomely printed set of volumes is intended to serve as a sample of the riches contained in the Smuts Archive at the University of Cape Town. They deal with the period (to 1919) covered by Sir Keith Hancock in the first volume of his biography of Smuts, *The Sanguine Years*, and stand as a partial documentation of that volume.

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The material, almost bewildering in its variety, has to do both with Smuts' public career in South Africa, in London, and at the Paris Peace Conference, and with his personal and family concerns. For even in the midst of his most pressing public responsibilities, he remained the devoted husband and father, as well as the intellectual determined to keep abreast of European thought. It was his friend H. J. Wolstenholme, the shy don of Christ's College, who saw that Smuts in South Africa received new books as they came off the press.

For reasonably conscientious readers of the Hancock biography there will be few surprises in these volumes. Sir Keith did his work thoroughly and sensitively. What the *Selections* do is to add vivid detail. There are letters from English- and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans, and Boer leaders, as well as from correspondents in England. Where the original is in Afrikaans, the editors have printed the document in its original language, followed by a translation. Among Smuts' regular South African correspondents, the letters from J. X. Merriman, the Cape statesman, are particularly impressive. For this old Whig-Liberal, a salty anti-imperialist, with ample commonsense, sensed some of the problems of the future even more clearly than did Smuts. Though he had little use for "the ridiculous democratic shibboleths 'One man one vote' . . . and all the rest" of them, he urged the planners of the Union not to deny the franchise on account of color. Give the natives the franchise, he argued, protected by as high educational tests as you like. Smuts could not agree, but conceded that "when I consider the political future of the Natives in South Africa I must say that I look into shadows and darkness" (II, 242).

Reading these letters from the vantage point of the nineteen-sixties, it is clear that South Africa was never as securely berthed in the Commonwealth as we assumed. Smuts and some of the other leaders, fervent admirers of the tradition of British liberalism, insisted that they had never fought for a Dutch South Africa. As the bitterness of the Boer War receded, as the Transvaal and the Free State gained responsible government, and as the four states joined together in the Union, these men were increasingly prepared to give loyal support to the Commonwealth. But disaffection was never absent, as the 1914 rebellion emphasized. Unhappily the tradition on which this body of opinion drew—Afrikaans, the Dutch Reformed Church, the myth of the trekkers, and the rest—proved a more commanding influence than the outward view of Smuts and Botha.

The First World War saw Smuts at the peak of his intellectual and moral ascendancy. From his successful operations against the Germans in Southwest Africa and East Africa, he was called to London to attend the Imperial War Cabinet. He remained in the West for the next two years. During this period the most consistently interesting of his letters

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are those to and from his friends the Gilletts and Mrs. Gillett's sister, Alice Clark. In this correspondence (which, incidentally, covers forty years in all) one can chart the curve of Smuts' emotions about the war and the peace. His early days in Paris seemed to confirm him in the sanguine hopes with which he had emerged from the war. He found that the League of Nations, "which is the real business of this Conference, is progressing very well" (IV, 51). So promising, indeed, were its prospects that (according to Lloyd George), President Wilson now "talks of the *scheme* as if he is the author of it" (IV, 41). But by May, Smuts was disillusioned with Wilson, and regarded the treaty as a disaster. To the British delegation he announced that he could not sign it unless it were substantially revised. Yet after a period of agonized wrestling with himself, he concluded that he could not withhold his signature from what he still felt was not "a peace treaty but a war treaty." It was the old business of an idealist caught up in practical politics.

DAVID OWEN
*Harvard University*

The Downfall of the Liberal Party: 1914-1935 *by Trevor Wilson. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1966.—416 pp. $7.50.*

The question raised by Dr. Wilson is briefly this: was the Liberal party mortally diseased when it entered World War I, or was it relatively healthy? Was the war the occasion only, or was it actually the cause of the party's downfall? "If it is guesswork to say that [the war] was mainly responsible for [the party's] demise, it is the most warrantable guess that can be made" (p. 19).

This "warrantable guess" immediately evokes the old challenge of *quo warranto?* To call the two elections of 1910 "victories" (p. 16), without mentioning their pyrrhic character, is a dubious assumption. To say that prewar nonconformity had passed its peak "at least for the moment," rather than *forever*, is equally dubious. To imply that those who argue for a moribund prewar party take the position that the outbreak of war in 1914 was the international culmination of "a pattern of internal violence" (p. 18) is not altogether justified, for it can be argued, and has been argued, that the war prevented this internal violence from attaining a final pattern. The strongest of Dr. Wilson's arguments is founded upon the pacific character of Liberal philosophy, but this philosophy might have survived a contest (however prolonged and terrible) which was popularly held to be a just one.

Indeed, the most graphic refutation of the "warrantable guess" is to

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be found on the book-jacket itself, in the appearance of a photograph of David Lloyd George. It is not quite the thing nowadays to quote J. M. Keynes against Lloyd George, but still, "one catches in his company that flavor of final purposelessness, that inner irresponsibility, existence outside and away from our Saxon good and evil, mixed with cunning, remorselessness, love of power." (*Essays in Biography*, pp. 35-36.) With this characterization Dr. Wilson substantially agrees and this is the character which dominates his book. A great Radical, a great war leader, a fascinating personage, Lloyd George was not a party man; and it is the strongest argument for a *prewar* sickness in the Liberal party that, from 1914 onwards, it was quite helpless to resist his destructive magic. The "coupon election" of 1918 was, from a party point of view, the last and most blatant of many betrayals. In his subsequent wanderings through the political landscape, the great Welshman resembled a counterclockwise King John of England. King John emerged from his final adventure with his army intact but his treasury gone; it was just the reverse with Lloyd George. He had his ill-gotten fund; but he had managed, even in the resurgence of 1923, somehow to destroy not only the Asquithians, but also his own following. In 1929, by a final irony, he sponsored one of the most imaginative, intelligent, and vigorous party platforms in Liberal history; but it was too late. The country had conceived a fatal distrust for Liberal promises.

In examining the political disintegration of a great historical entity, Dr. Wilson has undoubtedly produced a fascinating and formidable book. His documentation is masterly, and the spirit and style of his presentation are admirable. Those who, like myself, disagree with his original premise will not, on that account, refrain from saluting this book as a most valuable addition to Liberal historiography.

GEORGE DANGERFIELD
*Santa Barbara, California*

French Communism in the Making, 1914-24 *by Robert Wohl. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1966.—xii, 530 pp. $12.50.*

For many years the historiography of French communism was dominated either by its apologists, such as Gérard Walter, or, more commonly, by disenchanted commentators such as Franz Borkenau, André Ferrat, Boris Souvarine, and A. Rossi. In the nineteen-fifties, the "God that Failed" approach dominated the field as successive groups of ex-Communists searched for the origins of the party's loss of revolutionary integrity.

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American observers tended to lean heavily on such partisan sources, with the result that European communism was less explained than explained away.

But recently the level of scholarship, objectivity, and imaginative understanding among Western students of communism has sharply improved. Borkenau's influence is on the decline, while the merits of G. D. H. Cole and E. H. Carr are gaining wider appreciation. As Robert Wohl says, in his *French Communism in the Making, 1914-24*: "Borkenau's interpretation . . . confuses the national circumstances that produced Bolshevism with the international circumstances that made possible its exportation. It explains why Stalin followed Lenin; it does not tell us why Jaurès was followed by Thorez. Why, if Bolshevism was peculiarly Russian, did it strike such deep roots in the West?"

One of the merits of this excellent book is its willingness to confront and answer such questions. Not only has Wohl's research been immense, but his conclusions are formulated with unusual clarity and impartiality. No Bolshevik devils haunt his pages. Although this study cannot compete with Annie Kriegel's epic, *Aux Origines du Communisme Français, 1914-20*, in terms of detailed documentation and biographical information, it has the advantage of greater coherence and broader perspective

The shape which the French Communist party assumed in 1920-22 has to be explained not only in terms of the war, the Zimmerwald movement, and the October Revolution, but also in the light of the condition and structure of the working-class movement in 1914. Here Wohl combines historical and sociological analysis to good effect. While the boundary between parliamentary socialism and bourgeois liberalism had become blurred, the strength of the Socialist Left had been fragmented by the prestige of anarcho-syndicalism. After 1917 the vitality of the future Communist party would partly depend on the extent to which French syndicalists could convince themselves that the Soviet regime in Russia represented the decentralized, producer-orientated society that they held dear. Wohl's exploration of this dilemma is admirable, although his contention that the final choice for the syndicalists was essentially a choice between the Blanquist heritage and the reformism implicit in the tradition of Proudhon and Pelloutier is more challenging than convincing.

Lenin's hostility to "centrists," combined with the harsh twenty-one conditions for membership issued by the Comintern in 1920, have often led to the assumption that the Bolsheviks were more interested in the pure quality than in the quantity of their Western supporters. Wohl's step-by-step analysis of the maneuvers of 1919 and 1920 fully support his conclusion that "the Bolsheviks rejected the idea of a left-wing party [in

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France] and opted instead for a mass organization that would rest on a coalition of left-wing and centrist groups. It was this unwieldy and hybrid political formation that joined the Third International at Tours: an unstable compound of conflicting elements whose unifying principle—the revolutionary crisis—was about to disappear."

This is a crucial point, and from it springs Wohl's understanding of the internal upheavals, schisms, and expulsions which plagued the first four years of the party's existence.

Although *French Communism in the Making* suffers at times from understatement and detachment, these minor vices look remarkably like virtues which historians of the middle and later years of French communism will do well to imitate.

DAVID CAUTE
*New York University*

Yesterday's Deterrent: Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet *by Jonathan Steinberg. New York, Macmillan, 1965.—240 pp. $6.50.*

Students of the naval rivalry between Great Britain and Germany before 1914 have generally taken the line that the German building program was, in its origins, motivated by considerations of defense and that it took a more aggressive direction only after Anglo-German relations worsened during the Boer War. Thus, according to the accepted version, the critical turning point came not in 1898, when the first Naval Bill became law, but two years later when a stepped-up program was adopted and was justified by the so-called "risk theory."

Before 1945 Western scholars had no opportunity to determine whether the official papers of the German admiralty supported this view; but the fortunes of war changed that by bringing the comprehensive archives of the German Navy for the period from the eighteen-sixties to the end of the Hitler era to England, where they were selectively microfilmed on behalf of Cambridge University and the University of Michigan before being returned to Germany in 1959. Jonathan Steinberg of Trinity College, Cambridge, has now systematically explored those microfilms and has also used the collection of personal letters of Admiral Freiherr von Senden Bibran in Koblenz and certain unfilmed naval files now housed in Freiburg. On the basis of this pioneer research he has written a remarkable study of the origins of German naval policy which effectively demolishes the commonly accepted view.

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The nub of Mr. Steinberg's argument is that determination to wrest the exclusive hegemony over the world's oceans from Great Britain was behind the agitation for a big fleet as early as 1895, that it was the principal factor in bringing Tirpitz into office, and "it was the implicit strategy on which the Navy Law of 1898 was drawn up." This was explicitly admitted in the correspondence of the Emperor and Admiral von Senden, and it shone through every line of Tirpitz' memorandum of June 15, 1897. In this document, which, Mr. Steinberg writes, "can be said without exaggeration to have changed the course of history," Tirpitz started with the assumption that German ships must be built to meet "the most difficult situation in war into which our fleet can come." He continued: "For Germany the most dangerous enemy at the present time is England. It is also the enemy against which we most urgently require a certain measure of naval force as a political power factor." The clarity and logic of Tirpitz' supporting arguments (the risk theory was already present in essence), the skill with which he demonstrated the kinds of naval units needed and the necessity of concentrating them in home waters, and the extraordinary energy that he threw into the tasks of implementation made the German fleet "in an instant the diplomatic and military tool for which the Kaiser had been so anxiously pleading." But this was done by Tirpitz' "fixing his sights relentlessly on England." Anglo-German antagonism was not something that was caused by unwise German accelerations at a later date; it was inevitably there from the beginning and, in a sense, was sought.

Mr. Steinberg's services in clarifying the question of motivation in the original Naval Law should not be allowed to obscure the other noteworthy aspects of his study. His portrayal of the intramural politics of the naval establishment, the relations between the Admiralty, the Emperor's Military Headquarters, and the Reichstag, and the parliamentary debates over the Law of 1898 is admirably done; and his appraisal of Tirpitz as domestic politician, manager of men, and negotiator is balanced and fair, admitting his elements of greatness but insisting that his central theory was "simply calamitous." All told, this is more than a mere study of Germany's new naval policy; it is filled with enlightening, and sometimes startling, insights into the social and political realities of Wilhelmine Germany.

GORDON A. CRAIG
*Stanford University*

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Khrushchev: A Career *by Edward Crankshaw. New York, The Viking Press, 1966.—311 pp. $7.50.*

A satisfactory life of Khrushchev, like the memoirs of Helen of Troy, is a book we would like but do not have. The problems are plain: documentation for Khrushchev's early years is probably non-existent and for later periods has been winnowed politically under successive regimes. Our most likely informants—Khrushchev's successors—remain silent. The scarcity of facts is not limited to Khrushchev's earlier years; for example, we do not know what Khrushchev's relationship was to the 1952-53 "Doctor's Plot," a crucial event of Stalin's ominous last phase.

Edward Crankshaw has attempted a biography that is partly documentary and partly impressionistic. The result is a sometimes interesting but ultimately unsatisfying book. Crankshaw uses his feel for Russian conditions, an active journalist's knowledge of Soviet life, and the results of prior research (largely the freely acknowledged work of Lazar Pistrak in *The Grand Tactician*) to portray a man moving through his times. The resulting study has both virtues and flaws; insofar as the latter stem from scanty evidence, they lie beyond the author's control, but some result from his ideas about his subject.

The virtues first. We are shown convincingly that a Soviet career like Khrushchev's did not depend on new ideas or practical initiatives. Under Stalin, Stalinists prospered. Crankshaw rightly stresses the importance for Khrushchev of Kaganovich's patronage, without generalizing from this relationship. Nor does he point out that Khrushchev's amateurish meddling as a ruler is traceable to a career typically spent in party and not in substantive positions.

A useful aspect of the book is that it illustrates how Khrushchev impressed foreign observers—such as Crankshaw—rather more than he (Khrushchev) deserved. Thus, for Crankshaw, Khrushchev is a peacemaker whose foreign adventures are discounted as learning experiences. Crankshaw sees Khrushchev sitting with "far seeing eyes" among his colleagues and, unlike them, dreaming of a better Russia. Khrushchev's practical realism becomes sympathy for the suffering masses. The Khrushchev "cult," historical falsifications and all, is minimized. Finally, Khrushchev has a wife who has soothed the beast in the Bolshevik.

More serious is Crankshaw's judgment that the significant part of Khrushchev's career was that prior to 1953—his *rise* to power. His *exercise* of power is treated in a confused and aimless way; his *fall* from power is left obscure. Although Crankshaw repeatedly proclaims that Khrushchev's inability to resolve the Soviet agricultural impasse led to

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his ouster, in accounting for Khrushchev's downfall he leans heavily, like subsequent Soviet explanations, on Khrushchev's "erratic" behavior.

Khrushchev on the way up was not exceptional, only exemplary. He was one of a Stalinist cohort, who by 1953 was near the top but hardly an obvious successor. How did he gain the succession? Why did he disavow Stalin? To these questions Crankshaw gives weak answers. The author believes that Khrushchev's Ukrainian experience taught him to move men in real surroundings—as though Kaganovich, Malenkov, and the rest had not had equivalent experiences. For the latter, although Crankshaw shows that Khrushchev's de-Stalinization was trimmed to Khrushchev's political interests, his explanation amounts to moral revulsion in Khrushchev (and his wife!).

Crankshaw's conclusion, that Khrushchev wanted Stalinism without excesses, is fair enough, but he doesn't show why or how this failed. Khrushchev may have been "a visionary imprisoned by his past," but Soviet politics 1957-64 presumably also had something to do with it.

HENRY KRISCH
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Danilevsky: A Russian Totalitarian Philosopher *by Robert E. MacMaster. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1967.—ix, 368 pp. $7.95.*

Nicholas Danilevsky (1822-85) is known for one book, *Russia and Europe*, first published in 1869. Textbooks and general intellectual histories state that his book became the "code" of political Panslavism and that it was the intellectual ancestor of morphological philosophies of history. But Mr. MacMaster convincingly shows that Danilevsky had hardly any practical influence on the Panslav movement and that his ideas on the nature and history of cultures became widely known only after Spengler had first popularized the notion of historical morphologies. Danilevsky's interest lies elsewhere, in his own intellectual biography. This is the conclusion reached implicitly by Mr. MacMaster in his perceptive study which provides a subtle, suggestive, informed as well as informative, account of Danilevsky's development as man and thinker.

In his youth Danilevsky (together with Dostoevsky) was a member of the Petrashevskii circle, where he absorbed a heavy dose of utilitarian, socialist, and radical notions and attitudes. He also studied statistics and biology, and, after a period of (mild) exile, he led a successful career as expert scientist in the imperial administration. Along with his mentor,

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K. E. von Baer, and his friend, P. Semenov Tian Shanskii, he belonged to the first generation of Russian scientists to make outstanding practical and theoretical contributions to the knowledge of Russia's ecology. Yet, as Mr. MacMaster so ably shows, the inner tension between Danilevsky's early aspirations and his apparent adjustment to the Russian establishment reveals his fundamental alienation from both. In his efforts at overcoming this double alienation Danilevsky was led to write his best known work.

It was a peculiar book that allegedly had a scientific form and rational argument, but in fact it played emotionally on a sense of moral condemnation of nineteenth-century utilitarian and liberal culture. MacMaster shrewdly notes that Danilevsky was in truth a "social poet, not a social scientist," and that his purpose was to advocate deeds, not to reveal knowledge or truth. His book was, therefore, essentially existentialist in its tone and message. What was at stake for Danilevsky was the ability of the Russian culture and people to survive in their "natural" (psychologically and historically) form, fulfill their "natural" historic purpose. What was needed was a revivification of the culture's *élan vital* by all means, even by war. Indeed, what mattered was not so much immediate results as the experience of action itself, or, as brilliantly suggested by MacMaster, the "ritualism of the deed," though deed or ritual be absurd. The culturally and humanly disastrous possibilities implicit in this mood (rather than philosophy) are obvious.

But it was Danilevsky's merit to have sensed the nihilistic implications of his message and to have shied away from them. His last works, especially his two volumes on Darwinism, indicate a return to his earlier moral and intellectual commitments and renewed reliance on balanced, rational, empirical thought and an individualistic, libertarian, enlightened utilitarian point of view. Danilevsky thus found his way back to the mainstream of the eighteenth-century tradition in European thought; in his last phase he again came to share the outlook of enlightened, albeit politically conservative, Russian (and West European) intellectuals and scientists (for example, Mendeleev). Yet it was sadly characteristic of the disease that affected Western civilization that Danilevsky's popularity, such as it was, rested on the ominously irrational and brutal Panslavic implications of the suggestions contained in *Russia and Europe*.

The suggestive insights and important conclusions which Mr. MacMaster gives in his fascinating and deeply learned study are marred by serious defects of presentation. Correctly stressing the existentialist character of Danilevsky's contribution to Russian intellectual history, MacMaster yet over-rationalizes what, by his own admission, were only yearnings and moods of an intellect. What we have here is the story of a

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nineteenth-century intellectual in search of his self-image and moral consciousness. It would, therefore, have been wiser to organize the discussion along biographical, chronological lines. MacMaster's treatment in two parts, biographical and analytical, leads to a great deal of prolixity and repetitiveness. A consistent biographical approach would also have permitted the author to devote more attention to the relevant political and cultural background instead of getting lost in subtle dialectical distinctions.

Finally, MacMaster fails to convince of the accuracy of his judgment as expressed in the subtitle. True, he has some very suggestive and stimulating ideas on the typology of totalitarianism (even though his distinction between Western and Russian totalitarian modes seems a bit artificial); but the evidence he adduces does not explicitly demonstrate the conclusion that Danilevsky was a totalitarian thinker. The reference to humanism as polar opposite of totalitarianism is questionable enough; but is the following statement an adequate description of Danilevsky's totalitarianism: "his basic interests and goals were humanistic but his ideas about means and his whole attitude were quite the reverse" (p. 298)? One has the uneasy feeling that MacMaster is stretching the Danilevsky of *Russia and Europe* on the procrustean bed of totalitarianism. As the discussion of the typology of totalitarianism occurs in the introduction, the reader has the impression of being faced with preconceived notions and forced to accept a predetermined conclusion. MacMaster's interesting insights into the nature of totalitarian thinking should have come at the end of the book; they would have stimulated our reflection on and broadened our understanding of both Danilevsky and nineteenth-century European thought.

M. Raeff
*Columbia University*

Deterrence and Strategy *by Général d'Armée André Beaufre. Translated from the French by Major-General R. H. Barry. New York and London, Frederick A. Praeger, 1966.—173 pp. $6.95.*

Test Ban and Disarmament: The Path of Negotiation *by Arthur H. Dean. New York, Harper and Row for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1966.—xiii, 153 pp. $3.50.*

About the only thing which these two books have in common is that they both deal with the international system, mainly in its military aspect, and they are both written by highly intelligent men, each with a breadth

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of humane vision which lifts him above the ordinary. Each of these books is a peephole through the fence of our ignorance which surrounds the immensely complicated machinery of the international system, with the peepholes separated by at least a third of a circle so that what is observed through them looks very different. Arthur Dean looks at the apparatus from the point of view of an American ambassador-lawyer negotiating interminably at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva; General Beaufre looks at what is presumably the same object from the point of view of an intelligent French general and strategist, a product of the Institut Français d'Études Stratégiques.

Arthur Dean's little volume is an excellent introduction, especially for those who are less familiar with the technical aspects of the problems involved in the intricacies of disarmament bargaining. In the world as he sees it disarmament, or at least arms control, is possible in small doses and by easy stages. The Russians are boring and difficult but not wholly unreasonable, and vital common interests can be perceived and acted upon. The world of the negotiator is a world of limited agendas and many frustrations. Nevertheless, it is one where patience and realism are eventually rewarded, if only by small favors. From this book one develops an increased respect for the slow and painful path of the negotiator, even if one also wishes for the kind of skills which will speed it up and make it easier.

General Beaufre looks at the international system from a French point of view; nevertheless his peephole is enlarged because he is a theoretician and he is trying to look at the total system. He perceives very clearly that the nuclear weapon has increased the role of deterrence in the international system at the expense, shall we say, of conquest. He sees very clearly that the international system operates at a number of different levels and he argues that if deterrence is to operate the levels must be interpenetrated, which is the principal case he makes for tactical nuclear weapons. He is naturally much more aware of the problem of the multilateral nature of the international system than is Mr. Dean, and on his own terms he makes a likely case for nuclear proliferation at least to France. He comes out finally for a sort of grand alliance of the rich countries against the rising poor, which is, at least, honest. He is familiar with many of the concepts of current strategic discussion in the United States, though he never acknowledges them as such. He seems to be quite innocent of the terminology of game theory or of the modern theory of conflict, and there is a certain atmosphere about the book of an independent French intellectual deterrent. It is important, however, to look through all the peepholes we can, and the publisher is to be congratulated on making this more available to the American reader.

Neither Mr. Dean nor General Beaufre can really visualize a world in

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which there is any fundamental change in the international system. Mr. Dean, for instance, does not really believe in general and complete disarmament, that is, in stable peace. General Beaufre, simply because he is a theoretician and a logician, occasionally trembles on the edge of admitting that the present international system is nonsense, that it contains in it the seeds of its own destruction, and that it certainly cannot survive more than a hundred years. As he says in his very first sentence, ". . . there has been a loss of confidence in the efficacy of a defence effort." On the other hand, the idea that national defense might have to be abandoned is certainly too much for a general or even an ambassador to accept, and neither of these gentlemen, therefore, is preparing us for the quantum jump which seems to be necessary. This generation is the first in which the natural scientists and research in the natural sciences have become significant in the international system, as Mr. Dean brings out extremely well, with the discussion of the impact of project Vela. The social sciences, of course, have made no such impact. It may be, however, that in the next generation we might develop a social science helicopter from which to view the international system, as it were, from above, and when that happens, the view from every peephole will look different.

KENNETH E. BOULDING
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Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations *by Raymond Aron, translated from the French by Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox. Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1966. —xviii, 820 pp. $10.00.*

This is an important book by Europe's leading commentator on international relations. Aron begins by analyzing Clausewitz' antinomy between the tendency of war to become total and to serve as an instrument of policy—to make victory or the realization of policy its object. He illustrates from the recent world and colonial wars how war tends to feed on itself and to escalate until victor and vanquished are both ruined, unless one or both stop to consider that war is not an end in itself. Compromise may be less heroic, but it is more humane and rational than victory. At the same time he distinguishes occasional enemies from permanent enemies with whom compromise is impossible because of ideological differences and from "absolute enemies whose very existence is an aggression" (pp. 28, 34).

In *The Century of Total War* (1954), Aron was concerned with the dangers of total war and of totalitarian states in the nuclear age. In that

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book he traced historically the effort of statesmen, aware of the "dead sea fruit" achieved by victory in two world wars, to avoid a more total nuclear war in their resistance to totalitarian communism. In this book he investigates the same problem but from a broader base. He presents a general analysis of international relations from four points of view: *theory* or the philosophy of systems; *sociology* or the science relating causes and conditions; *history* or the actual situation; and *praxeology* or the art of balancing values. The differences of these approaches is illustrated by a game like soccer with its *rules* determined by the referee, its *strategies* advised by the coach, its *action* by the players, and its *appraisal* by the spectators (pp. 8, 9).

The introduction indicates the significance of these four approaches in the development of a general discipline of international relations. Such a discipline, he points out, has no natural boundaries, but is defined by its focus on the relations between states in peace and war, symbolized by the diplomat and the soldier, concerned respectively with "the arts of diplomacy and strategy, the complementary and opposed methods by which dealings among states are conducted" (p. 6). He recognizes that this conception of international relations can exist only when the dominant political actors in the world are territorially defined states, and that as economics would disappear "under conditions of abundance," so "war would cease being an instrument of politics the day it involved the mutual suicide of the belligerents." In the nuclear age "the prevention of such a war becomes for all participants in the diplomatic game a goal as evident as the defence of purely national interests" p. 18). Yet he is skeptical whether this goal is achievable. "The theory of international relations is entitled to take for granted the participants—as well as the absence of an arbitrator or laws, and the reference to war as a possibility" (p. 51). "Humanity," as suggested by Kant," must travel the bloody road of war to have access one day to peace. It is through history that the repression of natural violence is achieved, the education of man to reason" (p. 18).

This exposition of Aron's concept of the subject, his approaches to it, and his interpretation of its underlying problem, should be supplemented by indication of his method of treatment. His generalizations are not derived from statistics, though he gives some attention to the statistics of war (p. 329); nor from mathematical reasoning, though that is referred to in connection with game theory and deterrence (pp. 457, 773); nor from logical deduction from universally accepted values, though this is implied in his final section on praxeology. His method is to analyze familiar concepts and propositions, and to illuminate them from actions and policies, usually from recent history. In the first part,

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setting forth his theory, he analyzes power, force, prestige, security, glory, offense, defense, utility, interest, and other concepts. In the second part, on sociology, he analyzes environment and resources as elements of power and deals with the influence of technological, ideological, and nationalistic innovations as causes of change, of the birth and death of civilizations, and of the occurrence of war and civil strife. In the third part, he analyzes international systems, strategies of deterrence, and methods of persuasion and subversion in recent history. In the final part, concerned with values, he discusses the relations between idealism and realism, conviction and responsibility, armament and disarmament, survival and conquest, law and empire, strategy and policy.

Aron is always aware of the uncertainties with which the diplomat and the soldier are confronted, preventing a precise science of international relations. Although the problem of decision-making is emphasized in the last part on praxeology, it pervades all the others. His interest is less in a pure science of international relations, demonstrating and systematizing predictive formulas, than in an applied science or art helping the diplomat and soldier in a world of uncertainty to decide among alternatives none of which is very good.

He has little faith in international law and organization, with which he seems not too familiar. States, he says, recognize "the need to submit to law the coexistence of human collectivities" as manifested by the existence of international law, but he doubts whether this recognition modifies the essence of interstate relations. Significant norms, such as the principle of respect for the self-determination of peoples, of nationalities, and of collective security; non-aggression, non-intervention, recognition of *de facto* states and governments, and the outlawry of war are, he thinks, too vague to be defined by positive law. Treaties usually manifest a temporary balance of forces not accepted by all the parties as just. Furthermore, so long as civil strife is permissible international war will be possible. With the "historical and juridical heterogeneity of the world system," procedures either of effective enforcement or desirable change of international law seem to Aron "prohibited" (p. 124). Neither international law nor the United Nations has "exercised a major influence on the course of international relations" (pp. 710, 717).

But if international law and organization cannot assure a stable and peaceful world, neither can a balance of power, either multiple or bipolar, nor a balance of terror or system of mutual deterrence. The best mankind can expect is moderate war or warlike peace (p. 162). To this end, attention should be paid, at least in the short run, to wise strategy on the assumptions of power politics, rather than on peace from law, empire, world federation, or game theory. "The indications of a human

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consciousness are almost invisible compared with the daily renewed proofs of a tribal consciousness or of an ideological fanaticism" (p. 753), but mankind is still young and has time to learn. We cannot predict his future, so let us "think and act with the firm intention that the absence of war will be prolonged until the day when peace has become possible—supposing it ever will" (p. 787).

The book does not develop an integrated theory of international relations, but is rather a commentary on and criticism of recent history. The reader becomes aware of the state of the world and benefits from the sage reflections on the political problems which it presents, based on wide knowledge of history and of the opinions of statesmen, soldiers, and scholars.

QUINCY WRIGHT
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The Evolution of International Organizations *edited by Evan Luard. New York and Washington, Frederick A. Praeger, 1966.—342 pp. $9.00.*

The principal objective of this collection of twelve individual essays is an analysis of the processes of change and adaptation in international organizations. The book is almost evenly divided between essays dealing with the structure and functions of the various organs of the United Nations and those dealing with some of the functional institutions of international economic and social cooperation.

The reasonably advanced student of international relations will not find much new information or analysis in the individual essays. Thus, the changes in the relative position and function of the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations are by now familiar to the contemporary student of international relations.

There is, however, considerable merit in the coordination and juxtaposition of the processes of evolution in a number of different international institutions. The relative brevity of the essays, on the one hand, often makes it difficult to proceed beyond generalities, but, on the other hand, often provides remarkably crisp summaries of basic evolutions in contemporary international organization. An excellent example is the following analysis by Professor Inis L. Claude of the evolution of the Security Council's role:

> To put it in documentary terms, the actual result of the Korean case was neither the resuscitation of Chapter VII of the Charter nor the substitution of the Uniting for Peace Resolution, but the placing of fundamental reliance upon Article 51, and, through it, upon the North Atlantic Treaty and other col-

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lective defence arrangements, buttressed by the virtual deletion of the provision, in Article 53, paragraph 1, which makes enforcement action by regional agencies subject to the authorization of the Security Council. Thus, on balance, the Korean affair actually contributed to the diminution of the role of the Security Council—or, more broadly, of the United Nations—with respect to the problem of conflict among the major powers.

Mr. Andrew Shonfield underlines the remarkable change in the philosophy of the World Bank since the replacement of Mr. Eugene Black by Mr. George Woods. There is also a valuable brief analysis of the re-emergence of the International Monetary Fund as a vital agency of international financial relations, and a brief essay on the European Economic Community.

The field of international organizations is, however, vastly wider than indicated by the selection of subjects in the present volume. It would have been useful to differentiate among the various types of international organizations: those designed to restrain the use of force, those designed to organize specific objectives of economic and trade cooperation, those dealing essentially with communications and technical matters, those concerned with educational and cultural matters, and so on. It is only by such a comprehensive comparative analysis that insight into the structure of the organizations, and the differences in the extent of their powers and functions, can properly be understood. It is therefore to be hoped that this interesting and worthwhile enterprise will be expanded or followed by a more comprehensive analysis of the evolution of international organization in our time.

WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN
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Functionalism and World Politics: A Study Based on United Nations Programs Financing Economic Development *by James Patrick Sewell. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966.—xii, 359 pp. $6.50.*

The United Nations Programs for Financing Economic Development provide an appropriate testing ground for the applicability of the "functionalist" argument, and such testing and re-examining is precisely the author's objective. This review will concentrate on the key issues raised and their significance.

Sewell's appraisal of the "technical self-determination" powers of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development's management is most judicious. There is, however, one institution which, in my judg-

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ment, has even greater powers of technical self-determination than the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and that is the International Monetary Fund. Its executive directors are truly the final interpreters of its Articles of Agreement; their decisions have reinterpreted the character of the Articles without need for amendments. Their decision-making process has become a continuous evolution of the "Institution," unsatisfactory though it is at present for purposes of monetary reform.

The general evaluation of the United Nations Development Program, and especially of the pre-investment concepts of the United Nations Special Fund, are submitted to an interesting analysis demonstrating the functionalist approach.

The author appropriately quotes Hammarskjöld's argument that "international institution-building proceeds from transnational cooperation in the problem-solving process to the establishment of *institutional* systems of *international coexistence* and *constitutional* systems of *international cooperation.*"

While dealing with *patterns of representation and participation* in international financial institutions, Sewell notes how in recent years *ad hoc* expert conclaves have lost ground to inter-governmental committees. He gives justice to the institutionalization of expertise in the Secretariat. This reviewer thinks that as a result of improved expertise in national financial institutions, combined with political power, inter-governmental committees now are sometimes more effective than independent expert groups. Nevertheless, Sewell's preference for independent expert groups in development finance is justified in many instances.

Few political analysts have shown as much knowledge as does Sewell of the World Bank's bond sales on the money markets. This reviewer is grateful for the penetrating political analysis of those operations.

In the last chapter we read: "The Bank's modus operandi is negotiation; its modus vivendi, the bi-lateral loan agreement."

The author surely has grasped the essentials of the workings of the IBRD, but the reader somehow does not get the full impact of the Bank's part in program and project organization, its active role in the *mobilization* of *"parallel finance,"* its methods of organizing consultative groups —all of which are important to the functionalist argument.

The author refers to the Bank's disputes with governments as *borrowers,* and this reviewer would like to add at least a mention of the problem of governments as *guarantors* of IBRD loans to private enterprises.

In studying the evolution of the IBRD's affiliates, the author lucidly explains notable switches in problem-solving approaches. He recalls how Secretary Dillon obtained the House Banking and Currency Committee's

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unanimous agreement on the bill providing U.S. backing for the amendment allowing equity investment by the IFC, thus reversing earlier U.S. opposition to such investment, championed by Secretary Humphrey.

The IFC's evolution is explained from its conceptual origins, including the link to the Prebisch proposals for an inter-American fund for industrial, agricultural, and mining development (see page 220), and, of course, the "Black Plan," which launched the IFC with limited capital and without authority to make equity investments.

In his conclusion, Sewell does not reject summarily Mitrany's "World Commonwealth," although he is critical of this visionary concept. He makes a plea—not a conclusion—for "commitment and purpose," influenced by Redfield's dichotomy: "Technical order and moral order name two contrasting aspects of all human societies." To quote Sewell's own excellent formulation: " 'Organization engineering' in an international context is high politics, nothing less, and its achievements involve a creative union of commitment and purpose" (p. 330).

HENRY S. BLOCH
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The Political Illusion *by Jacques Ellul, translated from the French by Konrad Kellen. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1967.—xxi, 258, x pp. $8.95.*

Walter Kaufman once remarked that the important question about a philosopher is not what did he say but what did he see. Professor Ellul's *The Political Illusion* is a book which ought to be reviewed in this spirit. If his exposition is put to the test, "What exactly does he say?" the results, at least for the American reader, are likely to be rather unsatisfactory. Ellul dismisses what one would ordinarily be willing to call aspects of politics as illusory from so many different angles that one is hard put to establish a consistent understanding of his position. His overriding theme is, I suppose, clear enough: the heightened technological character of modern life—and this includes the bureaucratization of the state and the electrification of the means of communication—has made the control of events both by politicians and by the public illusory. Ellul's tone with respect to this development is quite pessimistic, and the only solution, if indeed there is one, is a sort of moral renaissance on the part of individuals who will breathe into society some sort of genuine tension.

On the surface this sounds like a hippie call to arms. One might expect to find Ellul in phalanx with Allen Ginsberg, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Paul

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Goodman leading a great parade of the unwashed against the citadels of modernism. But on the contrary, Ellul includes in his book as acute a critique of the "necessity for commitment" stance of the French Left, and by implication the American New Left, as I have ever read. Ellul writes in part as follows:

> Very impressive on this subject are Sartre's statements. In the political domain he holds the same opinion he expressed in a debate on dialectics in November, 1961, when he said to a physician: "Be quiet! Only we philosophers understand this matter." This formula explains his constant mixing in political affairs of which, by his own judgment, he knows nothing. Even if he does not really mean it, his avowed incompetence in political affairs must be taken seriously, all the more as it is reflected in his constant mistaken assertions . . . . Such admission of incompetence emerges more frequently in involuntary ways, as in the recantations and superficial judgments expressed in all of Sartre's political articles. Yet this man, who declared himself incompetent, and really was, and still is, formulated at the same time watchwords for the young and insisted that positions must be taken and that every intellectual worthy of the name must commit himself. All that is simply ridiculous (p. 164).

Thus, concludes Ellul, "Sartre proclaims his theory of political commitment only to vent his personal complexes, without reference to political reality; this also is, without doubt, one of the important reasons for the success of his invitation to political engagement, which is a means of fleeing reality in the name of pseudo-reality" (p. 169).

One must surely conclude that anyone who says this cannot be all bad. On the other hand, however, what are the characteristics of the genuine individualism that Ellul calls for? What ought one to do to engage in politics that is not illusory? It is not at all clear to me how Ellul answers these questions. I have read his words, but I do not really know what he says. Perhaps the difficulty here is, as Ellul himself points out in his preface to the English translation, that this is a very French book. Ellul frustrates me in rather the same way Camus does in *L'Homme Révolté.* Camus brilliantly condemns the dogmatization of rebellion and calls instead for moderation, but he never touches the question of how it is possible to engineer politically this moderation. One gets the impression that he had never heard of constitutionalism in the Anglo-American sense. Ellul speaks of his book as a "warning" to non-Frenchmen, and we must perhaps take it this way. It may indeed be the case that matters are culturally beyond the point of no return in France (and this would presumably seem to be particularly true to an author writing in the era of de Gaulle), but I am not certain that an American needs to be quite so pessimistic. You are likely to find *The Political Illusion* a bit

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annoying and unsatisfying, especially if you demand a consistent picture. It is, however, a mosaic of high quality, constructed by a sensitive and intelligent man, and I can promise you that you will not find it dull.

THOMAS LANDON THORSON
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Economic Policies Toward Less Developed Countries *by Harry G. Johnson. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1967. —xvi, 279 pp. $6.75.*

Professor Johnson's book is perhaps best regarded as an academic's tract for the times. It is not a work of research; professional students of international economics will find in it no new ideas and no new information. It is also not a work for the intelligent general reader; for that reader, the book is deficient, both in expository skill and in substance. It is a book, then, for serious graduate students in social studies and for the legion of non-economists who attend conferences on aid and trade; they may be stimulated by some of the book's perspectives, and they should be competent to safeguard themselves against its shortcomings.

In our bureaucratic language, the poorer countries are "LDC's." The 1966-67 *Annual Report* of the World Bank puts the combined LDC population (excluding the Communist countries) at 1,640 million, more than seventy per cent of the total. In the Communist world, by the same economic standard, only the U.S.S.R., East Germany, and Czechoslovakia escape from the category of LDC's; there the LDC population would be over seventy-five per cent. Indeed, if we draw the line at a Gross Domestic Product of $1,000 per capita, only two countries in all of Latin America, Africa, and Asia—Japan and Israel—are excluded from the company of LDC's.

Up to now, in the nineteen-sixties, incomes among the LDC's are falling farther behind the incomes of the peoples in the more advanced countries. In the advanced countries, average per capita incomes have been rising by something like 3½ per cent per annum, but the average LDC advance has been less than 2½ per cent.

Economic aid to LDC's is stagnant in monetary amount and declining in real value. Communist economic aid to countries outside Europe is tiny; it will hardly have reached $500 million per year in the nineteen-sixties. The World Bank estimates net economic aid by non-Communist governments (bilateral and multilateral) at about $6½ billion per an-

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num, after debt repayment but before interest. If one subtracts annual interest payments, now about $650 million, the net transfer is some $5.85 billion for about 1.64 billion people—or about $3.57 per capita per annum. It is against so munificent a transfer that one is to judge the indignation of senators and of others in authority at those wasteful underlings (white, black, brown, and yellow) who have not yet made good with all the money showered on them.

On statistical balance, taking all the pluses and minuses together, private enterprise now yields *no* net transfer of resources from the advanced countries to the LDC's. The World Bank estimates a net private transfer of about $2 billion a year, after amortization and after deducting recorded private capital outflows but *before* the deduction of foreign private earnings in the LDC's. Already in 1965, United States private investors alone had over $3 billion per annum of such earnings. On statistical balance, international private enterprise therefore yielded the LDC's only capital resources consisting of *part* of what foreign direct investment and other foreign private assets earned in the LDC's.

In expansion of exports, also, the LDC's lag. A few pull up the average. A tiny Kuwait, a Saudi Arabia, or a Hongkong can achieve export totals in the same range as all India or Brazil and greatly surpassing Pakistan or Indonesia. Yet, even including the favored few, the exports of the LDC's rose in value by roughly 7½ per cent per year in 1962-66, while the industrial countries achieved an increase of 9½ per cent. In 1966, the non-Communist LDC's supplied about $42 billion of the $180 billion of non-Communist exports.

To be paid *more* for their present exports—this is the first thing which the LDC's are asking when they ask for a more equitable ordering of international trade. To be paid *more*, as something owned and due, not given or granted—this is the nub. ("Stabilization" is eyewash, though Professor Johnson treats it seriously; no LDC desires merely to be paid the same amount in more equal instalments.) However, no LDC request for a new order in world trade ever succeeds in upsetting the conviction that, when the advanced countries are asked to pay more, these payers are rational only if they give weight to political considerations, to the need of the LDC recipient, and to the effectiveness with which the added payment is likely to be used. Then the potential payers inevitably conclude that paying more under various commodity schemes makes dubious rationality; indeed, such paying is likely to wind up yielding most to just those countries who produce whatever existing markets do not demand. Such commodity schemes make less sense even than completely indiscriminate per capita giving or granting.

To be afforded freedom to earn more by exporting more, to confront

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lower tariff barriers or even tariff barriers *preferentially* lower—this is the second thing for which the LDC's ask, in international trade policy. The evaluation of this second LDC request receives more attention in Professor Johnson's book than any other issue. And it is perhaps in this matter that the book makes its contribution. Chapter VI, "Trade Preferences for Manufactured Goods," may be regarded as the climax of the volume. It is not a climax which I find of great policy value, but it deserves thoughtful reading. And readers should not be put off by the fact that Professor Johnson's text—here as throughout the book—pays little attention to either the particular facts of economic life in less-developed countries or to the distinctive limitations of the political-administrative process. An-alysis like his necessarily abstracts, and it yields most meaning precisely when rigorously focused on what is structural and not bemuddled by trying to take everything into account from the beginning.

Unfortunately, however, when Professor Johnson does deal with a particular factual matter, his performance is not uniformly reassuring. An extreme case is the treatment of U.S. quota control over imports of crude petroleum. On this item Professor Johnson computes a past injury to LDC exports of $1,109 million per annum. But, in attaining this conclusion, he makes a number of erroneous assertions. First, that U.S. quota control of crude petroleum imports has been abolished. Second, that this quota control did not apply west of the Rockies. Third, that limits on these imports from Canada and Mexico were only informal. Fourth, that, among developed countries, only the United States imposes non-tariff restrictions on crude petroleum imports. Fifth, that one may reasonably use an f.o.b. value of $2.25 per barrel for additional U.S. imports of crude from the Middle East and Venezuela. Any serious student of petroleum economics knows that, in each of these points, Professor Johnson is in error—though perhaps less simply in the fifth than in the others. But to be so mistaken, in a simple factual matter, is peculiarly unfortunate. It undermines confidence in judgments made elsewhere, in contexts where facts are harder to establish and where a more delicate quality of judgment is involved.

But, in the end, Professor Johnson reaches conclusions which I believe to be entirely sound:

> . . . while the contribution of trade policy changes to development might be very large in the long run, their impact in the short run—say five to ten years—would probably be small and concentrated on the few countries that have achieved some success in development. It therefore appears inescapable that for the short run an increase in the supply of foreign aid would be more effective in supplying external resources for development than would the opening of trade opportunities.

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There are discriminating readers whom this book can assist. They should not be scared away from it.

OSCAR GASS
*Washington, D.C.*

Cicero, the Statesman *by R. E. Smith. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1966.—viii, 269 pp. $8.50.*

This book is a history of the last years of the Roman Republic, based on the writings of Cicero, whose "central position in the politics and events of Rome from 63 B. C., even when he was not an active participant, enables the story to be written without distortion, and the tragedy of Cicero and the Republic to unfold itself without the help of the author's promptings." The book is intended both for the specialist and for a wider public, but the specialist, in considering Professor Smith's thoughtful comments, will miss citations of sources and modern discussions, and the wider public will need more background for the introductory chapters and more explanation of the Roman constitution than the author gives. In the reviewer's opinion Cicero's "central position" depends much more on his cultural than on his political significance, which is often distorted for us by the massive evidence of the orations and letters. For Cicero's political significance there is a curious failure to consider his career before 56 B.C. in the light of the ideal of statesmanship embodied in the *Republic*, which he wrote in a time of deep humiliation. The *Republic* is barely mentioned, although the major spokesman in the dialogue, Scipio Aemilianus, is presented as Cicero's ideal statesman. The estimate of Cicero's statesmanship is based primarily on Cicero's fight after the assassination of Caesar to maintain Republican institutions and particularly the prestige of the senate, which, as Smith shows in his interpretation of the Gracchi in *The Failure of the Roman Republic* (1955), is almost as dear to Smith's heart as it was to Cicero's. Cicero's statesmanship was, Smith believes, doomed to failure because of the rise of professional armies (see Smith's admirable *Service in the post-Marian Army* [1958]), and of the long-term commanders who took the place of the annual magistrates, once in control of the legions. Yet Smith thinks that Cicero's fight was worthwhile because it had in it "the seeds of liberty as the imperial system never did." The emphasis on liberty is hardly in accord with Smith's insistence on the identification of Cicero with the ideals of the Italian peoples. Did the identification go beyond the propertied Italians who came to Rome in masses to vote for Cicero's offices and for his restoration from exile? Cicero was proud of his grandfather's success in opposing the introduction of the secret ballot in the elections of his native Arpinum, and yet he de-

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scribes the institution of voting tablets at Rome as in a sense a safeguard of liberty (*quasi vindicem libertatis, De Legibus* III, 39). The facts are well known to Smith, but the role of the Italians in the decline of the Republic is one of the subjects on which the specialist will wish for more discussion in this stimulating book.

LILY ROSS TAYLOR
*Bryn Mawr College*

Roman Voting Assemblies: From the Hannibalic War to the Dictatorship of Caesar *by Lily Ross Taylor. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1966. —xx, 175 pp. $7.50.*

Professor Taylor rounds out with this book her two previous studies of the actual working of Roman politics during the later Republic, namely, *Party Politics in the Age of Caesar* (1949) and *The Voting Districts of the Roman Republic* (1960). *Party Politics* explains how the senatorial "nobles" used clientship, the loyalty of veterans, the tribal organization, and the state religion to control voting in the assemblies, particularly for election to the consulship. It then analyzes the rivalry within the senate between "optimate" and "popular" factions. *The Voting Districts* consists in the main of a geographical analysis of the extension and distribution of the thirty-five tribes through Italy. However, the introductory and concluding chapters describe how the senatorial families distributed members through the tribes in order to influence their votes. *Roman Voting Assemblies* affords a fairly technical discussion of the points in Rome where the assemblies—centuriate, tribal, and plebeian—met and how they operated under the Roman system, by which the votes of individuals counted only in determining the vote of the group (century or tribe) to which they belonged and decisions were reached by the majority vote of the groups.

Miss Taylor makes skillful use of the varied and fragmentary evidence for the actual operation of the assemblies: chance and inadequate literary statements; inscriptions, notably the *Tabula Hebana* which describes new centuries created in 19 A. D.; the few coins which show scenes of voting; archaeological evidence for buildings (*comitia, rostra,* and the like) connected with assemblies; and the recent restudy of the fragments of the Severan marble plan of Rome, the *Forma Urbis,* which casts new light on the *Saepta Iulia* in the Campus Martius, a building erected by Augustus, probably to replace an earlier building of the late Republic, to give adequate space for all types of voting assemblies. In her final chapter she describes in the light of these investigations how the assemblies work-

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ed. Preliminary discussion, in set speeches (*contiones*), was held outside the actual voting place. The people were then dismissed to gather either by the thirty-five tribes or by the 193 centuries, which were probably organized within the framework of the tribes, and, at least in the *Saepta*, to pass down long aisles and at the end across raised platforms (*pontes*) to deposit their secret voting tablets in urns. Though Miss Taylor holds that even in the late Republic, the *concilium plebis*, in which the plebeians voted by tribes under the presidency of a tribune, remained distinct from the *comitia tributa*, in which patricians and plebeians together voted under the presidency of a consul or praetor, she does not suggest whether or how the voters were checked to see whether they were patrician or plebeian and in what tribe they should vote. Nevertheless, she does make clear that what appears at first sight to have been an almost impossibly unwieldy method of voting could in fact operate. She concludes, however, that the unequal numbers in the groups, particularly as between the urban and rustic tribes, and the cumbersome system made the assemblies peculiarly subject to manipulation by clever politicians, notably by Caesar.

Miss Taylor's three studies are fundamental for students of the history, politics, and political procedures of the later Republic. For students of comparative political institutions, they illuminate the operation of a system of group voting which, superficially democratic, actually worked for the benefit of an oligarchy. General students of political science will find in *Party Politics* and in the general conclusions of *Voting Districts* and *Roman Voting Assemblies* a stimulating picture of the practical operations of Roman republican politics.

MASON HAMMOND
*Harvard University*

The Papers of Alexander Hamilton *edited by Harold C. Syrett; associate editor, Jacob E. Cooke. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1966; Vol. X: xix, 615 pp., Vol. XI: xiv, 657 pp., $12.50 each.*

The editors have now excelled themselves. Always zealous in ferreting out materials relating to Hamilton, and adding substantially to what was previously known, they have a prize in Tench Coxe's draft of the Report on Manufactures of 1791. Other students, disappointed in overtures to the owner, have had to be content with vain speculation concerning Coxe's contribution. Indeed, they could not be sure that Coxe had

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prepared a coherent statement for Hamilton's approval. The present editors, doubtless using superior diplomacy and supported by the dignity of their undertaking, are able to offer the paper (Vol. X, pp. 15-23, some two thousand words, thought to have been prepared in the fall of 1790). With proper appreciation of Coxe's assistance, it is fairly judged that "Hamilton's final version of this Report differs markedly in both emphasis and substance from Coxe's draft and from Coxe's other writings on manufactures."

Hamilton's four drafts, on which he worked intermittently for a year, are printed with all of his alterations, and his few changes in the paper as submitted are indicated also. As is well known, this is the one of his principal recommendations to Congress which was not favorably acted upon at the time. However, in solicitude for a rounded economy it was a prophecy. Even Jefferson, in June 1791, lamenting that we could not rely "on a steady . . . commerce with . . . Europe," concluded it would be "wise in us to turn seriously to manufactures; and if Europe will not let us carry our provisions to their manufacturers we must endeavor to bring their manufacturers to our provisions."

These volumes, covering the early months of Hamilton's administration of the Treasury, are of peculiar value in exhibiting policies as they were forming. Directions for management of the customs took his close attention for a protracted period, as his circulars to collectors and supplemental correspondence show. He had less time in which to muster means of meeting the speculative panic of 1791-92, in which the admirable William Seton served him and the country. Madison's desertion of Hamilton, as Hamilton saw it, is the subject of a bitter letter to Edward Carrington (May 26, 1792, Vol. XI, pp. 426 ff.), which is of importance for the origin of parties. Hamilton's "warm attachment" to William Duer, shown in assistance and forbearance, appears in several letters (*ibid.*, pp. 131, 325).

More generally, these volumes will engage the political scientist no less than previous ones covering Confederation and Constitution, because Hamilton's conduct of the Treasury had the object of launching the nation on a career of solidity as well as prosperity. His fiscal determinations, however technical, were inseparably linked to his resolute political policy. He was not simply your true political economist, anxious for the public welfare. He was principally concerned with statecraft, to which his remarkable economic skill was subordinate.

The editors' introductions to main papers, and no less the briefer footnotes, go beyond mere identification of sources, incidents, and persons. They light up, with splendid scholarship, the intellectual, political, and economic history of a crucial period. The picture given us is both

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panoramic in scope and sharp in detail. The indexes prepared by Jean G. Cooke deserve their own praise.

BROADUS MITCHELL
*Hofstra University*

The Road To Independence: The Revolutionary Movement In New York, 1773-1777 *by Bernard Mason. Lexington, University of Kentucky Press, 1966.—x, 279 pp. $7.50.*

Yet another study inspired by Carl Becker's 1909 thesis that the American Revolution was both a war for independence and a struggle as to "who should rule at home," *The Road To Independence* reaches moderate and persuasive conclusions based on much research.

Mason believes, to begin with, that Whigs—that is, supporters of independence—were a "decisive majority" in the state of New York. He bases his conclusion on a great deal of evidence and, in a separate appendix, criticizes thoughtfully the hitherto accepted conclusions of Alexander C. Flick's *Loyalism In New York During The American Revolution.* Comparing three kinds of totals—population; soldiers whom British officers received commissions to recruit; and soldiers actually recruited—and making the assumption that the portion of the population available for military service (males sixteen to fifty) represented one-fifth of the population as a whole, Mason has no difficulty in showing, for example, that it is highly unlikely that the British formed a militia organization in 1779 composed of six thousand men who had been inhabitants of New York City for more than three years when the total number of men, women, and children of whom that was true was hardly more than ten thousand. Mason states his conclusion tentatively. If he is right, it is important, for New York has the reputation of being the state in which Toryism was strongest; and if Whigs were a decisive majority in New York, that was no doubt true a fortiori in the United States as a whole.

The second major finding of *The Road To Independence,* presented with more confidence, is that class conflict was a significant but *not* decisive phenomenon. "Conflict was spasmodic and disorganized and did not produce a program or sense of class solidarity." Mechanics desired independence more vigorously than merchants, middle-class farmers sought to widen the suffrage during the drafting of New York's new constitution of 1777, Hudson Valley tenants and landlords pursued their chronic quarrel. But these were centrifugal strains on a "coalition" the basic business of which was "a war of liberation." In sum, "the lesser-propertied classes neither controlled the revolutionary movement nor

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were able fundamentally to alter social relations.... By and large the prewar elite were preponderant in the revolutionary organs, but the very nature of the conflict with the parent nation opened the door to power to the middle-class farmers." Mr. Mason may be surprised to hear it from me (since my own work on New York in the Revolution has emphasized the elements of class conflict), but I think he has it just right.

The best chapter of the book and the one which may interest political scientists most concerns the drafting of the 1777 constitution. From scattered and oblique evidence Mason has constructed a convincing scenario of the success of a conservative faction headed by John Jay, Robert R. Livingston, and Gouverneur Morris in blocking reforms such as drastic suffrage extension and the secret ballot. Ten years later the same men, once more in the minority, engineered New York's adoption of the United States Constitution with equal skill.

STAUGHTON LYND
*Chicago State College*

Jacksonian Aristocracy: Class and Democracy in New York, 1830-1860 *by Douglas T. Miller. New York, Oxford University Press, 1967.—xiii, 228 pp. $6.00.*

Historians were once confident that the Jacksonian era was democratic as well as Democratic. In recent years Lee Benson, R. P. McCormick, and others have changed the old picture: by arguing, for example, that Andrew Jackson was not particularly Jacksonian, or that the similarities between Democrats and Whigs were greater than the differences. The emphasis in such studies was mainly political. Douglas T. Miller concedes that *political* democracy triumphed in the first third of the nineteenth century. His concern is with socio-economic factors, and here he denies that there was a corresponding democratic development.

Miller, like Benson, focuses upon New York State. His thesis is that the rapid expansion of industry and transportation after about 1830 disrupted a previously homogeneous social order. The status of the skilled workman was depressed by the spread of factory methods. Large-scale immigration created an urban proletariat. At the other end of the social scale, the men with capital became markedly more affluent and aped the styles of European aristocracy. The only privileged group in New York which lost ground—actually and figuratively—was the landed gentry of the Hudson Valley, but even here it was not difficult to commute assets into investment capital. By 1860 New York City, with a population of a million, revealed an alarming gulf between mansion and slum. A sub-

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sidiary thesis is that the Civil War was not a decisive turning-point, in economic terms; the Gilded Age began before 1860.

These assertions need scrutiny. One caveat, though minor, is that the period 1830-60 is somewhat *post*-Jacksonian. Surveys of "Jacksonian" America usually end at 1848 or 1850. An objection of greater substance is that New York was not America. Miller defends his choice on the ground that it was "both representative and prophetic." Yet to the extent that New York was "prophetic," that is, in advance of the rest of the country, it was not entirely "representative." The chronological element is a little vague in Miller. We are not told what conditions were like before "aristocracy" set in. If "aristocracy" followed "democracy," presumably "democracy" followed a previous period of "aristocracy." Was there a continuous development, or a regression? Part of the problem is one of terminology. "Aristocracy" is a slippery word, though perhaps no satisfactory substitute exists. It connotes power and influence as well as wealth; but in avoiding politics Miller skirts the question of what power was wielded by wealthy New Yorkers. Nor does he stress sufficiently the fact that the American proletariat, in being fed by immigration and migration, did not remain constant in composition.

But these are caveats rather than rebuttals. Miller's short book offers a clear and stimulating thesis. Much of the evidence he presents was to be found in earlier studies. His originality lies in rearrangement and reinterpretation. The result is a valuable corrective, possibly an over-corrective. We see that generalizations about the economic vitality of pre-1860 America may have had the effect of concealing deprivation—as has become apparent in the America of the nineteen-sixties. By the same token, our tendency to dwell upon political, public rhetoric may have blinded us to social, private attitudes that were much less egalitarian. The emergence of an "aristocracy" and a "proletariat" may have been overlooked because of their low visibility within the political context. There is a great deal of food for thought in Miller's lively book.

MARCUS CUNLIFFE
*University of Sussex*

James K. Polk, Continentalist: 1843-1846, Vol. II, *by Charles Sellers. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966. —x, 513 pp. $12.50.*

For nearly ten years students of antebellum America have been awaiting completion of Charles Sellers' biography of the eleventh president, begun so auspiciously with *James K. Polk, Jacksonian.* This volume, mov-

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ing from his nomination and election to the completion of his first eighteen months in office, is a thoroughly documented and well-written study of the political career of this enigmatic figure. This is traditional political biography; the focus is on national politics with occasional excursions into the maze of factionalism in such key states as New York, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee. Polk is obviously the center of attention, but he does not always hold the center of the stage, being barely mentioned in some chapters. But even when he is maneuvering quietly behind the scenes, Polk is clearly carrying out his stated intention "to be *myself* President of the United States."

Sellers warns in his Preface that he is not attempting to evaluate the ambiguous category of Polk's "greatness" as a president. Yet his account demonstrates that Polk was a consummate politician, an astute diplomat who continually overrode the timidity of his secretary of state, and a statesman with a program and a concept of the president's role in the legislative process far more explicit than his predecessors'. With neither the charisma of a Jackson nor the "legitimacy" of a Van Buren, Polk endeavored to overcome factionalism and sectionalism, to unify his party and the nation in the pursuit of truly national objectives. Combining an adherence to the Old Republicanism of Jefferson and Jackson with a continental vision which transcended that of his political mentors, he was essentially responsible for the accomplishments of "the most remarkable congressional session of the nineteenth century."

At the same time, as Sellers indicates, Polk's administration was in the final analysis a tragic failure, attributable both to his own failings and to forces which he could neither control nor understand. His personality and his politicking occasionally led him to the verge of duplicity. Moreover, he refused to recognize that his political orthodoxy was rapidly becoming irrelevant to the needs and desires of a dynamic society, and he manifested a moral blindness to the emotions engendered by slavery and expansion. In seeking to strengthen the bonds of the Union with a revival of democratic nationalism, his policies inadvertently created the climate for disunion. Nevertheless, as Sellers concludes, he was the last president who had any chance to master "these dangerous and incomprehensible forces of disruption."

In spite of its many excellencies this volume is disappointing. The details are often overwhelming, as in the account of the Oregon debate, and sometimes become tedious. Although we welcome Sellers' refusal to psychoanalyze his protagonist, Polk never comes alive as a person with understandable though complex motives. Moreover, the sources of his "continental vision" are not made clear, Sellers merely stating that his nationalism was born in the period after the War of 1812. Polk's ac-

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complishments are not really evaluated from the viewpoint of historical perspective, nor is his relationship to the forces of "manifest destiny" completely clear. Hopefully, some of these questions will be dealt with more fully in the concluding volume.

WALTER HUGINS
*San Jose State College*

Florence Kelley: The Making of a Social Pioneer *by Dorothy Rose Blumberg. New York, Augustus M. Kelley, 1966. —xii, 194 pp. $5.00.*

Splice together Josephine Goldmark's *Impatient Crusader* (1953) and Dorothy Blumberg's *Florence Kelley: The Making of a Social Pioneer* and the result is still something less than an adequate biography of Mrs. Kelley. Both books are works of homage to an extraordinary woman whose life was dedicated to social reform and in particular to the elimination of child labor. But each has its deficiencies: among other things Miss Goldmark's suffers from lack of documentation; Mrs. Blumberg's has not completely outgrown its origins as an M.A. thesis.

Students of American social history will be grateful to Mrs. Blumberg for casting light on Florence Kelley's relationship with Friedrich Engels and on her brief involvement with the early American Socialist movement. The daughter of Judge William D. Kelley, a Pennsylvania Republican congressman renowned for his advocacy of protective tariffs, became a Socialist in 1884 while studying in Zurich. In the same city she met and married Lazare Wischnewetzky, a Russian medical student and a fellow Socialist.

Between 1884 and 1894, Florence Kelley maintained a running correspondence with Engels which began when she took upon herself responsibility for translating his writings into English. Engels' side of the correspondence has been previously published, but only a few of Mrs. Kelley's letters were known to scholars. Mrs. Blumberg unearthed most of the remainder in the archives of the Marxism-Leninism Institute in Moscow, and they add much to our still very incomplete knowledge of American radicalism during these years. They also reveal that the exuberant Mrs. Kelley could be a source of irritation to Engels who almost studiously avoided seeing her during his brief visit to the United States in 1888. From this point on Florence Kelley lost interest in Marxism as she became increasingly absorbed in, and eventually assumed leadership of, the crusade against child labor.

Mrs. Kelley left New York for Chicago in 1890 in order to obtain a

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divorce from Dr. Wischnewetzky who had something less than a successful medical career in the United States. In Chicago she immediately plunged into the activities of Hull House. As a consequence of her investigation of sweatshops in Illinois, Governor John Altgeld appointed her the state's first chief factory inspector in 1895, a position she lost two years later when the governor failed to achieve re-election. Mrs. Kelley returned to New York hoping to obtain from Governor Theodore Roosevelt the same position as chief factory inspector for the Empire State. Though she had strong local backing, her association with Altgeld proved too much of a political liability. Her career as social reformer was subsequently to revolve around her activities as general secretary of the National Consumers League.

While Mrs. Blumberg's research is generally competent, her book suffers on the literary side. It contains far too many block quotations and, indeed, too much quotation altogether. Nor is Mrs. Blumberg very venturesome with her own analysis and interpretations. Perhaps this caution comes in part from her desire to have Mrs. Kelley speak for herself "in her own words."

HOWARD H. QUINT
*University of Massachusetts*

Competition and Cooperation: The Emergence of a National Trade Association *by Louis Galambos. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966.—x, 329 pp. $7.50.*

Because of its literary devices, I thought at first I had stumbled into Dos Passos' *U.S.A.* Each of the five sections of Mr. Galambos' book is preceded by an impressionistic page or two giving the atmosphere of a cotton manufacturing community at a critical time; the chosen place is usually Fall River. The first part of each following chapter states more prosaically the problems facing the industry. To these the manufacturers respond by some form of trade association. In spite of its exceptional structure, the book begins on the low key usually found in this type of history. In the late nineteenth century manufacturers north and south preferred the dinner-club associations. Such groups operated without a bureaucracy; their budgets were tiny; and the participants informally exchanged information about technical and other peripheral matters. Soon after 1900 new necessities and forces pressed in for action. Since highly competitive units, some very small, characterized the industry, it proved impossible to initiate a combination movement which in other industries was bringing about standardization and stabilization in production. Reform legis-

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lation regulating the conditions of labor bore unequally upon north and south and stimulated cotton managers to fight back by lobbying and education. Organized labor was more aggressive and better organized. So the trade association became a service association with a bureaucracy and a politically orientated program.

Following the industry-wide depression in 1925 the Cotton Textile Institute represented another phase of cooperation, a policy-shaping association. The rather humdrum story of just another trade association now begins to pick up speed. The Institute had masterly leadership in its first president, Walker D. Hines, its secretary, George A. Sloan, and its counsel, G. H. Dorr. All were college graduates; all held law degrees. They formulated a program to control production by getting an agreement from the industry to run only two forty-hour shifts a week. They also introduced the exchange of information about prices and inventories. The section of the volume where the leadership prevailed upon Hoover, Julius Klein, and "Wild Bill" Donovan to reconcile anti-trust with the Institute's program is a delightful example of political fencing and it is told very well.

Then came the melodrama of the New Deal with NRA and General ("Iron-Pants") Johnson and the internecine warfare within the Roosevelt fold. The Institute, already in evidence and packed with political experience, made Johnson its captive, drew up the code for the industry, and practically had its way in interpreting the code's provisions and getting the rulings it wanted from NRA. Labor, at first benumbed, became restive; curtailment did not yield satisfactory profits; and many Institute members became convinced that they had let the government into the management of the industry and now the government was selling them out. When the Supreme Court threw out NRA and the Roosevelt administration opted "gung ho" for competition, the Institute organizationally regressed to the service association status. All this does not discourage Mr. Galambos. The Institute had softened the harsh laissez-faire philosophy of cotton industrialists; it "had modified the nation's anti-trust policy" for a partnership principle between government and business. Whether or not these were enduring or desirable accomplishments, Mr. Galambos has at least written a sophisticated and spirited volume sure to dispel the dreary pattern hitherto characteristic of most writing about trade associations.

EDWARD C. KIRKLAND
*Thetford, Vermont*

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Liberals and Communism: The "Red Decade" Revisited *by Frank A. Warren III. Bloomington and London, Indiana University Press, 1966.—ix, 276 pp. $6.95.*

The author of this book believes that we need another analysis of the "extent of Communist influence on [American] liberal thinking" during the nineteen-thirties. Acknowledging that contemporaries argued at length about the matter, that new spasms of criticism, defense, and allegedly disinterested discussion were stimulated by Eugene Lyon's *The Red Decade* in 1941 and by the cold war of the nineteen-fifties, Warren nevertheless claims that "none of the debaters was yet ready to engage in a careful and detailed study of the factual evidence." His own method of "careful and detailed study" is to review the publications of about two dozen authors, most of whom wrote for *The Nation*, the *New Republic*, and *Common Sense*, concentrating almost entirely on the opinions these writers expressed about communism and about Soviet Russia.

Not surprisingly, Warren concludes that these "left-wing liberals" were divided into three groups: "the fellow travelers, the Russian sympathizers, and the anti-Communist liberals." His sympathies very clearly rest with the latter group. Indeed, despite Warren's obvious intention to treat his subject dispassionately, almost all of his strong statements are reserved for contemptuous references to liberals who were "soft" on communism, those who "failed to grasp the impossibility of separating the economic and political culture of a totalitarian state" (p. 221).

Perhaps interviews supplemented by contemporary correspondence and publications by the same authors on other subjects might have helped Warren get behind published statements on communism to discover what these writers really wanted for America and for the rest of the world, how their attitudes toward the Popular Front against fascism, for example, fitted into their overall hopes. The conclusion that some American liberal writers held high expectations for Soviet Russia during the nineteen-thirties despite discouraging evidence, while an increasing proportion did not, hardly requires over two hundred pages of documentation.

STANLEY COBEN
*Princeton University*

The Broken Seal: The Story of "Operation Magic" and the Pearl Harbor Disaster *by Ladislas Farago. New York, Random House, 1967.—iv, 439 pp. $6.95.*

Traditional diplomatic history has so far denied itself—or has been denied by the keepers of official documents—the use of at least four kinds of

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sources, highly secret all: the documentation as to the application and size and recipients of briberies paid out by foreign offices, the use of intercepts of foreign governments' communications, espionage, and personnel files. Next to nothing of this *partie honteuse* of diplomacy is in evidence or even suspected in the great collections of diplomatic documents that started with the *Grosse Politik der europäischen Mächte* in 1922. Old fashioned diplomats, including Americans like Stimson (pp. 54, 149), have on occasion declined to make use of such "dirty" practices, until they became inevitable, and serious historians have followed them, rather than find out what they could about bribers and bribed, interceptors, perlustrators (a category that should have been added on page 18), whose earlier doings might, for example, force them to rewrite the history of the Washington Conference of 1922. Since we have entered the age of electronic perlustration, *vulgo* "bugging," such aloof habits have to be shed by the diplomats and the historians if they want to follow them. Farago's book, a first considerable and serious thrust into a field hitherto haunted and "covered" only by such as spy-story writers, does not quite avoid the stylisms of that kind of writing, purple passages designed to reproduce or hint at the secretive-ominous atmosphere: "during one of the moonless nights," "in pitch-black darkness in an icy storm," "a pall of doubt and apprehension hung over the heads of the warmakers," the "climax of one of those contrived melodramas in which the ominous meaning of every passing minute used to be accentuated by the ponderous ticking of a big clock on the wall," and more of the sort that seems aimed at a so-called large public (such readers, incidentally, will find the book fascinating perusal, following the clues and *clous* of its story). It is, however, fundamentally serious and ought to be taken as such, in its enumeration of insights and oversights—with Pearl Harbor the greatest, most fatal of the oversights on the American side when contemplating likely targets of Japanese aggression—on the part of the agencies and agents, of whom, as to Japanese working stateside, there were far less than popular suspicion would have it.

The prehistory of "Pearl," including the very remote, is reconstructed with considerable care and with the use of the most varied sources. I find, though, the version of the Venezuela intervention of 1902-03, which the author drags in (p. 12), rather boxed out of shape, and "Lord Leed" on page 24 should be Lee of Fareham. The labors of the cryptographers and decipherers and spies are carefully evaluated; among the latter the "privileged spies," the service attachés, seem the most ineffectual. The division of labor among the various groups of Washington Lynkeuses is shown up as poorly organized, helping to explain—finally?—how, with all fore-

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knowledge of hostile Japanese intentions acquired through "Magic," the Pearl Harbor disaster could still come about, and why after such experiences, including the fact that on occasion the holders of secrets could become withholders, for periods denying them even to the White House for fear of leaks occurring there, the overall organization of the CIA had become imperative.

ALFRED VAGTS
*Sherman, Connecticut*

On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age *by Klaus Knorr. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966.—185 pp. $5.00.*

Escalation and the Nuclear Option *by Bernard Brodie. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966.—151 pp. $4.50.*

Klaus Knorr's essay is thoughtful, important, and timely. His thesis is that new conditions have changed the role of military power as an adjunct of diplomacy in ways that neither a Thucydides nor even a Bismarck would recognize.

Nuclear weapons represent power essentially untranslatable into action in any rational pursuit of political objectives. "Today it looks as if unlimited might is associated with absolute impotence" (p. 84). Nuclear power coerces through persuasion, deterrence, and contingent threats. But these uses are political, in the sense that they do not involve the actual application of violence.

Conventional arms, however—where most of the world lives—have also undergone a revolution, and here Professor Knorr's analysis makes its more original contribution. That revolution has taken place firstly in the developed areas, where nations have moved beyond territorial conquest. But the less-developed countries might still be tempted to use force to achieve objectives of a territorial nature, either as a surrogate for internal progress, or where ethnic facts bear no relation to borders, or where dreams of empire seduce those who were only yesterday the victims of Western imperialism.

In general, "military power has appreciably lost in political utility, compared with preceding ages" (p. 79). By and large, the value of certain non-military means, such as economic assistance, "public opinion," the potential role of international organizations, and so on, has improved relative to the use of force. Combined with a widespread change in moral standards in terms of the way men view "war," Knorr perceives something that might be even an "epochal shift" (p. 45). But he wisely warns that the shift is uneven, and in some cases, not proven. Its uneveness is

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nicely illustrated by the exception to UN Charter norms found in the definition of "just war" by Communists and anti-colonial activists.

Dr. Knorr balances these inferences with the admission that, if the usability of military *force* has been vastly transformed, one cannot demonstrate that "the utility of national military *power* has positively declined . . ." (p. 133, my emphasis). "It continues to act as an indispensable main-stay of international order as we know it" (p. 172).

In an impressive final essay, Knorr hints at the possibility that international organizations, both global and regional, may benefit from changing appreciations of the role of force and power. But that will not happen tomorrow, for so far "there is no obvious way out of the trap that man has ingeniously constructed around himself" (p. 175). This is a wise and profound book, which should serve as a helpful guide through a strategic landscape of singular complexity.

Bernard Brodie's essay is of a rather different order. Written in a considerably more lively style, it is a plea for "keeping and indeed expanding the benefits that have come to us from [nuclear weapons] . . ." (p. 7). As such, much of it constitutes a critique of the Kennedy-McNamara NATO strategy of flexible or proportionate response which has resulted in a significant increase in the capability of the United States to mount a conventional military action, by contrast to the narrow spectrum of options in the Eisenhower-Radford-Dulles policy of massive retaliation.

In Brodie's view, the new strategy has caused us to "come close to depriving ourselves of a real tactical option in nuclear weapons" (p. 7). Seeing tactical nuclear weapons primarily as a deterrent, he focuses on the need to continue the process of deterrence after the first combat threshold has been passed, with tactical nuclear weapons then serving the function of "de-escalating devices" (p. 23).

His method is to unmask the Soviets as a paper tiger and thus our own fears of escalation and of accidental war as unfounded. The heart of his argument is that, in shrinking from the planned use of tactical nuclear weapons, we misconstrue probable scenarios that would have led to that point. On the basis chiefly of Soviet performance in the Cuban missile crisis, Brodie guarantees, in effect, that under all circumstances Moscow is unwilling to live with the prospect of nuclear escalation. (He actually uses the word "guarantee" in this sense, on page 133.)

Thus, while Brodie shares the current concept of firebreak, he nevertheless urges the United States to configure its forces and map its strategy on the basis of crossing that line. Others of us would, I think, conclude that this threshold is so momentous that its effects when crossed, *whatever the military situation*, would shatter a taboo whose value transcends the sometimes esoteric logic of a particular military doctrine, for it is a

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restraint that keeps us this side of nuclear insanity. This reviewer hopes that the McNamara strategy will prevail.

The book consists of some materials prepared earlier on a classified basis for the RAND Corporation in which Dr. Brodie was a distinguished participant. The new introduction, in which the author tends somewhat defensively to justify the role that he took in various aspects of recent strategic debate, might well have been omitted in order to focus on a position whose intellectual merits can be recognized, even though one may not agree with either the premises or the conclusions.

LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD
*Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

Technology, Economic Growth and Public Policy *by Richard R. Nelson, Merton J. Peck, and Edward D. Kalachek. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1967. —xiii, 238 pp. $6.00.*

World War II demonstrated to the public the great capacity of modern science and technology to assist in the attainment of important public goals. In the ominous peaceful aftermath they have come into even greater prominence in the drive for national power and domestic welfare. Partly to make these instruments more effective and partly out of curiosity, social scientists have contributed a growing number of scholarly monographs and articles in recent years on the causes and effects of technological progress. The volume under review, produced under the sponsorship of the Rand Corporation and The Brookings Institution, brings the results of much of this research together with a view toward improving both our comprehension and our management of the phenomena involved. In this effort it succeeds admirably. It is well written, thoughtful, and thought-provoking. While much of the ground it covers will necessarily be familiar to specialists, it is a "must" for those whose interest in the topic is more than casual.

The first half of the book describes the relations between technological progress and economic growth. The next section discusses the problems of adjustment to technological change. The final section describes existing public policies and institutions and suggests several changes in them.

Part One describes the institutions that produce the various kinds of technological knowledge, the sources of finance, and the strategies used in research, development, and diffusion. The authors show why the increase in technological knowledge is necessary for sustained growth in economically advanced countries, and how the rate and direction of

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technological progress are determined. Chapter Three analyzes "the invention industry." While the focus is necessarily on organized R&D, in favorable contrast to other accounts the authors call attention to both informal invention in business firms and independent invention. Here the authors discuss the fact that formal R&D is highly concentrated in several ways: in large firms, in a handful of industries, in a small portion of the economy's array of products, and in projects directed toward quite modest improvements. They note that independent and informal invention counterbalance this concentration to some extent, but wisely refrain from asserting that the imbalances in organized R&D are thus entirely offset.

Chapter Four is devoted to a more extensive discussion of industrial R&D concentration, and the emphasis here is on the superior resources of large firms and economies of scale in R&D itself. While the issues raised are discussed expertly, it is surprising that no mention is made of the possibility that the higher ratio of R&D expenditures to sales among large firms may, in part, reflect both declining R&D efficiency as size of firm increases and a need for larger firms to offset the reduced motivation and opportunity for inventive actvity by operating personnel. Chapter Five presents an excellent discussion of the determinants of the rate at which new technical knowledge is put to use.

Part Two of the book is concerned with employment and technological change. Like the great majority of economists, the authors see little reason to expect either much technological unemployment or satiation of consumer demand. Our society, they argue, particularly with the aid of recent legislation, possesses enough flexibility in retraining and reallocating its labor force to assure high levels of employment, while the persistence of a high propensity to consume, supplemented with appropriate fiscal and monetary policy, can assure adequate aggregate demand.

The more serious problems of adjustment to technological change arise, the authors appropriately point out, in ways that only recently have become of great public concern—for example, traffic congestion, air and water pollution, and the empty lives of millions of retired people who represent in part the product of advancing medical technology. The authors thus briefly call our attention to the tendency of a private, market-oriented society to lag behind in dealing with the difficulties that technological progress often brings in its wake.

The concluding section describes the wide variety of government programs that affect the rate and direction of technological progress, and concludes with some tentative proposals for new programs. The latter include a federally-supported National Institute of Technology to sponsor research in "the middle ground between academic science and pro-

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duct development," a limited number of government-supported R&D programs on large, technically advanced systems for the civilian economy, the sponsoring of R&D in other fields where private firms are doing "too little," and the use of government procurement to stimulate early experimental use. One proposal of the authors has already become public policy—the creation of an industrial extension service resembling that in agriculture. The authors urge an experimental approach to their own proposals, and suggest that they be implemented in such a fashion as to facilitate the collection of data needed to assess their effectiveness. Like the rest of the book, the proposals are both thoughtful and temperate.

JACOB SCHMOOKLER
*University of Minnesota*

In the Name of Science *by H. L. Nieburg. Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1966.—ix, 431 pp. $7.95.*

What President Eisenhower termed the "military-industrial complex" but failed to comprehend—perhaps because the concept originated with a speechwriter—becomes in Professor Nieburg's book the "scientific-military-industrial complex," or the Contract State. One part necessary (or allegedly necessary) R&D connected with defense and the space race, and the other parts pork-barrelism, lobbying, favoritism, graft, waste, padding, and above all huge profiteering, the Contract State is regarded by Professor Nieburg as Leviathan incarnate. The "R&D cult," he writes,

> is becoming a sheltered inner society isolated from the mainstream of national needs. More and more it departs from the reality principles of social accounting, insulated against realism by the nature of its contract relations with government and its political influence. . . . Massive government subsidies to R&D facilitate its expansion beyond the point of rational response to international politics; it becomes a self-perpetuating pathology, intensifying the regressive structure of the economy and making further pump-priming exertions necessary.

The author's use of such psychoanalytic terminology as "reality principles" and "regressive" also serves to make the point: the Contract State, whether judged from the perspective of rational need, democratic values, or even cost accounting, is a very sick state indeed.

Those who regard R&D as the brains-trust of the Great Society would do well to read the chapter titled "The Ramo-Wooldridge Story," and those who assume that scientists cannot be corrupted should consult the several chapters devoted to the science establishment. With social science about to become Big Social Science and, as such, still another beneficiary

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of the Contract State, the time is surely coming when the teaching professor who works for a modest salary will be as rare as a baldheaded worker in a toupee factory. The conversion of independent academic inquiry into R&D research, the tendency of university departments to become research bureaucracies, the transformation of professional societies into contract-seeking pressure groups—all this is in the name of science, too.

Professor Nieburg has no solution for these problems, and perhaps there is none. He apparently feels that more McNamaras in the government—he greatly admires the Defense Secretary—would take us some way toward a solution, but he nowhere provides a precise definition of "democratic control," "democratic planning," and so forth. Surely more is required than hard-headed budget-paring and a call for more responsible procedures. To what extent is the whole phenomenon of the Contract State a reflection of a severely disturbed system of values that prefers science, technology, and specialization to those arts and skills that make for social wholeness and integrity? Is it possible that R&D is simply the reverse side of Vietnam and our obsession with a military response to global problems rooted in poverty and backwardness? Professor Nieburg hints at such questions here and there, but they are not, nor could they be, what the book is about. *In the Name of Science* is an important work in the tradition, now rapidly disappearing, of problem-oriented, policy-proposing political science, and one may hope that this is not Professor Nieburg's last venture in that direction.

ARNOLD A. ROGOW
*City University of New York*

The Making of United States Foreign Policy *by Burton M. Sapin.* Washington, D.C., *The Brookings Institution, 1966.—xi, 415 pp. $7.50.*

Documents on American Foreign Relations: 1965 *edited by Richard P. Stebbins, with the assistance of Elaine P. Adam. New York, Evanston, and London, Harper and Row for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1966.—xxi, 498 pp. $9.50.*

The United States in World Affairs: 1965 *edited by Richard P. Stebbins. New York, Harper and Row for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1966.—ix, 430 pp. $6.95.*

On the premise that recent appraisals of American foreign policy have "not been sufficiently scientific"—that they have lacked "explicit hypoth-

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eses and theoretical formulations"—Professor Burton M. Sapin has produced a new and comprehensive analysis. It draws heavily upon earlier studies by The Brookings Institution, under whose auspices he prepared this volume. Having combined service in government with an academic career, the author is eminently qualified for this undertaking.

Sapin's scholarship is characterized by an encyclopedic knowledge of his subject, by original and perceptive insights, and by balanced judgments about still troublesome, if long-standing, problems besetting the formulation and administration of foreign policy by the United States. Moreover, his assessment reflects awareness of significant new tendencies —such as that nearly all foreign policy issues are now inter-departmental and the increasingly important role of science in all aspects of national policy—affecting America's external role.

Unlike some other students of the subject, Sapin never permits his interest in administrative aspects of foreign affairs to deceive him into believing that an "ideal" administrative pattern exists or that most frustrations encountered by the United States abroad have their origin essentially in organizational defects.

Yet when judged by his own initial premises, Sapin's work produces some feeling of dissatisfaction, growing principally out of the disparity between what he essays to do and what he in fact does. The organization of his book, for example, is traditional and predictable; the bulk of every chapter is devoted to description and to discussing emerging organizational tendencies. In the course of his treatment, the "explicit hypotheses and theoretical formulations" which he advocates tend to become obscured, if not sometimes altogether lost.

In general, Sapin is sanguine (more sanguine than many other commentators) about how the machinery of foreign policy operates in a crisis-ridden environment. With respect to national intelligence activities, for example, he informs us that they have been carried on "impressively on the most complicated and challenging problems. . . ." Without contesting such judgments as statements of fact—and in awareness that Sapin does not attempt to deal with the substance of American foreign policy—the reader might still reasonably have expected the author to identify and evaluate the *scientific criteria* producing such verdicts. In too many instances the reader is simply left to take Sapin's word for it that the American foreign policy process is working well or that, with his suggested improvements, it can be significantly improved. On some issues, Sapin may well be right. But the reader has very little basis for understanding why, in "scientific" terms, this is necessarily the case.

For the kind of evidence needed to evaluate many of Sapin's judgments, the student of foreign policy is required to rely upon other studies, like

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the companion volumes published annually by the Council on Foreign Relations. For 1965, as in earlier years, the *Documents* continue to provide a service—useful to journalists, public officials, scholars, and interested citizens alike—by making available primary source materials on the full range of foreign relations, from the contest in Vietnam to the balance of payments issue.

Under the editorship of Richard P. Stebbins, the latest installment in the Council's commentary on American foreign policy remains comprehensive, dispassionate, and as contemporary as publications schedules can make it. The basic theme—that events in 1965 "offered grounds for disappointment and apprehension"— is amply supported by the discussion of developments in Southeast Asia, by the Dominican crisis and other Latin American upheavals, by growing disarray within the Western alliance, by the United Nations' ongoing financial difficulties.

A conspicuous feature of the 1965 volume is the extent to which the conflict in Vietnam pervades the account; a separate chapter, for example, is devoted to domestic implications of the crisis. Again, in the final chapter (doubtless in order to permit the insertion of the most contemporary data), Stebbins returns to Vietnam and other subjects and regions where events move swiftly. To my mind, it is not a commendable innovation, since the chapter becomes a mélange of unrelated topics, whose only discernible rationale seems to be editorial convenience.

CECIL V. CRABB JR.
*Vassar College*

Elections and the Political Order *by Angus Campbell* et al. *New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1966.—ix, 385 pp. $8.75.*

For students of American politics this collection of articles provides an important extension and up-dating of the same authors' well-known volume on *The American Voter*. All but two or three of the sixteen chapters have appeared elsewhere, but it is handy to have them pulled together. Despite the ambitious title, the emphasis of the material is still rather more on voters and elections than on the functioning of "the political order" otherwise. But the virtues of a comparative emphasis (three of the articles deal with cross-national survey data) and of a concern for the time dimension are strongly apparent.

Different readers will doubtless have different favorites among the articles. For an understanding of much of the Survey Research Center's current orientation to American politics the chapter by Philip E. Converse on

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"The Concept of a Normal Vote" is of particular importance. It and several of the other chapters move at a quite advanced level of statistical analysis, though the authors generally do a good job of integrating their verbal analysis with the mathematical or statistical materials. If I had to pick a single favorite chapter as an example of outstanding data analysis I think it would be the Converse selection on "Information Flow and the Stability of Partisan Attitudes."

One regrets that two of the most exciting pieces by the members of the Survey Research Center are not included. Here I refer to Donald E. Stokes' application of analysis of variance to dissect national, state, and local district trends in congressional elections (published in *Mathematical Applications in Political Science*, Vol. I, edited by John M. Claunch); and to Converse's brilliant monograph on "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics" (published in *Ideology and Discontent*, edited by David Apter). Indeed, on rereading a variety of articles written by individual members of the SRC one is struck by the differences in style of research. Thus Stokes inclines to the application of more formal mathematical models, drawing on probability theory, stochastic processes, and the analysis of variance. Converse appears more inductive, but equally impressive. One has the feeling that he loves his data and lives with it for many hours each day; the result is data analysis at its best.

All in all the volume is good evidence that political science may yet become a discipline worth taking seriously. The work of the SRC is cumulative, not just repetitive, and is becoming more politically relevant as well as more methodologically advanced.

HUGH DOUGLAS PRICE
*Harvard University*

Economics of the Property Tax *by Dick Netzer. Washington, D. C., The Brookings Institution, 1966.—xviii, 326 pp. $6.75.*

When Benjamin Franklin wrote that "in this world nothing is certain but death and taxes" he was thinking, surely, of the property tax, for, as Dick Netzer reminds us, that levy "has been the major fiscal resource of American local governments since seventeenth century colonial days" (p. 3.). Despite periodic storms of criticism, the property tax has survived as a major American institution. As Netzer points out, it came under severe attack in the decades around the turn of the century following Henry George's celebrated demand for a "single tax" on land rent, and again in the nineteen-thirties, when property owners were understandably

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indignant at the failure of assessments to decline with the catastrophic fall in market values and local officials were distressed at their inability to collect essential revenues.

It would be an exaggeration to say that critical attack on the levy has revived in the nineteen-sixties; indeed, Netzer describes recent attitudes toward the tax as a "new complacency" (p. 3), arising, presumably, from the fact that after declining in relative importance from the late nineteen-twenties until the early fifties, the property tax surprised both its friends and its foes by the rapid growth in its yield thereafter. Yet we are undeniably witnessing a revival of analytic interest in this levy, a consequence, no doubt, of our currently intense concern with all manner of urban problems.

*Economics of the Property Tax* was sponsored by The Brookings Institution as one of its Studies of Government Finance. It is the most comprehensive analysis of the tax since Jensen's *Property Taxation in the United States* (1931), but it is not a latter-day version of Jensen. It does not treat in detail either the history of the tax or the problem of administering it; instead, it concentrates on analyzing the way in which the tax "actually works in the United States today," in order to evaluate "the economic case for and against it" (Preface, ix-x).

The book's major accomplishment is to marshal, for the first time, a wide array of data from the national income accounts, the national wealth estimates, and the censuses of housing, government, and business, and to combine these with theoretical analysis in order to make quantitative statements about the nationwide incidence and effects of the tax. Netzer is a master at compression and covers more ground in 220 pages of text than many of us do in twice the space. The book contains copious references to the relevant literature, and the author frequently uses his data to test others' hypotheses as well as his own.

After a short introductory chapter Netzer presents a breakdown of property tax payments by major economic sector, agriculture, non-farm business, non-farm households, and by subsectors, such as manufacturing, transportation and public utilities, and non-farm housing. In Chapter III he examines the incidence of the tax by income class. Chapter IV analyzes "Economic Effects," such as neutrality or non-neutrality toward resource allocation. For example, how far is the substantial (fifteen to twenty per cent) burden of the property tax on consumers' annual housing expenditure offset by the favorable treatment of owner-occupied housing under the federal income tax? Netzer's answer:

> The combined property tax/income tax system discourages expenditure for owner-occupied housing at the lower end of the scale and encourages it for better off families. Moreover, it surely discourages consumption of rental

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housing, which has no income tax advantage relative to owner-occupied housing and to other forms of consumption (p. 70).

In Chapter V Netzer takes up geographic differentials in tax base and tax rate between states, between regions, and between central cities and suburbs. He reviews the evidence that as metropolitan areas grow suburban property tax rates rise toward uniformity with central city rates. Chapter VI examines "The Personal Property Component of the Tax Base." Chapter VII provides "A General Appraisal of the Institution," that is, its merits or defects when compared with non-property taxes that localities might use to replace it.

Finally, in Chapter VIII Netzer discusses alternative forms which the property tax itself might take, and concludes by putting forward a proposal for reform. He suggests that we replace the American property tax with a new package consisting of (1) a site value tax calculated to absorb half the rent of land, (2) a twenty per cent tax on increments in land value, (3) a set of user-charge type of property taxes to finance services clearly beneficial to property, and (4) a tax on housing at about five per cent of annual housing costs (instead of the fifteen to twenty per cent taken by the present tax). These levies, Netzer argues, would be both more equitable and more efficient economically than the present tax, and he estimates that they would yield at least as much revenue. Many who, like myself, believe that the present property tax is a major obstacle to reconstruction in the older central cities, would welcome some such reform. But one can hardly be optimistic. I opened with one cliché; let me close with another: everyone talks about the weather, but nobody does anything about it.

JAMES HEILBRUN
*Columbia University*

America in the Market Place: Trade, Tariffs and the Balance of Payments *by Paul H. Douglas. New York, Chicago, and San Francisco, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966.—ix, 381 pp. $7.95.*

International trade and finance affect our lives more, and at more points, than most of us realize. Many problems of government policy result, some relatively simple, some highly complex. Professor Paul Douglas deals with both types—and well, for he is a professional economist of high standing (once president of the American Economic Association) who has acquired invaluable experience from service in the U. S. Senate. In this book he draws upon his rich background to help Americans under-

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stand, and then to act more wisely upon, matters of foreign economic affairs.

The discussion combines simplicity with sophistication, theory with evidence, objectivity with no lack of willingness to indicate value judgments. In the best sense of the term this is a "tract for the times." Yet it is not merely for the moment because some of the analysis deals with principles of enduring concern. Moreover, the account of recent events seems likely to serve indefinitely as a useful history.

The book opens with a (re)statement of the basic creative role of the division of labor—simple, often-told, yet always in need of retelling to a public with instinctive mercantilist and "protective" biases. The book closes with discussion of complex and controversial problems of the international payments mechanism. In between, the author blends theoretical, historical, and policy discussions of the development of international trade; governmental (and private) devices for restricting trade (amount and composition); efforts to reduce such restrictions; the Common Market; the international payments mechanism, including variants of the gold standard and ties to domestic monetary policies. These aspects of economics were not those of Dr. Douglas' pre-congressional specializations; the reader will benefit from an exposition which perhaps reflects the author's own efforts to master a complex and rapidly changing world in which theory *must* engage politics and policy.

The author draws directly and concretely on his experience in Congress. He gives the reader a sense of realism, the pressures for compromise, the influence of inertia, and difficulties of overcoming strong predilections of established agencies of government (not the least important being central banks).

The United States can benefit from general reduction of trade barriers; Douglas explains why and makes a persuasive case for trying even more doggedly to overcome domestic and foreign opposition to greater freedom. Success will require strength in the bargaining position—domestic support, something to offer others, and realistic firmness by our negotiators. The author offers practical suggestions. He shows how the reduction of trade barriers within the European Common Market will help the residents of the countries. His discussion of the problems of Britain's membership deals with both domestic politics and some unpleasant realities of the British economy. He also discusses the difficulties of harmonizing the interests of the United Kingdom's associates in the Commonwealth and the European Free Trade Association with those of the Common Market—to say nothing of the obstacles created by de Gaulle, whom Douglas criticizes time and again.

Two chapters on "special problems" reflect an impressive combina-

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tion of the author's liberalism, resting on fine human instincts, with his sophisticated (but not disillusioned) understanding of the world. (1) He wants to see an expansion of world trade. Yet he detests totalitarianism and recognizes that encouraging East-West trade, though offering some benefits to America, would strengthen evil systems at their homes and risk their spread to areas not yet afflicted. At the least, we must be cautious. (2) He points out that goodwill and money from richer countries can help speed the development of poor lands, but he explains why they will not be adequate and holds out no hope for magic, or even easy methods. In asserting that Western Europe "ought" to provide more aid on easier terms, he almost implies that generosity on an American scale can be expected from others. His convincing criticisms of agreements among (poor) exporting countries to stabilize and raise prices of coffee and other commodities deserve wide attention, not only among the consumers who would suffer but also among the groups who hope to benefit.

The professional economist will respect and benefit from this book, even though he is not the author's intended audience. Not all of us would reach the same analytical conclusions or agree with all of the author's judgments. Yet on one point agreement will be broad: the country, and the world, will benefit if the audience proves to be large and gives support to Douglas' basic policy positions.

C. Lowell Harriss
*Columbia University*

Nationalism in Latin America *by Gerhard Masur. New York, Macmillan, and London, Collier-Macmillan, 1966.—x, 278 pp. $5.95.*

Nationalism in Contemporary Latin America *by Arthur P. Whitaker and David C. Jordan. New York, The Free Press, and London, Collier-Macmillan, 1966.—ix, 229 pp. $6.95.*

Appearing almost simultaneously, virtually equal in length, similar in organization and subject, and bearing almost identical titles, it is inevitable that these two books are being reviewed together. The juxtaposition is unfortunate; not only is there more difference between them than their price tags, but also their simultaneity of publication tempts one to question whether it is still necessary to write such general books on Latin America. They both follow the established path: a general theoretical introduction followed by historical case studies. The Whitaker and Jordan volume looks at ten countries, principally since 1930, and Masur covers nine. The cases are almost exactly the same: Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Cuba appear in the two books;

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Whitaker and Jordan add Chile, Venezuela, and Uruguay, and Masur adds a short treatment of Ecuador.

Now, it must be obvious that to analyze the growth of nationalism in so many varied cases cannot be well done unless an explicit theoretical framework is built *a priori*. That is to say, the mere space limitation precludes discursive description; therefore, the authors must know precisely what it is they hope to reveal by a careful selection of historical data if they are to avoid writing simple historical summaries. Neither work accomplishes this task of linking theory to data with unalloyed success, although the Whitaker and Jordan book is far superior to the Masur one in this respect. The authors of the former book have made a very conscious effort to review the literature, criticize it, and indicate what they want to accept, and then build their cases with more than passing reference to their conceptual commitments. Their lack of complete success is in part a function of their choosing to emphasize historical happenings and ideological writings as their data sources; population and economic statistics, voting behavior and interest group analysis, and some rigorous attention to social structure and social mobility are required for the testing of those parts of their hypotheses which concern nationalism as a socially integrating mechanism.

Professor Masur attempts no such tightness of construction. Indeed, he early gives up the search for definitional rigor: "... clarity of definition will not suffice, if we are to ferret out the significance of nationalism in operation. Our need is for detailed studies of the various societies in our contemporary world where we find nationalism at work" (p. 5). Thus these two books provide the classical confrontation between inductive and deductive modes of thought, between the "data first" or "theory first" schools of thought. The ultimate justification of the Masur approach should be to end with a rigorous set of conclusions; these he denies us, maintaining a loose speculativeness to the last page. Again, the Whitaker and Jordan work comes off better, with an attempt to link identification with individual nation-state to identification with transnational culture area in the style of the latest works of Hans Kohn and his argument that nationalism may well be a necessary step to effective internationalism.

Masur's book will be of utility to the non-specialist interested essentially in a political survey of South America; his citations are of easily available works in English, his interpretations sympathetic to liberal national aspirations in Latin America, and his theory left almost totally implicit. The Whitaker and Jordan volume can also be used by the layman, but the authors add some academically useful bibliography, suggest

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important Latin American polemical authors to the student, and form part of that stream of historians attempting to adapt theories generated in the social sciences to the problems and techniques of the historian.

K. H. SILVERT
*New York University*

Trujillo: The Life and Times of a Caribbean Dictator *by Robert D. Crassweller. New York, Macmillan, 1966.—xii, 468 pp. $8.95.*

Overtaken by Events: The Dominican Crisis from the Fall of Trujillo to the Civil War *by John Bartlow Martin. Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, 1966.—xiv, 821 pp. $7.95.*

All students of Caribbean and inter-American affairs should read these two excellent studies, which are unique among the growing number of books on the Dominican Republic. Non-specialists may also read them with profit, for the questions they raise about government and international politics are applicable beyond the Latin American area. Basically different in approach, *Trujillo* and *Overtaken by Events* complement each other at every turn. Crassweller carries his biography of the Dominican strong man to the expulsion of the Trujillo family late in 1961. Martin briefly reviews the history of the island republic to the assassination of the tyrant on May 30, 1961, and then leads the reader step by step through the next five years of coups, elections, revolution, and military intervention. Thus, between them, the two authors provide in penetrating and absorbing detail an account of the background, record, and legacy of the long Trujillo era. They examine the personal and institutional, national and international aspects of Dominican politics and diplomacy from occupation by the U.S. Marines in 1916 to occupation by the Inter-American Peace Force half a century later. They weigh the morality and practical consequences of intervention and of non-intervention. And, throughout, they are concerned with the use, abuse, and limits of political power. Neither is copiously footnoted, but printed sources are listed in the bibliographical sections. The reference value of both books is enhanced by their extensive indexes.

Robert Crassweller's work is the first objective and reasonably dispassionate biography of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina to appear in any language. It gives Trujillo full credit for the positive achievements of his reign—economic growth, fiscal independence, and three decades of

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political stability—while portraying all too graphically the price paid for such benefits by the Dominican people—complete individual and collective subservience to the dictator. Trujillo is presented as the logical, perhaps inevitable, product of Dominican culture and history, yet more like some ancient Oriental potentate than a twentieth-century ruler; as an infinitely complex personality, who combined genius for organization and power with monumental vanity, immense greed, and profound immorality; as a true despot, who perfected the use of terror, deceit, and humiliation as political weapons; and, ultimately, as a leader who failed to lead his people toward a new social order, self-rule, and self-respect. The author's matter-of-fact appraisal of the Trujillo regime as one of wasted ability and lost opportunity may well be a more damning indictment of the man and his rule than all the diatribes by enemies who saw Trujillo simply as the personification of evil.

This biography has the advantages and drawbacks of being written while its controversial subject is still fresh in the memory of contemporaries. The account is based in large part on personal observation and interviews with participants in the events described, and thus has a freshness and spontaneity often lacking in biographies drawn solely from written records. At the same time, the reader is frequently at a loss to judge the validity of bald assertions in the text, for the identity and bias of specific sources is seldom revealed. For all such limitations, however, the book faithfully reflects the nightmarish quality of fear and resignation that characterized the Dominican Republic under Trujillo.

In *Overtaken by Events* John Bartlow Martin provides an intimate account of his experiences as President Kennedy's fledgling ambassador to the Dominican Republic, and incidentally says a great deal about the making and executing of American foreign policy. A militant liberal and enthusiastic supporter of the New Frontier, Martin welcomed the opportunity to throw the weight of United States influence into the Dominican quest for democracy and against the extremes of Right and Left. The confidence, good will, and naïveté he took to his first diplomatic post were soon replaced by frustration as he came to realize the United States could not bring its great power to bear effectively in domestic Caribbean politics. Within two years, despite his best efforts, the Dominican wheel had gone full turn. Disillusioned, Martin resigned and began writing this book to explain what had gone wrong. It was still unfinished when violence broke out anew in April 1965, and he was swept back into the Dominican crisis as President Johnson's emissary. Thus, Martin was able to add the fourth and most gripping part of his report, which deals with civil war, communism, and intervention.

*Overtaken by Events* is a timely book, but it should stand both as a

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testimonial to the strengths and weaknesses of United States diplomacy under Kennedy and Johnson, and as a primary source on the men and issues in Dominican politics in the early nineteen-sixties.

ROLLIE E. POPPINO
*University of California, Davis*

The Eastern Question, *1774-1923: A Study in International Relations by M. S. Anderson. London, Macmillan, and New York, St. Martin's Press, 1966.—xxii, 436 pp. $9.00.*

There must be a half dozen scholars who have intended to write an up-to-date history of the Eastern Question. Here it is. Anderson's history, as the preface states, is not based on original research. It is instead the long-needed synthesis of the findings that many scholars have published in countless books and articles. A selective bibliography lists many of these; all are in European (not Near Eastern) languages, including Russian.

Starting with a sketch of Ottoman decline and the treaty of Kuchuk Kaynarji, the book runs almost chronologically through the major phases of the Eastern Question: Napoleonic wars, Serb and Greek revolts, Turco-Egyptian crises, Crimean War, creation of Rumania, problems of the eighteen-sixties (Syria, Crete, Suez, Bulgar exarchate, and the like), Balkan crisis of 1875-78, British occupation of Egypt, Bulgarian union, Armenian massacres of the eighteen-nineties, Baghdad railway, Macedonia, Bosnian crisis, Tripoli, Balkan wars, Liman, the war of 1914-18, and the peace settlement down to Lausanne. It's all there.

Yet is it all there? Anderson nowhere defines the Eastern Question until, by implication, his conclusion makes it coincide with the question of Ottoman survival (p. 388). This is a not uncommon view, often stated by nineteenth-century statesmen and modern historians; and certainly the Ottoman empire was at the center of the question, until 1920. But I think this is not enough for the historian, who cannot conveniently chop off the Eastern Question by geography. Anderson recognizes this, discussing Austro-Serb and Russo-Rumanian relations well after all Ottoman influence vanished. He sometimes mentions conflict over over Iran as well. More of this would help; the fringes are needed to explain the center. No reader of this book would know that Britain ever took Aden, or consolidated her Egyptian control by facing down France at Fashoda, or that France took Algeria, or that Iranian oil became important to the British navy. Even within Anderson's limits there are unexpected omissions—no mention of Kaiser Wilhelm II's visits to Turkey,

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of the Armenian massacres of 1915 (until one sentence in the peace settlement chapter), of Churchill's splitting Transjordan from Palestine in 1921. Reference to such events would help the reader's perspective and understanding.

Anderson says his account may be "pedestrian." Sometimes it is, but it is always clear, even when the detail piles up. I wish only that he had allowed himself a little of the drama and humor in which the subject is so rich. Why couldn't he have smuggled Karl into Rumania in 1866, for instance, in the Ruritanian style in which it happened? There are remarkably few errors, factual or typographical. Two in the former category might deserve correction: the Egyptian railway did not cross the Suez isthmus (p. 176), but ran Alexandria-Cairo-Suez. Russia was not one of the guarantors of Ottoman integrity in 1856 (p. 200); Austria was, as correctly stated on page 144. The index is inadequate, but the ten maps are fine.

These criticisms do not indicate major defects. The book is a splendid summary. Some conclusions at the end are debatable, but not unfair. Anderson's book is far superior to Marriott's *Eastern Question*, not only because Marriott is thirty years out of date, but because this one is more carefully done. It will be invaluable to students, teachers, and the public. It is now the best in any language.

RODERIC H. DAVISON
*George Washington University*

Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882-1914 *by Robert L. Tignor. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966.—xi, 417 pp. $9.00.*

The record of British rule in Egypt abounds in historical irony. The occupation was—very reluctantly and hesitatingly—carried out by that sincerest of pacifists and denouncer of British imperialism, Gladstone. Both he and his immediate successors envisaged the occupation as temporary, and the number of British government promises of speedy evacuation made between 1882 and 1922 has been put by an unsympathetic French writer at no less than sixty-six; yet, in fact Britain was to remain in Egypt for seventy-two years, and was pushed out only by successive waves of Egyptian nationalist pressure, in 1918-22, 1935-36, and 1950-54, the last greatly aided by the United States.

Other paradoxes abound. Here was Britain, in many ways the most advanced country in the world, taking over a land which had already car-

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ried out a large measure of economic and social development. One would have expected a noticeable acceleration in the process of modernization to follow. But since for quite a long time the occupation was thought of as only temporary, since Egypt was valued not for its own resources but mainly for its position on the India route, since Britain's freedom of action was severely limited by treaties and conventions and by the international bodies backed by the other Powers, since the Egyptian government's financial resources were earmarked for the servicing of the national debt, since the British government was certainly not going to spend any money on regenerating Egypt, and since the Arabi revolt had shown it the fragility of Egypt's social structure and convinced it of the danger of upsetting the Egyptian applecart by precipitate reform—the results were much more complex. The British reorganized the judicial, administrative, and financial systems, raising them to levels far higher than those of any other Middle Eastern country. They built large-scale irrigation works, thus greatly increasing agricultural output and national income; but they did nothing to encourage—and a good deal to discourage—industrialization, and the fruits of economic progress accrued mainly to a small group of foreigners or rich landlords. They allowed a vigorous press to grow and express itself freely, but their achievement in education was negligible. Most serious, they froze the social and political development of the country. The baleful results of all this were felt only after Egypt had achieved its independence, in the nineteen-thirties. At the risk of seeming to be flippant, one can summarize the situation:

When the Egyptian Question
Gave Gladstone indigestion,
Lord Dufferin
Prescribed a Bufferin.

Dr. Tignor's treatment is far from flippant. In addition to many books and pamphlets in English, French, and Arabic, he has worked on a vast body of unpublished papers in England and—presumably *faute de mieux* —the archives of the Egyptian Ministry of Health. The material has been carefully sorted out and the exposition is logical and clear. The result is the best single book yet published on this period, but this reviewer feels that much more could have been done on the economic and social structure and trends. To take one example, no attempt is made to answer the surely not insignificant question whether the level of living rose or fell in this period (it rose). There is much available material, in books, pamphlets, and articles in such journals as *Egypte Contemporaine*, which the author could have used with great profit.

One more point. For a book of about 130,000 words, with no charts,

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tables, or illustrations, a price of nine dollars (seventy-two shillings in the United Kingdom!) is excessive.

CHARLES ISSAWI
*Columbia University*

Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition *edited by Ralph Braibanti. Durham, Duke University Press, 1966.—xx, 733 pp. $17.50.*

This is the twenty-eighth in the notable series of volumes emanating from the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center. The intellectual historians of the next century will surely record the research undertakings of the Center among the more significant contributions to the understanding of the new Asian and African states produced in our time. It is true that Duke University had a considerable head-start: its genial and scholarly provost, who writes the preface to the present book, was busily occupied with a large and important part of the commonwealth even while it was still part of an empire, confounding his fellow political scientists with his interest in anything so readily at hand as the government of Canada and the Canadian civil service. The Center is the worthy inheritor of this long-standing commitment of Taylor Cole, which he continues to share, to the comparative study of political institutions in its finest and most liberal tradition.

Structurally, the symposium consists of an introductory section, six country studies, and a summary by the editor bringing the whole enterprise into focus. Ralph Braibanti's lead-off chapter is a succinct and comprehensible exposition of what the book is up to—an adventure in comparative political analytics. Hugh Tinker's magistral essay on the structure of the British imperial heritage makes quite explicit just what it is that the bureaucracies of these Asian countries have inherited, which is the administrative style and substance of the East India Company and the Colonial Office, not Whitehall. Bernard Cohn concludes the introductory section with a fascinating account of the recruitment and training of British civil servants in India from 1600 to 1860, and brings to light what appear to be some important administrative "firsts" until one recalls that Wang An Shih was demobilizing a Chinese army of three million men at about the same time our ancestors were throwing rocks at each other in the Battle of Hastings. The country studies—India by David Potter, Pakistan by Ralph Braibanti, Burma by James Guyot, Ceylon by Sir Charles Collins and Robert Kearney, Malaya by Robert Tilman, and Nepal by Merrill Goodall—are meticulously researched pieces by scholars

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who have all had extensive and obviously meaningful experience in the countries of which they write.

A plumbing of the richness in detail, illustration, and analysis of the country studies is beyond the reach of a brief review. But Braibanti's concluding chapter gives us insight into the tone and content of the book. His main points are:

(1) The British song may have ended, but the melody lingers on. The 245 British officers in the elite cadres of the five countries (Nepal had none) at the time of independence had shrunk to ten (three in India, four in Pakistan, three in Malaya) by 1964, but the British presence is still overwhelming.

(2) The elite corps concept of a very small, highly educated, well remunerated, exclusive cadre, occupying the critical posts providing maximum opportunities of control, continues to dominate the bureaucratic phenomenon in these countries.

(3) The 3,190 members of the elite cadres in the six countries, constituting 1.85 per cent of the total government employes, continue to be the dominant instruments of government, in large part because the "reserved posts" in central secretariats and provincial administration put them athwart the lines of communication and command.

(4) Internal criticism of the elite cadres continues most insistent in those countries in which lateral recuitment has been least utilized, such as Pakistan, and less insistent where officers have been promoted from other services into the elite corps or where the services have been substantially unified, as in Burma, India, Ceylon, and Malaya.

(5) Drastic salary disparities remain. In India an elite corps secretary to the government receives a salary sixty-four times that of the lowest paid government employe; in the United States the salary of a GS-18, at the top of the supergrades, is seven times that of the GS-1.

(6) The subordination of the bureaucracy to political direction is most advanced in India, least advanced in Pakistan and Nepal. In India, moreover, the judiciary has asserted substantial control over the *ultra vires* acts of administrators.

(7) Administrative reform in the several countries has tended to follow traditional lines, seeking to meet new needs such as economic planning and development with a minimum of change in the ways of the pre-independence law-and-order bureaucracies. "The concepts of Platonic guardianship, 'gentlemanly power,' and literary-generalism on which these bureaucracies were so strongly constructed" have perhaps served well during the initial periods of independence. How long they will serve is another question.

ROWLAND EGGER
*Princeton University*

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Foundation of Constitutional Government in Modern Japan, 1868-1900 *by George Akita. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1967.—viii, 292 pp. $7.50.*

This careful study is an important addition to our increasing knowledge of the crucial, formative years of Japan's constitutional government. By the use of extensive source materials, the author is able to show how deep rivalries and basic differences developed among the oligarchs on whether Japan should have a constitutional government, when it should be formed, what general type should be adopted, and how it should be operated. In so doing, this work further confirms the special role of each of the important figures of the period and especially the three chief leaders. Yamagata emerges as the staunch conservative who continually mistrusted the Diet and especially the political parties and their leaders; Ito is the gradualist and chief builder of a constitutional government which tries to preserve the power of the oligarchs; and Okuma is the maverick and advocate of party cabinets.

The most provocative aspect of this analysis of the growth of Japan's constitutional government is the author's emphasis on three basic theses. These are that (1) constitutionalism was not forced on the Meiji oligarchs by the pressure of public opinion, but that the oligarchs' thinking on this subject preceded and went beyond that of the "party" leader; (2) the constitution was supported and written by the oligarchs as an effort by them to share it with the people and at the same time to control this new experiment legally and rationally; and (3) the oligarchs were basically wrong in their expectations and hopes as to the extent to which they could control this experiment in parliamentary government.

To a considerable extent all three of these positions are tenable and valid, but at times the author has difficulty in making all of the events, and some of them important ones, prove his point. In reference to the first thesis, for example, the author quite justifiably devotes an entire chapter to the clash in 1881 between Ito and Okuma, primarily over when a constitution should be adopted and how much responsibility the constitution should give to the cabinet. Through part of the discussion Okuma is treated as though he were a party leader, but his purge from the government is described as an example of the oligarchs disciplining one of their own members.

The last half of the book, which is devoted to the first twelve years of the operation of parliamentary government, is a helpful and exhaustive treatment of the period. It clearly reveals the inability of the oligarchs to control parliament to the extent most of them desired. As the events unfolded which forced the oligarchs to use the prestige of the emperor to

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obtain support for the budget or to dissolve parliament repeatedly when challenged by it, it is understandable that the oligarchs wondered at the edifice they had wrought and sought new ways to retain their position of power.

In this context, the determination of Ito to form a party of his own in order to gain control of parliament becomes more understandable. At the same time, on the basis of events during this decade, one questions the author's conclusion that they are indicative of Ito's "mastery of the art of the possible" (p. 107). Certainly the internal and external forces surrounding him during all of his cabinets left him practically no alternatives of action and almost a victim of circumstances.

As this review indicates, this study is interesting and provocative, especially for anyone interested in the beginnings of a constitutional government. Furthermore, the historian and political scientist specializing in this period of Japan's development will find a rich source of information in the text, in the elaborate and extensive footnotes, and in the more than 350 bibliographical references.

HUGH BORTON
*Haverford College*

Dreams and Deeds: Achievement Motivation in Nigeria *by Robert A. LeVine with the assistance of Eugene Strangman and Leonard Unterberger. Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1966.—123 pp. $3.95.*

Professor LeVine has set a high standard for field research and reporting that other students of developing countries should emulate. He states a clear-cut hypothesis—that "the ideology of a status system 'will reinforce' traits regarded as facilitating status mobility"—and then tests it systematically in the Nigerian context. More explicitly, he reasons, in the familiar culture and personality tradition, that the causal chain runs as follows: society, represented by "the status mobility systems → parental values (that is, a concept of the ideal successful man) → child-rearing practices → personality frequencies (for example, percentage of population members high in *n* Achievement or obedience compliance dispositions)" (p. 17). He finds three subcultures within Nigeria with different traditional status mobility systems: (1) the Hausa, among whom a man rises in the world primarily by clientage (attaching himself to a powerful patron) because the social system is organized hierarchically with commands flowing from the top down; (2) the Ibo, among whom a man can get ahead primarily by being voted into title societies which are based on

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wealth and achieved status; and (3) the Yoruba, where a man can rise both by ability and lineage, family connections, or clientage. He predicts and finds that Ibo boys should be highest in achievement motivation (*n* Ach in dreams), Hausa boys lowest, and Yoruba boys in between, because they have variously learned from their parents whether striving hard for achievement (as among the Ibo) or serving loyally a superior (as among the Hausa) pays off in status mobility. It is striking that the motivational differences appear in dream reports rather than school essays, presumably because in school all boys have learned that they should report an interest in achievement. He further documents the "pushiness" or achievement orientation of the Ibo in many ways—from attitude survey data, the ideology of published pamphlets, comparative rates of high status occupational advancement in Nigeria, and the like.

But he is commendably cautious in considering other possible interpretations of his findings since the cultures differ in other ways than in their systems of traditional status mobility. He finds that he cannot dismiss the possibility that Everett Hagen's theory of "withdrawal of status respect" is responsible for the differences, since the Ibo were certainly treated more disrespectfully than the Hausa who were left alone by the British. But he is correctly critical of simple-minded, rationalist explanations, such as those indulged in all too often by social scientists, who, lacking any direct knowledge of sociology or psychology, fall back on that convenient myth, "the rational man." They have argued that in this case the Ibo "had to" become pushy because of overpopulation which "forced" them to become achievement-oriented to survive. As LeVine points out, becoming achievement-oriented is by no means the only option open to them, nor even the most "rational." They could have adopted lower standards of consumption which is by far the most common adaptation to population pressure all over the world.

He is also critical of my view that religion plays a role in developing *n* Ach, despite the fact that the Ibo are predominantly now Christians (who are generally higher in *n* Ach) and the Hausa are Moslems (generally lower in *n* Ach). One reason lies in his finding that among the Northern Yoruba there is no difference in *n* Ach among those who are Moslem or Christian. Similar findings are reported in *The Achieving Society* for minority Christian groups in India, and they support the view that religious values must be part of a generally consistent social system for the whole complex to affect modal personality structure. My own growing conviction is that child-rearing should also be regarded as a *reflection* of a general value system (not its cause) which may also be reflected in the status mobility system and ideology (as codified in folk re-

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ligious understanding). For after all, the historical question still remains: Why did the Hausa develop a clientage system? Did they "have to" because they were conquered by the Fulani? Or did their own prior values have something to do with developing such a system at that time? Did Islam have nothing to do with strengthening such a social system?

For the political scientist the book illustrates not only the critical importance of such varying value orientations among subcultures in modernizing nations, it also shows how values can be assessed quantitatively rather than inferred *post hoc* in circular fashion from political events. Professor LeVine is to be congratulated for having provided us with a striking example of the "new" behavioral science—part anthropology, part psychology, part political science. I have only one theoretical complaint: he is so focused on achievement that he may have missed the main goal of the Hausa power-oriented clientage system, which is probably not status mobility at all (an achievement concept), but satisfaction of *n* Power (feeling powerful) via identification with a powerful master.

DAVID C. MCCLELLAND
*Harvard University*

Nigerian Government and Politics: Prelude to the Revolution *by John P. Mackintosh. Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1966.—651 pp. $12.95.*

Nigeria's current crisis has spoiled the comforting illusion of her friends who saw her as the paragon of constitutionalism and political stability in Africa. Of course no serious student of Nigerian politics could have failed to see that Nigeria was in danger of being destroyed by tribalism and the short-sightedness of her leaders. Rather than minimizing tribal differences, Nigerian leaders emphasized and exploited them ruthlessly. All the major political parties of Nigeria are essentially tribal parties and political competition has become a life-and-death struggle between the different tribes. For some time, the British administration contributed to the same effect by its clumsy efforts to insulate the relatively quiescent North against the "unwholesome" influence of nationalistic Southern politicians. Yet, the British administration was committed to preserving the unity of the country it had "constructed." As a matter of fact, the evidence suggests that it was more committed to the preservation of Nigeria than Nigerian leaders.

It is all the more surprising that the British administration did not insist on a constitution that would allay the fear of tribal domination by

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maintaining a balance of power between the major tribes, for this was the kind of constitution most likely to preserve the country. For some reason—I am not clear whether it was mental laziness, cynicism, or defeatist apathy—the British settled for a constitution that guaranteed the hegemony of the Hausa-Fulani North. Paradoxically, Southern politicians also supported the independence constitution, but this was mainly because they misunderstood it. Shortly after independence Southern politicians (especially Easterners) became conscious of their subordination and insisted on a greater share of power. The North resolutely held on to its power and the stage was set for a showdown.

To be sure, it would be naïve to assume that any feat of constitutional engineering could have averted the present crisis. Constitutional guarantees are effective only when there is commitment to the norms that legitimize them. To all appearances, Nigerian leaders do not appreciate the necessity for restraint in the exercise of power. Because those who gain control of the machinery of government cannot be expected to be moderate and to respect the rights of their defeated rivals, the stake of political competition is greatly increased—at least psychologically. It becomes imperative to win by all means, for security lies only in winning. Extremism in the exercise of power leads to extremism in the pursuit of power. Thus a vicious spiral is set in motion. The deluge did not come too soon.

The real tragedy of the Nigerian situation is that after two coups and much bloodshed, the old problems have become more intractable than ever. The North is still dominant and there is not a sign that it has learned that advantages should not be pressed too far. The failure of the Ironsi regime may have had the unfortunate effect of reinforcing the feeling that moderation does not pay. What is more, the events of the last year have made ethnic rivalry more bitter. No wonder there are fearful whispers that the worst is yet to come.

It is a tribute to Mr. Mackintosh's understanding of Nigerian politics that even though his book was written before the coups of 1966, no one can read it without feeling that Nigeria was headed for disaster. Mr. Mackintosh has penetrated the intricacies of Nigerian politics. He has succeeded in making Nigeria infinitely more intelligible and in giving us a heightened appreciation of the frustrations and excitement of nation-building.

The book is divided into four parts. Part One traces the evolution of the Nigerian constitution since 1947. Part Two deals with the machinery of Nigerian government. Mr. Mackintosh describes the structure and the working of the federal and regional governments. Mr. I. Nicholson contributes an excellent chapter on the administrative apparatus of the fed-

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eral and regional governments. There is also an illuminating piece on local government contributed by Ronald Wraith. Part Three attempts a portrait of Nigerian politics. The section is introduced by an analysis of voting behavior. Mackintosh is at his best here. He deploys his data with admirable skill; his comments are sparing and poignant. Anyone interested in understanding Nigerian politics will find this chapter an asset of incalculable value. Mr. Mackintosh's introductory chapter is followed by short studies of Nigerian parties: J. B. Dudley writes on the Northern Peoples Congress, K. W. Post on the National Council of Nigerian Citizens, J. M. Dent on the United Middle Belt Congress, and Mackintosh on the Action Group. All the contributors write readably and the standard of scholarship is uniformly high. The section ends with two chapters by Mackintosh on electoral trends and the power struggle of 1964. Part Four, entitled "Nigerian Democracy," consists of Mr. Mackintosh's concluding remarks.

Perhaps the chapter on electoral trends should have been omitted. It merely restates a point that the chapters immediately preceding it have made repeatedly. And I could not help feeling that having already appeared in a Nigerian magazine and in a British journal, this piece has just about yielded all the mileage that can be squeezed out of it.

Must every book on the new states end on the prospects-for-democracy theme? Is the possibility of establishing democratic institutions the ultimate point of reference for the study of the new states? I wonder whether this teleological approach is not inhibiting a fuller understanding of the new states by overemphasizing certain kinds of data and certain ways of formulating research problems.

There are a few minor editorial errors (see pp. 23, 62, 590). Note 3 on page 383 accuses S. Naumann [*sic*] of writing an essay entitled "Towards a Comparative Study of Parties in Nigeria." Unquestionably the verdict is Not Guilty! Incidentally, the NCNC is no longer National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons but the National Council of Nigerian Citizens. These minor points must not obscure the fact that this is an outstanding book. It is easily the best general work on Nigerian government and politics yet.

CLAUDE AKE
*Columbia University*

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The Delinquent Solution *by David M. Downes. New York, The Free Press, and London, Collier-Macmillan, 1966. —xi, 284 pp. $6.95.*

The Emergence of Youth Societies *by David Gottlieb, Jon Reeves, and Warren D. TenHouten. New York, The Free Press, 1966. —xii, 416 pp. $7.95.*

Though both these books are scientific treatises that deal with the hypothetical adolescent subculture in an international context, they could hardly be more different. Gottlieb and his co-authors have produced an unintentional parody of mathematical sociology at its most ponderous. This curious document, fortunately, occupies only the first forty-seven pages of their book, leaving nearly four hundred more for a useful and highly comprehensive annotated bibliography of published research on adolescence throughout the world. Downes, in contrast, has written a thoughtful and well integrated analysis of the concept of adolescent subculture and its putative effect on the behavior of those of the young whose disaffection manifests itself in criminal or otherwise socially disruptive behavior. *The Delinquent Solution* provides the clearest available summary of the major research and theoretical formulations dealing with juvenile delinquency through the decade from Albert Cohen's *Delinquent Boys, The Culture of the Gang* (1955) down to, but not including, David Matza's recent *Delinquency and Drift*, whose significance Downes notes respectfully in a brief preface.

This summary of American research on delinquency, which fills the first hundred pages of Downes' book, is followed by an account of the much less extensive and less sophisticated British literature; then by an illuminating presentation of research conducted by the author in the East End of London, making use of participant observation and a considerable body of official statistics. Downes is far less pretentious methodologically than Gottlieb *et al.*, but he is penetratingly aware of the limitations of his data and almost excessively reserved in drawing conclusions from them.

They are sufficient, certainly, to justify his major conclusion: juvenile delinquency in Britain does not follow the subcultural patterns attributed to American delinquency by Cohen, or by Cloward and Ohlin. Groups of delinquent youth in Britain are far more loosely organized and ephemeral than those Cohen observed in this country in the early fifties; while organized crime in Britain has not evolved to the point of making use of organized criminal youth gangs as bush leagues in which to try out and train young talent in the way Cloward and Ohlin describe. Downes is at his best in his discussion of the costs to British society of

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its relative freedom from more vicious forms of juvenile crime. He attributes this to the early "cooling out" of most young working-class Britons, who would otherwise encounter massive frustration and insult in their efforts to better their status, by the persistence in England of a system of status-ascription, implemented by a school system so grim and hostile in the aspect it presents to working-class youth as to offer little seductive promise for the future and, consequently, little threat to the norms that hold working-class society together. The existence of a more open opportunity structure would, he implies, quite probably result in the establishment of American patterns of delinquency if expectations rose more rapidly than British social institutions could meet them.

Downes' book is about as sensible, inclusive, and sophisticated as any work on its chosen subject could be. These virtues encompass a paradox for the perceptive student of contemporary youth in movement. For despite them, in terms of what is happening, Downes is nowhere. The very notion of juvenile delinquency has become an obstacle to understanding such subcultural phenomena as now involve youth, especially in California, on the Sunset Strip and in the Haight Ashbury district of San Francisco. Juvenile delinquency, as a concept, implies that the "straight" adult society is a valid and continuing source of norms as well as of power; the general society, which judges youth delinquent, may be harsh, rigid, stupid, constrictive, and corrupt, but it must nevertheless be accepted as legitimate. The delinquents may see themselves as full of "heart" and as less hypocritical than their elders, but they must concede their own illegitimacy even if they hold it to be unjust. Juvenile delinquency may be destructive, but it is not unconventional.

There are still many youngsters, especially in the working class, in the delinquency bag; but they are no longer the focus of social concern, for they are no longer youth's major challenge to society. Conversely, today's hippies and teenyboppers, though frequently in violation of laws expressly designed to trap them, are not about to volunteer for the role of social problem, or to yield to adjustments in society designed to promote adjustment in them. They are caught in no cycle of rebellion, remorse, and readjustment; they ask of society very little except that it let them be.

Nothing could be harder for a mass, industrial society to do; and the chances are very unfavorable—Lyndon Johnson doesn't do *that* for anybody. But the very terms in which today's youth, who quite often break laws that bug them, have begun to present themselves have made the empirical, objective approach these books share irrelevant. I do not, of course, suggest that the dynamics of unlawful behavior among contemporary youth, or the dynamics of the groups in which they partici-

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pate, are beyond the scope of scientific enquiry. But that enquiry must be something a lot more like the best anthropology, devoted to a realization of what it is to *be* a member of a particular culture or subculture, rather than an assessment of the social correlates of norm-violation. The technics of sociology are too much like picking up the rice from a church where a wedding has been. I don't doubt that this could yield data for an informative monograph; there must be meaningful relations between this parameter, income level, rate of social change, and social origins of the guests. But it doesn't seem to get to the heart of the marriage relationship.

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Types of Economic Theory: From Mercantilism to Institutionalism *by Wesley C. Mitchell,* Vol. I, *edited and with an introduction by Joseph Dorfman. New York, Augustus M. Kelley, 1967. —xi, 608 pp. $12.50.*

The first half of these famous lectures given from 1913 to 1937 and hitherto only available in mimeographed form is now most handsomely printed. Professor Dorfman's introduction tells us that the original mimeograph was prepared by a student, John Meyers, from notes taken down in 1926-27 and added to by him till 1935. Mimeographing was then continued till 1949 by Augustus Kelley, the present publisher—also a student of the course. Professor Dorfman has used the final mimeographed edition and also notes and outlines in his own possession from the collection of Mitchell papers. He has, in particular, drawn from the typescript of the lectures given in the spring term of 1918 when the class was "very lively" and included "a student fresh from the halls of Alfred Marshall's Cambridge." This student was myself. I was lucky indeed to have studied at Columbia as well as Cambridge and, incidentally, also at Freiburg in Breisgau.

Curiously enough American universities in those days reminded me more of the German than the English pattern. Mitchell's lectures, at least in 1918, were of the seminar type, familiar in Germany but then unknown in England; and their history of theory content, too, was familiar in Germany but unknown at Cambridge. In fact I still had to be convinced that nothing but the truth as finally revealed was worth studying. Even Marshall, as he himself said he hoped, might become obsolescent and replaced in the curriculum.

It is one of the excellencies of Mitchell's book that he faces up to this

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view and argues at the very outset for the study of the past economic classics. His argument is convincing, particularly because he takes economic theory in a wide sense and includes with Adam Smith, Malthus, and Ricardo such quasi-political thinkers as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, who had in the latter's words a "social philosophy" appropriate to his times. Herein lies the specific contribution of Mitchell. He relates each of the main theorists to the particular historical conditions and problems of the time, for instance, Adam Smith to mercantilism, or Jeremy Bentham to the still subsisting feudal traditions of England. In our own day Keynes could similarly be related to the urgent problem of the interwar unemployment.

The subtitle of the book is *Mercantilism to Institutionalism* and most of what Mitchell had to say on the study of institutions will no doubt appear in the second volume. In the present volume Mitchell links up his plea against isolating economic theory from the conditions of the time with a plea against its isolation in content and method from other social sciences. It is certainly still in need of integration with sciences such as anthropology and studies of institutions based upon observations that are, if possible, statistically measured.

Unlike these sciences, "economics has not been primarily a vast body of systematic ordered observations upon human behavior. It has been more a set of speculative statements which outrun the observational basis. . . . Almost always the basic assumption on which the whole argument turns in the last resort . . . is left unmentioned" (p. 192).

Though outlines (in small print) and text occasionally repeat one another, I found the book easy, indeed, almost compulsive reading, with a refreshing number of actual quotations from the originals. I look forward eagerly to the second volume which will, incidentally, supply an index to the whole work.

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# Book Notes

Howard H. Peckham's "narrative account" of a state university—*The Making of the University of Michigan, 1817-1967* (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1967; vi, 276 pp., $6.50)—lacks the thoroughgoing analytical penetration that some institutional historians attempt today, but the book ought to be useful beyond the circle of Michigan residents, alumni, students, and parents of students, for whom it was written. It is a compendium, presenting an incredible amount of information, organized chronologically, about the powers, actions, and succession of regents; university finances; the policies, achievements, and frustrations of presidents; the growth of the administrative structure and of the faculty, student body, and academic program; the physical expansion (and ultimate division) of the campus; the shaping of student society around fraternities, the Michigan Union, athletics, publications, political associations, and the like; the proliferation of research; and the public service of university members in peace and war. Although Professor Peckham remarks that another author might well have selected different events and other names, it is difficult to imagine how that author could find much ground not traversed here. Indeed, the book resembles an historical atlas; chapters on presidential administrations correspond to the maps of a nation with an increasing population and ever expanding frontiers. An author cannot justly be condemned because he chooses to write for Tom and not for Dick or Harry; but if the outsider who reads this book is convinced that there is need to multiply the number of universities that are excellent as well as huge, he must hope that Professor Peckham will presently say more in explanation of the forces that have worked like geological pressures to produce the visible surface of the University of Michigan. Not infrequently he does comment on men and issues, and those remarks are at once humane and acute.—Richard J. Storr, *University of Chicago.*


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A detailed analysis of the first national uprising in Persia in modern times—*Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892* (London, Frank Cass, 1966; xx, 163 pp., 35s) by Nikki R. Keddie—is apparently first in a series of publications of a larger project on Persian constitutional history. The second in the series, as the author promises us in her preface, will be a full-length biography of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, the foremost protagonist of the Pan-Islamic movement. Its ostentatious, market-seeking title aside, this little study is a useful introduction to Iran's most significant modern historical event—the Constitutional Movement of 1905-11. The work is an account of the Tobacco Monopoly, a fifty-year concession granted to an English company for the production, sale, and export of tobacco in all of Iran. At the beginning the author makes the statement that "the protest against this concession was the first successful mass movement in modern Iranian history, and led to a defeat of the government and triumph of the protesters in their demand for a total cancellation of the concession" (p. 1). The next 130 pages of the book is a successful effort to give a detailed explanation of this statement. The author's documentation is excellent. The book's elaborate bibliography, preceding the text, and its subsequent use in the footnotes shows that the author has thoroughly exhausted the subject's sources in the Western languages and in Russian and Persian. The study of Persian constitutional history has been badly neglected by scholars of Iranian studies. No comprehensive history has been published on the subject in English since Edward G. Browne wrote his rather personal narrative of the event in 1910. The present introductory monograph is therefore timely and no doubt will be welcomed by students of Persian history. It is with eagerness that we shall await Dr. Keddie's next work on this important subject which has dominated the mind and behavior of the people of Iran since the great events of 1905.—HAFEZ FARMAN-FARMAIAN, *Columbia University*.

The disillusionment of an idealistic Socialist is demonstrated in *Beyond Marxism: The Faith and Works of Hendrik de Man* (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1966; vi, 280 pp., 29.70 guilders) by Peter Dodge. The story is, in many ways, a familiar one, a tale of the compassionate individual who turns to Marxism out of his own desperate need to eliminate injustices from the world, but who comes to despair of any beneficial results from the materialistic determinism of organized socialism-communism. It seems clear that de Man adopted Marxism, not from any sincere belief in its principles, but from the stimulus of his own conscience; it is then clear why his devotion to Marxism could not stand up to the test of

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principles compromised by political reality. Yet de Man differs from the numerous idealists in the Socialist camp on at least two grounds. He was indeed more of an internationalist by the actual experience of living in many lands, by his practical knowledge of many languages, perhaps even by his birth and childhood in cosmopolitan Belgium. He also seems to have been at least semi-Fascist before 1940 when he rejoiced in the German defeat of "decadent" Belgian parliamentarianism. Though stressing de Man's belief in "authoritarian democracy," his preference for elitist rule, his sympathy for but dislike of the working class, his desire for the mystical unity of a one-party state under a strong leader, and his not-so-impartial neutralism during World War II, the author stops short of seeing, or of saying, that beyond Marxism Hendrik de Man found fascism. —Louise Dalby, *Skidmore College.*

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